Bankruptcy Court

Southern District Stern Review: Rakoff Rules that Fraudulent Transfer Actions Belong in Bankruptcy Court, But Only for Reports and Recommendations

Southern Tip of Manhattan, New York by Ken LundNext, the court turned to the “heart” of Stern – i.e., the public vs. private rights distinction.  Relying on Marathon, Granfinanciera, and Stern, the court held that fraudulent conveyance actions were “private rights” claims, in that they are “quintessentially suits at common law that more nearly resemble state law contract claims … than they do creditors’ hierarchically ordered claims to a pro rata share of the bankruptcy res.” (quoting Stern and Granfinanciera).  Moreover, the court held that the Refco Trustee’s fraudulent conveyance claims would have no effect on the bankruptcy case and would simply increase payouts to creditors under the confirmed plan of reorganization.  Still further, the court recognized that, even if consent could confer authority on the bankruptcy court (which it did not decide), the defendants in this action had not filed proofs of claim or otherwise consented to the court’s authority to enter a final judgment.
Source: weil.com

Video: Bankruptcy Attorney, Senior Partner

Southern District of Florida Bankruptcy Information

The Southern District of Florida, like many other federal districts, is divided by division in order to better serve local communities. In the bankruptcy context, the division you live in determines the location of your 341 meeting of creditors as well as the bankruptcy court that will hear any motions or litigation that results from the filing of your case. For example, if you were to file for chapter 7 bankruptcy and you live in Dade County, your 341 meeting would be held at the Bankruptcy Courthouse in Miami. If you live in Broward County, your 341 meeting would be held at the Courthouse in Fort Lauderdale. The goal is to make the Courts more accessible to South Floridians. If the only bankruptcy court in the Southern District of Florida were located in Miami, it would impose a traffic jammed commute down I-95 on Fort Lauderdale and West Palm Beach residents.  Clearly, it is more convenient for South Florida residents to have the courts divided by division so that residents of Fort Lauderdale and West Palm Beach can attend their meeting of creditors locally and are not forced to fight traffic commuting to Miami.
Source: nationalbankruptcyforum.com

LightSquared Files for Bankruptcy

The filing in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York comes nearly a year-and-a-half after the FCC granted the company a waiver to begin building the network in the L-band frequency, setting off a storm of protest from the aviation industry and other users of GPS concerned about the threat of interference with navigation receivers operating in the same band. The FCC withdrew the waiver in February after the National Telecommunications and Information Administration had concluded that there was no practical way to mitigate potential interference with GPS.
Source: ainonline.com

ResCap Goes Broke Leaving Families In Limbo

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Source: mfi-miami.com

Wireless startup LightSquared files for bankruptcy

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‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G3FV6TGC09YRHW9LP&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Drivers – Company Drivers and Owner Operators’, ‘Confidential’, ‘Drivers Company Drivers & Owners Operators…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G3ZF5X20QN4QNPZ8J&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘OTR DRIVERS’, ‘ANOTHER GREAT COMPANY’, ‘OTR Drivers United States 804-798′, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G4H46GZY6RQT21X85&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(’2nd Shift SMT Technician’, ‘MJS Designs, Inc.’, ’2ND shift SMT Technician Responsible for…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G4N95WZTQTXZL6632&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Electrical Journeyman’, ‘Confidential’, ‘Electrical journeyman needed with 5 years…’, 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Scottsdale’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3H10V761DMZSPF4RRG&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘FINANCE DIRECTOR / MANAGER’, ‘EDDY COUNTY’, ‘FINANCE DIRECTOR/MANAGER Starting $74,995…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3H1V36JB6VXMN6DHCY&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘FRONT DESK & HOUSEKEEPING’, ‘HOLIDAY INN EXPRESS DOWNTOWN’, ‘Front Desk & Housekeeping Phoenix, AZ’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3H3J55Z9TT72LM807J&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘HEAVY DUTY WRECKER DRIVER’, ‘ANOTHER GREAT COMPANY’, ‘Heavy Duty Wrecker Driver Williams, AZ’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3H4C272S5SDN3P86FV&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘CNC MACHINIST’, ‘JPS MANUFACTURING’, ‘CNC Machinist Scottsdale Airpark Email 3…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3H5NK75W2NDS75WR70&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘APPOINTMENT SETTING’, ‘ANOTHER GREAT COMPANY’, ‘Appointment Setting 19th Ave & Glendale…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3H6YH6P7183W3S0GL7&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘RV Service Technicians’, ‘A & M RV CENTER’, ‘Busy Anchorage, AK RV dealership needs two…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3H8BJ6NMN78X7LK0KP&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Landscape Positions’, ‘Valley Rain Construction Corp’, ‘Landscape Landscape/Irri’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3J0CN69QDL11P7DR99&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘School Secretary; Landscaper’, ‘Wilson School District #7′, ‘Education Phoenix, AZ Fax 602-275-7517 Wilson…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3J2JW6NW0KSJ3NHQXX&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘DELIVERY – PARTS RUNNER’, ‘LAYNE CHRISTENSEN’, ‘Delivery – Parts Runner Chandler, AZ’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3J3CV6085G6WFKWPQW&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(’1st Shift QA Inspector’, ‘MJS Designs, Inc.’, ’1ST SHIFT QA INSPECTOR. QA Inspector for…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3J3W871T17BRLHGK8N&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Asst School Principal’, ‘Wilson Elementary School District’, ‘Asst. School Principal Wilson Elem SD is…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3J6Z66GDV2SW4YGWMR&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Assistant to the President’, ‘Northland Pioneer College’, ‘Assistant to the President Northland Pioneer…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3J7MB6C1DV814YQT6B&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) ); //
Source: azcentral.com

Bankruptcy Appeals in Orlando

The Circuit Courts connected with Appeals have legal system over appeals through final judgments, orders and also decrees of region courts inside their areas. The Region Court has legal system over appeals from final decision taking, requests, as well as interlocutory orders regarding bankruptcy judges within their region. The Judicial Council of the Circuit has authority to establish a personal bankruptcy Appellate -panel (BAP) for each district within its signal. A BAP is really a 3-judge -panel consisting of bankruptcy judges from every district inside the circuit. Even though Congress established that BAPs should be established in each signal, some circuits have not accomplished so because they have inadequate judicial resources to ascertain a BAP, or feel that a BAP would lead to increased hold off or costs to the parties. Even inside circuits which have proven BAPs, BAP is attractive are only accessible in those districts where the section court judges have approved the particular BAP procedure. For example , in the Sixth Circuit, BAPs can be found only within the Southern and also Northern Districts involving Ohio and not in Kentucky, The state of michigan or Tn. District Tennis courts have the specialist to review the BAP’s decision and are not guaranteed to stick to BAP’s judgment. Currently, there is a BAP within the Initial, 6th, 8th, Ninth as well as Tenth Brake lines. BAP idol judges are appointed by the Judicial Authorities for seven-year conditions. Terms are renewable for an additional three years. BAP judges may not listen to a matter using their own district. Appeals from interlocutory requests will be read by the BAP (if available) except if a party objects or perhaps the appellant elects otherwise at the time a notice of appeal is registered. In case a party items to an charm being heard by the BAP, an objection must be filed inside 30 days following service of the notice associated with appeal. In the event that an objection is actually filed, the actual appeal is going to be heard by the Orlando bankruptcy attorney. The particular Court of Appeals has jurisdiction more than appeals from ultimate judgments, purchases or decrees through District Court or the Personal bankruptcy Appellate Screen. In amazing circumstances, the actual Court of Is attractive may hear is attractive of particular interlocutory orders when the order requires a controlling issue of law or if doing so will facilitate the proceeding. If the Circuit Courtroom of Appeals or Bankruptcy Appellate -panel feels that an appeal is actually frivolous, it might award problems and costs to the appellee (Rule 8020).
Source: pac10fanatic.com

Lightsquared files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy

Stricken open-access Long Term Evolution (LTE) start-up LightSquared has announced that it has commenced voluntarily reorganisation cases under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code to give it time to resolve regulatory issues that have prevented it from building its coast-to-coast integrated satellite 4G wireless network. The company will also file a recognition proceeding in Canada, which relates to cross-border insolvency cases. The company fully expects to continue normal operations throughout this process. The firm says that it intends to work with all key constituents to conduct an orderly restructuring process with a view to maximising its asset value and exiting Chapter 11 in the quickest and most efficient manner possible. The filing was made in the US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York and the recognition proceeding will be filed in the Superior Court of Justice in Toronto, Ontario.
Source: telegeography.com

Bankruptcy Court California Southern District

Filed 10/2/09 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR ANDREW BUESA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. B212854 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC378215) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Elihu M. Berle, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of David W. Allor and David W. Allor for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Rockard J. Delgadillo and Carmen Trutanich, City Attorneys, and Paul L. Winnemore, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Respondent. _________________________ 2 This is an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in an action against the City of Los Angeles (City)1 brought by two former Los Angeles police officers, Andrew Buesa and Michael Cardenas. Plaintiffs seek damages for a violation of their rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq. (POBRA)).2 The gravamen of their complaint is that a perjured declaration submitted by the City deprived them of their statute of limitations defense in an administrative mandamus proceeding over their discharges. The issue is whether they may maintain this as a separate action, or whether under the doctrine of collateral estoppel it is barred by the final judgment denying their petition for administrative mandamus. We conclude that plaintiffs‟ action under POBRA is barred because it constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the mandate judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Since this matter is on appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, we take our factual summary from the allegations of the second amended complaint, which is the charging pleading. On February 2, 2002, plaintiffs participated in the arrest of a suspect following a car and foot chase. The same day, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) learned of alleged acts of misconduct by plaintiffs arising from that arrest. The next day, Sergeant Joe Losorelli, of the LAPD Internal Affairs Group, was assigned to investigate the alleged misconduct. On August 15, 2002, Losorelli met with a deputy district attorney in the Los Angeles County District Attorney‟s Office for the purpose of seeking a determination whether criminal charges should be filed against plaintiffs based on the February 2002 incident. Losorelli met with the deputy district attorney again on October 2, 2002, at which time he provided a copy of his investigation and witness statements. 1 Police Chief William J. Bratton was a named defendant in the original complaint, but he was deleted in the second amended complaint, the charging pleading. He is not a party to this appeal. 2 Statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated. 3 According to plaintiffs, the district attorney‟s office opened its criminal investigation against plaintiffs that day. POBRA provides a one-year statute of limitations for bringing of police misconduct charges. The time runs from discovery of the misconduct. (§ 3304, subd. (d).) Section 3304, subdivision (d)(1) tolls the limitations period while a criminal investigation or prosecution is pending. On December 2, 2002, Losorelli asked LAPD superiors to toll the statute of limitations against plaintiffs because of the pending criminal investigation. He asked that the period be tolled from his August 15, 2002 meeting with the district attorney‟s office until the conclusion of the criminal investigation. The criminal investigation was terminated on February 11, 2003, when the deputy district attorney in charge of the case elected not to seek a grand jury indictment. Personnel complaints against plaintiffs were filed at the Los Angeles Police Commission on August 3, 2003, alleging misconduct arising from the February 2002 arrest. They were served the next day. On August 3, 2004, a board of rights found plaintiffs guilty of misconduct and recommended that they be discharged. On September 29, 2004, the chief of police adopted the recommendation that plaintiffs be terminated for failure to report the use of force against a suspect. The chief signed orders removing them from employment, effective that day. Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) on December 14, 2004 seeking review of their terminations. They alleged that Losorelli furnished a false declaration regarding tolling, which was used by defendant in responding to the petition. Allegedly, Losorelli knew that pursuant to a policy of LAPD and the district attorney‟s office, only the latter was authorized to open a criminal investigation against sworn personnel. According to the complaint, the district attorney‟s office opened the criminal investigation against plaintiffs on October 2, 2002. Plaintiffs allege: “Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that his investigation against plaintiffs was considered a criminal investigation from the beginning (as of February 2, 2002). Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that he first presented the case against plaintiffs to [the deputy district 4 attorney] for possible criminal filing at a July 31, 2002 meeting, when this meeting actually took place on August 15, 2002.” Allegedly, with knowledge that the August 3, 2003 personnel complaints against plaintiffs were time-barred, Losorelli presented a false declaration in the mandamus action “with the intent of fraudulently extending the tolling period for criminal investigations” authorized by section 3304, subdivision (d) “and with the malicious intent to deprive plaintiffs of their rights,” and further employment with the LAPD. According to plaintiffs, they discovered Losorelli‟s wrongful conduct on July 25, 2007, after the administrative mandamus proceeding was concluded. They do not explain the circumstances of that discovery. Plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate was denied by the trial court. The court found the weight of evidence at the administrative hearing supported the decision to terminate plaintiffs. It identified the application of the POBRA statute of limitations as “the main legal issue in the case.” The court noted that both sides had submitted documentary evidence and declarations on the limitations issue, and that no objection to this evidence was made by either side. The trial court found: “The disciplinary action against the petitioners is not barred by the limitations provision of the POBR” because of the tolling provision in section 3304, subdivision (d)(1). The court stated that charges were served on plaintiffs 18 months and two days after the alleged misconduct. It found: “The alleged misconduct was the subject of a criminal investigation that commenced on or before July 31, 2002, when an LAPD investigator met with the District Attorney regarding the matter, and which did not end until February 11, 2003, when the District Attorney decided not to ask the grand jury for an indictment because of the lack of evidence. The one-year limitation period was therefore tolled for six months and eleven days. The investigation was therefore completed and notice of charges were served upon the petitioner[s] within the 5 twelve month period required by section 3304(d).” No appeal was filed from the denial of the petition for administrative mandate and that order is now final.3 Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this separate action seeking reinstatement on September 27, 2007. They filed a first amended complaint which was the subject of a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion was granted with leave to amend. Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint dropped the claim for reinstatement, and, instead sought damages against the City for violation of POBRA. City responded with a new motion for judgment on the pleadings. At the first hearing on the motion, the trial court requested additional briefing on whether perjury in a prior proceeding may be the basis for a collateral attack on the judgment. After supplemental briefing on that issue, a second hearing was held. The court found: “The gravamen of this lawsuit is an action under Government Code section 3309.5, but it‟s based upon plaintiffs‟ claim for perjury in the underlying action in the mandamus proceeding.” The court observed that the weight of California authority is that perjury is not a basis for collateral attack on a judgment. It found “that since the gravamen of the complaint in this case is perjury in a prior proceeding and further based upon the principles of law that perjury in a prior proceeding, which is intrinsic fraud, is not grounds for collateral attack, the court is going to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Judgment was entered in favor of City. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION “The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a general demurrer: We treat the pleadings as admitting all of the material facts properly pleaded, but not any contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law contained therein. We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. We review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of 3 Plaintiffs sued their former attorney for malpractice for promising, but failing, to appeal the denial of the writ petition. We are not informed of the outcome of that action. 6 action under any theory. [Citation.]” (Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298.) The issue presented is whether the action for damages under POBRA is barred by the final judgment following denial of plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Plaintiffs argue they are not collaterally attacking the mandate judgment, which is final, and therefore the doctrines of finality of judgments and collateral estoppel do not apply. Their theory is that their procedural rights under POBRA were thwarted by the alleged perjury by Sergeant Losorelli. Rather than seeking reinstatement to the LAPD, plaintiffs now seek damages for emotional distress, lost earnings and benefits (including pensions), both past and future. They also seek a civil penalty of $25,000 under section 3309.5, and costs of suit. Finally, plaintiffs seek “an order of injunctive or extraordinary relief that the court deems necessary and just to prevent such future similar actions on the part of defendants against other employees.” A. POBRA POBRA “sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace officers (see § 3301) by the public entities which employ them. (§§ 3300 et seq.) „It is a catalogue of the minimum rights (§ 3310) the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable employer-employee relations (§ 3301).‟ (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 135.)” (Gales v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1600, fns. omitted (Gales).) Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint alleges an action under section 3309.5, which provides a private right of action for police officers who claim a violation of their rights under POBRA.4 4 In pertinent part, section 3309.5 provides: “(a) It shall be unlawful for any public safety department to deny or refuse to any public safety officer the rights and protections guaranteed to him or her by this chapter. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) The superior court shall have initial jurisdiction over any proceeding brought by any public safety officer against any public safety department for alleged violations of this chapter. [¶] (d)(1) In any case where the superior court finds that a public safety department has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall render appropriate injunctive or other 7 B. Availability of POBRA Cause Of Action City argues that plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action under POBRA because the alleged perjury was committed in the administrative mandamus proceedings after plaintiffs had been discharged from the LAPD. At that point, City argues, plaintiffs were no longer peace officers as defined by section 3301. Plaintiffs respond that the purpose of POBRA would be defeated if their rights are guaranteed only up to the point of discharge. We need not resolve whether a cause of action lies under POBRA based on a false declaration filed in an administrative mandamus proceeding because the time to challenge the declaration is in the Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 proceeding. A subsequent collateral attack on that basis is not allowed, as we next discuss. C. Finality of Adjudications The California Supreme Court examined the principles underlying the finality of judgments in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 (Cedars-Sinai), in which it held that there is no separate tort for intentional spoliation of evidence. The court reviewed several cases that denied a tort remedy for the presentation of false evidence or suppression of evidence and observed these decisions “rest on a concern for the finality of adjudication.” (Id. at p. 10.) “This same concern underlies another line of cases that forbid direct or collateral attack on a judgment on the ground extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety department from taking any punitive action against the public safety officer. [¶] . . . [¶] (e) In addition to the extraordinary relief afforded by this chapter, upon a finding by the superior court that a public safety department, its employees, agents, or assigns, with respect to acts taken within the scope of employment, maliciously violated any provision of this chapter with the intent to injure the public safety officer, the public safety department shall, for each and every violation, be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) to be awarded to the public safety officer whose right or protection was denied . . . . If the court so finds, and there is sufficient evidence to establish actual damages suffered by the officer whose right or protection was denied, the public safety department shall also be liable for the amount of the actual damages.” 8 that evidence was falsified, concealed, or suppressed. After the time for seeking a new trial has expired and any appeals have been exhausted, a final judgment may not be directly attacked and set aside on the ground that evidence has been suppressed, concealed, or falsified; . . . such fraud is „intrinsic‟ rather than „extrinsic.‟ [Citations.] Similarly, under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, a judgment may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that evidence was falsified or destroyed. [Citations.]” (Ibid., italics added.) The claim that the judgment was based on forged documents or perjured testimony does not obviate the force of this policy favoring finality of judgments. As explained in Pico v. Cohn (1891) 91 Cal. 129, upon which the Supreme Court relied, “„[W]e think it is settled beyond controversy that a decree will not be vacated merely because it was obtained by forged documents or perjured testimony. The reason of this rule is, that there must be an end of litigation; and when parties have once submitted a matter . . . for investigation and determination, and when they have exhausted every means for reviewing such determination in the same proceeding, it must be regarded as final and conclusive . . . . [¶] . . . [W]hen [the aggrieved party] has a trial, he must be prepared to meet and expose perjury then and there. . . . The trial is his opportunity for making the truth appear. If, unfortunately, he fails, being overborne by perjured testimony, and if he likewise fails to show the injustice that has been done him on motion for a new trial, and the judgment is affirmed on appeal, he is without remedy. The wrong, in such case, is of course a most grievous one, and no doubt the legislature and the courts would be glad to redress it if a rule could be devised that would remedy the evil without producing mischiefs far worse than the evil to be remedied. Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice . . . .‟” (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11, italics added, quoting Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134; accord, United States v. Throckmorton (1878) 98 U.S. 61, 68-69.) 9 D. Intrinsic Fraud Courts traditionally have distinguished between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, a distinction which “is of critical importance because intrinsic fraud cannot be used to overthrow a judgment, even where the party was unaware of the fraud at the time and did not have a chance to raise it at trial.” (Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810, 828.) As we have discussed, the introduction of perjured testimony is a classic example of intrinsic fraud. (See also Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 634, cited with approval in Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 828.) Plaintiffs argue these principles do not apply because their second amended complaint does not seek to invalidate the denial of the mandate petition and does not seek their reinstatement. They characterize the two actions: “The prior action litigated whether [plaintiffs] were entitled to equitable relief because inter alia the City of Los Angeles brought charges against them beyond the one year statute of limitations. The present action seeks statutory penalties and damages for a different and distinct violation of Government Code § 3309.5 by an employee of the City of Los Angeles.” They rely on Corral v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 1004 (Corral). Corral arose out of an uninsured motorist arbitration between an insured and her insurer. The insurer refused to stipulate that the third party involved in the accident with the insured was uninsured. The arbitration was continued to allow the insured to obtain evidence that the third party was uninsured or to obtain a stipulation to that effect. When neither was obtained, counsel for the insured submitted on the evidence produced at the hearing. The arbitrator found for the insurer. Six weeks later the insured sought to reopen the arbitration based on a new declaration from the third party stating that he was uninsured. The request was denied on the ground the arbitrator lacked authority to grant the relief requested. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1007-1008.) The insured‟s motion in the superior court to vacate the arbitration award was denied as untimely, a ruling that was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. (Id. at p. 1008.) 10 The insured then filed a separate action against the insurer for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In it, she alleged that at all times the insurer knew that the third party was uninsured, and fraudulently contended at the arbitration hearing that he was insured. In opposition to the defense motion for summary judgment, counsel for the insured submitted his declaration in which he stated that a claims manager for the insured had told him before the arbitration that the insurer would treat the claim as an uninsured motorist case. The attorney declared that, in reliance on these assurances, he made no effort to obtain evidence of the third party‟s lack of insurance coverage. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1008-1009.) The Corral court rejected the insurer‟s argument that the bad faith action was barred by either res judicata or the policies underlying finality of judgments. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 1009.) Instead, it held that each proceeding was based on a different claim of right: the arbitration proceeding was brought to recover benefits under the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance contract; the bad faith cause of action was not based on facts surrounding the automobile collision or the terms of the insurance policy, but on bad faith (refusal to acknowledge that the third party motorist was uninsured) committed after the collision. The court concluded that the bad faith claim constituted a different cause of action, and so was not barred by collateral estoppel. (Id. at pp. 1011-1012.) It held that the bad faith action was “not a collateral attack upon the arbitrator‟s award as it is not directed toward directly preventing the enforcement of that award or defeating rights acquired under it.” (Id. at p. 1013.) The court in Corral acknowledged a then recent case that reached a different result, but disagreed with its holding. The case was Rios v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 811, which held that the doctrine of finality of judgments barred a separate action for bad faith alleging that in an arbitration between insurer and insured, the insurer had presented false evidence and testimony. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1012-1014.) But Rios (and several other decisions) were cited with approval by our Supreme Court in Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 10. Of course, the Corral court did not 11 have the benefit of the Supreme Court‟s reasoning in Cedars-Sinai, which was decided some 19 years later. Plaintiffs do not cite or discuss Rios, but argue that Corral should apply because in that case, as in this one, the facts giving rise to the second action occurred during the first proceeding. They contend: “As demonstrated in Corral, it is the extraordinary obligations of the defendant that allows the second action to proceed. In that case, it was the insurance company‟s obligation of good faith and fair dealing. . . . Similarly, in the present case the City of Los Angeles cannot get away with its conduct at the hearing on the writ where it presented the perjurous [sic] declaration because it had an independent obligation not to violate [plaintiffs‟] rights under Government Code, § 3309.5.” Here, to prevail in their action for damages, plaintiffs had to prove a violation of POBRA based upon defendant‟s reliance on a perjured declaration to show that the tolling of the time to file disciplinary actions lasted long enough to render their discharges timely. This goes to the heart of the trial court‟s finding in the mandate proceeding. To the extent that Corral stands for the proposition that the finality of judgments doctrine does not apply to a separate bad faith action arising from the presentation of false or perjured testimony in an earlier proceeding, we disagree, and instead follow Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th 1 and Rios, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 818-819. Plaintiffs also rely on Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1331 (Miller). In that case, the executor of an estate hired a law firm to represent her in connection with her duties. At the conclusion of the probate matter, the firm requested and was awarded its fees except for one category which the probate court found to involve work for the executor in her individual capacity. The firm did not appeal that decision. Instead, it filed a new action seeking quantum meruit recovery of the denied fees directly from the client. The trial court held the action was barred by the final judgment in the probate case. The Court of Appeal reversed. Significantly, it found that the probate court did not decide that the law firm was not entitled to the additional fees, but only that the fees were not payable out of the estate. 12 (Id. at p. 1341.) As the Miller court explained, the probate court never ruled on the firm‟s entitlement to fees directly from its client, and therefore there was no basis for collateral estoppel. (Id. at p. 1343.) The case before us is quite different. The court ruled on the tolling issue in the mandate proceeding. Indeed it was the central question in the case. “„Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an issue only if (1) the issue is identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior proceeding or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)‟ (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.)” (Plumley v. Mockett (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1048-1049.) That describes the present case. Because the tolling issue was actually litigated in the mandate proceeding, a new claim based on the allegedly perjured declaration is a collateral attack on the mandate decision. Perjured testimony cannot be the basis for a separate proceeding. (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11.) In light of our conclusion, we need not and do not address City‟s other arguments. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. City is to have its costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. EPSTEIN, P. J. We concur: WILLHITE, J. MANELLA, J. Source: barstowwatch.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: attorneysearchco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com
Source: probatecourtco.com

Borders files for bankruptcy, to close 200 stores

All 200 closings will be superstores, and about 6,000 jobs will be affected, the company said. It has the option of closing up to 275 in all, according to court documents. It said the stores it wants to close lose a combined $2 million a week. The closings will start by Saturday. The company said it will honor gift cards.
Source: normbondmarkets.com

Pacer bankruptcy southern district florida // 810

  Texas, Gonzalez de la Garza Genealogy Collection   Vermont, Vital Records, 1760-1954   Washington State County Land Records, 1852-1935   Washington State County Probate Case Files, 1832-1950   Washington State County Records, 1885-1950   Wisconsin, Fond du Lac Public Library Records, 1848-1980 New images have been added to the following databases unless otherwise noted: Australia, Queensland Cemetery Records, 1802-1990 Australia, Tasmania, Miscellaneous Records, 1829-1961 Austria, Seigniorial Records, 1537-1888 Bolivia, Catholic Church Records, 1566-1996 Brazil Civil Registration, 1870-2009 Canada, Ontario Births, 1869-1912  (Index records) Canada, Quebec Notarial Records, 1800-1900 Canada, Saskatchewan, Judicial District Court Records, 1891-1954 Canada, Saskatchewan, Probate Estate Files, 1887-1931 Canada, Quebec Notarial Records, 1800-1900 Chile, Santiago, Cementerio General, 1821-2010                       China, Collection of Genealogies, 1500-1900 Colombia, Catholic Church Records, 1600-2008                     Costa Rica, Civil Registration, 1860-1975 Czech Republic, Censuses, 1843-1921 Czech Republic, Church Books, 1552-1935 Czech Republic, Land Records, 1450-1850 Czech Republic, Třeboň, Nobility Seignorial records, 1664-1698 Dominican Republic Civil Registration, 1801-2006 El Salvador, Civil Registration Records, 1836-1910 England and Wales Census, 1871 England, Norfolk Parish Registers, 1538-1900  (Index records and images) Estonia, Church Books 1835-194 Germany Marriages, 1558-1929  (Index records) Germany, Bavaria, Dinkelsbühl Miscellaneous City Records, 1804-1946 Germany, Württemberg, Albstadt, Miscellaneous City Records, 1705-1850 Guatemala, Catholic Church Records, 1581-1977 Hungary Catholic Church Records, 1636-1895  (Index records)                       Hungary Reformed Church Christenings, 1624-1895  (Index records) Hungary, Civil Registration, 1895-1980 Italy, Bologna, Bologna, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1941 Italy, Catania, Caltagirone, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1861-1941 Italy, Catania, Catania, Civil Registration (Comune), 1820-1905 Italy, Cuneo, Civil Registration (State Archive), 1795-1915 Italy, Genova, Chiavari, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1941 Italy, Napoli, Civil Registration (State Archive), 1809-1865 Italy, Pistoia, Pistoia, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1929 Italy, Ravenna, Ravenna, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1929 Italy, Trieste, Trieste, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1924-1939 Jamaica, Civil Birth Registration Korea, Collection of Genealogies, 1500-2009 Mexico, Morelos, Civil Registration, 1861-1920 Micronesia, Pohnpei, Land Records, 1971-2007 Nicaragua, Diocese of Managua, Catholic Church Records, 1740-2008 Norway Census, 1875  (Index records) Peru, Civil Registration, 1874-1996 Philippines, Civil Registration (National), 1945-1980 Poland, Roman Catholic Church Books, 1600-1950 Portugal, Aveiro, Catholic Church Records, 1550-1911 Portugal, Aveiro, Passport Registers, 1882-1965 Portugal, Aveiro, Testaments, 1900-1936 Portugal, Braga, Catholic Church Records, 1530-1911 Portugal, Bragança, Catholic Church Records, 1541-1985 Portugal, Coimbra, Catholic Church Records, 1459-1911 Portugal, Coimbra, Passport Registers and Application Files, 1835-1938 Portugal, Diocese of Lamego, Catholic Church Records, 1532-1911 Portugal, Diocese of Vila Real, Catholic Church Records, 1575-1975 Portugal, Faro, Catholic Church Records, 1587-1880 Portugal, Guarda, Catholic Church Records, 1459-1911 Portugal, Leiria, Catholic Church Records, 1534-1911   Portugal, Leiria, Passport Registers, 1861-1901 Portugal, Porto, Catholic Church Records, 1535-1949 Portugal, Porto, Catholic Church Records, 1582-1908 Portugal, Setúbal, Catholic Church Records, 1555-1911   Portugal, Viana do Castelo, Catholic Church Records, 1537-1909 Portugal, Vila Real, Catholic Church Records, 1533-1941 South Africa, Orange Free State, Estate Files, 1951-2004 South Africa, Reformed Church Records, 1856-1988 Spain, Cádiz, Testaments, 1550-1920 Spain, Consular Records of Emigrants, 1808-1960 Spain, Consular Records of Emigrants, 1808-1960 Spain, Municipal Records Sweden, Älvsborg Church Records, 1642-1897; index 1681-1860 Sweden, Blekinge Church Records, 1612-1916; index 1646-1860 Sweden, Gävleborg Church Records, 1616-1908; index 1671-1860 Sweden, Göteborg och Bohus Church Records, 1577-1932; index 1659-1860 Sweden, Gotland Church Records, 1582-1940; index 1655-1860 Sweden, Halland Church Records, 1615-1904; index 1615-1860 Sweden, Jämtland Church Records, 1582-1928; index 1642-1860 Sweden, Jönköping Church Records, 1581-1935; index 1633-1860 Sweden, Kalmar Church Records, 1577-1907; index 1625-1860 Sweden, Örebro Church Records, 1613-1918; index 1635-1860 Sweden, Skaraborg Church Records, 1612-1921; index 1625-1860 United States:   Alabama State Census, 1855  (Index records)   Alabama State Census, 1866  (Index records)   Alabama, County Estate Records, 1800-1996   Alabama, Sumter County Circuit Court Files, 1840-1950                         California, Marriage Index, 1960-1985  (Index records)                       California, San Francisco Area Funeral Home Records, 1835-1931   California, San Francisco County Records, 1824-1997   California, San Mateo County Records, 1856-1967   Connecticut, Death Index, 1949-2001  (Index records)                         Delaware, Vital Records, 1680-1962   District of Columbia Marriages, 1811-1950 (Index records and images)   Florida Marriages, 1830-1993 (Index and images)                         Florida, Tampa, Passenger Lists, 1898-1945   Georgia Headright and Bounty Land Records, 1783-1909   Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960                         Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960   Idaho, Minidoka County Records, 1913-1961   Illinois, Probate Records, 1819-1970   Indiana, Death Index, 1882-1920   (Index records)   Indiana, Marriages, 1811-1959 (Jay and Hamilton counties)  (Index records)   Kentucky, Confederate Pension Applications, 1912-1950   Kentucky, County Marriages, 1797-1954  (Index records and images)   Louisiana, Orleans Parish Vital Records, 1910, 1960   Louisiana, Parish Marriages, 1837-1957  (Index records and images)   Louisiana, Second Registration Draft Cards, compiled 1948-1959   Maine, State Archive Collections, 1790-1966   Maine, Washington County Courthouse Records, 1785-1950   Maryland, Garrett County Probate Estate and Guardianship Files, Source: blogspot.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: businessbankruptcyco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcyrecordsco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcyattorneysco.com Source: bankruptcyattorneysco.com Source: bankruptcyattorneysco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: foreclosureattorneyco.com
Source: bankruptcycourtco.com

LightSquared files for bankruptcy protection

“The company fully expects to continue normal operations throughout this process,” the firm said in a statement. “All LightSquared distribution partners and customers, including public safety, emergency response, government and military users of LightSquared’s satellite-based communications services can continue to rely on LightSquared to provide them with mission critical communications services.”
Source: telecoms.com

Southern District Stern Review: Rakoff Rules that Fraudulent Transfer Actions Belong in Bankruptcy Court, But Only for Reports and Recommendations

  Texas, Gonzalez de la Garza Genealogy Collection   Vermont, Vital Records, 1760-1954   Washington State County Land Records, 1852-1935   Washington State County Probate Case Files, 1832-1950   Washington State County Records, 1885-1950   Wisconsin, Fond du Lac Public Library Records, 1848-1980 New images have been added to the following databases unless otherwise noted: Australia, Queensland Cemetery Records, 1802-1990 Australia, Tasmania, Miscellaneous Records, 1829-1961 Austria, Seigniorial Records, 1537-1888 Bolivia, Catholic Church Records, 1566-1996 Brazil Civil Registration, 1870-2009 Canada, Ontario Births, 1869-1912  (Index records) Canada, Quebec Notarial Records, 1800-1900 Canada, Saskatchewan, Judicial District Court Records, 1891-1954 Canada, Saskatchewan, Probate Estate Files, 1887-1931 Canada, Quebec Notarial Records, 1800-1900 Chile, Santiago, Cementerio General, 1821-2010                       China, Collection of Genealogies, 1500-1900 Colombia, Catholic Church Records, 1600-2008                     Costa Rica, Civil Registration, 1860-1975 Czech Republic, Censuses, 1843-1921 Czech Republic, Church Books, 1552-1935 Czech Republic, Land Records, 1450-1850 Czech Republic, Třeboň, Nobility Seignorial records, 1664-1698 Dominican Republic Civil Registration, 1801-2006 El Salvador, Civil Registration Records, 1836-1910 England and Wales Census, 1871 England, Norfolk Parish Registers, 1538-1900  (Index records and images) Estonia, Church Books 1835-194 Germany Marriages, 1558-1929  (Index records) Germany, Bavaria, Dinkelsbühl Miscellaneous City Records, 1804-1946 Germany, Württemberg, Albstadt, Miscellaneous City Records, 1705-1850 Guatemala, Catholic Church Records, 1581-1977 Hungary Catholic Church Records, 1636-1895  (Index records)                       Hungary Reformed Church Christenings, 1624-1895  (Index records) Hungary, Civil Registration, 1895-1980 Italy, Bologna, Bologna, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1941 Italy, Catania, Caltagirone, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1861-1941 Italy, Catania, Catania, Civil Registration (Comune), 1820-1905 Italy, Cuneo, Civil Registration (State Archive), 1795-1915 Italy, Genova, Chiavari, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1941 Italy, Napoli, Civil Registration (State Archive), 1809-1865 Italy, Pistoia, Pistoia, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1929 Italy, Ravenna, Ravenna, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1929 Italy, Trieste, Trieste, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1924-1939 Jamaica, Civil Birth Registration Korea, Collection of Genealogies, 1500-2009 Mexico, Morelos, Civil Registration, 1861-1920 Micronesia, Pohnpei, Land Records, 1971-2007 Nicaragua, Diocese of Managua, Catholic Church Records, 1740-2008 Norway Census, 1875  (Index records) Peru, Civil Registration, 1874-1996 Philippines, Civil Registration (National), 1945-1980 Poland, Roman Catholic Church Books, 1600-1950 Portugal, Aveiro, Catholic Church Records, 1550-1911 Portugal, Aveiro, Passport Registers, 1882-1965 Portugal, Aveiro, Testaments, 1900-1936 Portugal, Braga, Catholic Church Records, 1530-1911 Portugal, Bragança, Catholic Church Records, 1541-1985 Portugal, Coimbra, Catholic Church Records, 1459-1911 Portugal, Coimbra, Passport Registers and Application Files, 1835-1938 Portugal, Diocese of Lamego, Catholic Church Records, 1532-1911 Portugal, Diocese of Vila Real, Catholic Church Records, 1575-1975 Portugal, Faro, Catholic Church Records, 1587-1880 Portugal, Guarda, Catholic Church Records, 1459-1911 Portugal, Leiria, Catholic Church Records, 1534-1911   Portugal, Leiria, Passport Registers, 1861-1901 Portugal, Porto, Catholic Church Records, 1535-1949 Portugal, Porto, Catholic Church Records, 1582-1908 Portugal, Setúbal, Catholic Church Records, 1555-1911   Portugal, Viana do Castelo, Catholic Church Records, 1537-1909 Portugal, Vila Real, Catholic Church Records, 1533-1941 South Africa, Orange Free State, Estate Files, 1951-2004 South Africa, Reformed Church Records, 1856-1988 Spain, Cádiz, Testaments, 1550-1920 Spain, Consular Records of Emigrants, 1808-1960 Spain, Consular Records of Emigrants, 1808-1960 Spain, Municipal Records Sweden, Älvsborg Church Records, 1642-1897; index 1681-1860 Sweden, Blekinge Church Records, 1612-1916; index 1646-1860 Sweden, Gävleborg Church Records, 1616-1908; index 1671-1860 Sweden, Göteborg och Bohus Church Records, 1577-1932; index 1659-1860 Sweden, Gotland Church Records, 1582-1940; index 1655-1860 Sweden, Halland Church Records, 1615-1904; index 1615-1860 Sweden, Jämtland Church Records, 1582-1928; index 1642-1860 Sweden, Jönköping Church Records, 1581-1935; index 1633-1860 Sweden, Kalmar Church Records, 1577-1907; index 1625-1860 Sweden, Örebro Church Records, 1613-1918; index 1635-1860 Sweden, Skaraborg Church Records, 1612-1921; index 1625-1860 United States:   Alabama State Census, 1855  (Index records)   Alabama State Census, 1866  (Index records)   Alabama, County Estate Records, 1800-1996   Alabama, Sumter County Circuit Court Files, 1840-1950                         California, Marriage Index, 1960-1985  (Index records)                       California, San Francisco Area Funeral Home Records, 1835-1931   California, San Francisco County Records, 1824-1997   California, San Mateo County Records, 1856-1967   Connecticut, Death Index, 1949-2001  (Index records)                         Delaware, Vital Records, 1680-1962   District of Columbia Marriages, 1811-1950 (Index records and images)   Florida Marriages, 1830-1993 (Index and images)                         Florida, Tampa, Passenger Lists, 1898-1945   Georgia Headright and Bounty Land Records, 1783-1909   Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960                         Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960   Idaho, Minidoka County Records, 1913-1961   Illinois, Probate Records, 1819-1970   Indiana, Death Index, 1882-1920   (Index records)   Indiana, Marriages, 1811-1959 (Jay and Hamilton counties)  (Index records)   Kentucky, Confederate Pension Applications, 1912-1950   Kentucky, County Marriages, 1797-1954  (Index records and images)   Louisiana, Orleans Parish Vital Records, 1910, 1960   Louisiana, Parish Marriages, 1837-1957  (Index records and images)   Louisiana, Second Registration Draft Cards, compiled 1948-1959   Maine, State Archive Collections, 1790-1966   Maine, Washington County Courthouse Records, 1785-1950   Maryland, Garrett County Probate Estate and Guardianship Files, Source: blogspot.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: businessbankruptcyco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcyrecordsco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com
Source: bankruptcyforumco.com

MF Global to get $168 million back from JPMorgan

U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge Martin Glenn rejected arguments from Koutoulas that Freeh should not be allowed to extend a Friday deadline to file financial data about the company. Koutoulas had argued the postponement would allow Freeh, a former FBI director, to rack up unreasonable fees.
Source: chicagobusiness.com

Bankruptcy Questions and Answers

Colloquially, a 501(c) organization, also referred to as a 501(c), is an American tax-exempt nonprofit organization. Section 501(c) of the United States Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. § 501(c)) provides that 28 types of nonprofit organizations are exempt from some federal income taxes
Source: bankruptcy–court.net

Video: Corporate Panel Discussion: Hot Chapter 11 Plan Issues

numerology for Joan Orie Melvin

using the number/letter grid: 1      2      3       4       5       6      7      8      9 A      B     C       D       E       F      G      H      I J      K      L      M      N       O      P      Q      R S      T      U      V      W      X      Y      Z
Source: edpetersonnumerology.com

Medical debt can damage credit scores

Filed 10/2/09 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR ANDREW BUESA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. B212854 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC378215) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Elihu M. Berle, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of David W. Allor and David W. Allor for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Rockard J. Delgadillo and Carmen Trutanich, City Attorneys, and Paul L. Winnemore, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Respondent. _________________________ 2 This is an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in an action against the City of Los Angeles (City)1 brought by two former Los Angeles police officers, Andrew Buesa and Michael Cardenas. Plaintiffs seek damages for a violation of their rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq. (POBRA)).2 The gravamen of their complaint is that a perjured declaration submitted by the City deprived them of their statute of limitations defense in an administrative mandamus proceeding over their discharges. The issue is whether they may maintain this as a separate action, or whether under the doctrine of collateral estoppel it is barred by the final judgment denying their petition for administrative mandamus. We conclude that plaintiffs‟ action under POBRA is barred because it constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the mandate judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Since this matter is on appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, we take our factual summary from the allegations of the second amended complaint, which is the charging pleading. On February 2, 2002, plaintiffs participated in the arrest of a suspect following a car and foot chase. The same day, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) learned of alleged acts of misconduct by plaintiffs arising from that arrest. The next day, Sergeant Joe Losorelli, of the LAPD Internal Affairs Group, was assigned to investigate the alleged misconduct. On August 15, 2002, Losorelli met with a deputy district attorney in the Los Angeles County District Attorney‟s Office for the purpose of seeking a determination whether criminal charges should be filed against plaintiffs based on the February 2002 incident. Losorelli met with the deputy district attorney again on October 2, 2002, at which time he provided a copy of his investigation and witness statements. 1 Police Chief William J. Bratton was a named defendant in the original complaint, but he was deleted in the second amended complaint, the charging pleading. He is not a party to this appeal. 2 Statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated. 3 According to plaintiffs, the district attorney‟s office opened its criminal investigation against plaintiffs that day. POBRA provides a one-year statute of limitations for bringing of police misconduct charges. The time runs from discovery of the misconduct. (§ 3304, subd. (d).) Section 3304, subdivision (d)(1) tolls the limitations period while a criminal investigation or prosecution is pending. On December 2, 2002, Losorelli asked LAPD superiors to toll the statute of limitations against plaintiffs because of the pending criminal investigation. He asked that the period be tolled from his August 15, 2002 meeting with the district attorney‟s office until the conclusion of the criminal investigation. The criminal investigation was terminated on February 11, 2003, when the deputy district attorney in charge of the case elected not to seek a grand jury indictment. Personnel complaints against plaintiffs were filed at the Los Angeles Police Commission on August 3, 2003, alleging misconduct arising from the February 2002 arrest. They were served the next day. On August 3, 2004, a board of rights found plaintiffs guilty of misconduct and recommended that they be discharged. On September 29, 2004, the chief of police adopted the recommendation that plaintiffs be terminated for failure to report the use of force against a suspect. The chief signed orders removing them from employment, effective that day. Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) on December 14, 2004 seeking review of their terminations. They alleged that Losorelli furnished a false declaration regarding tolling, which was used by defendant in responding to the petition. Allegedly, Losorelli knew that pursuant to a policy of LAPD and the district attorney‟s office, only the latter was authorized to open a criminal investigation against sworn personnel. According to the complaint, the district attorney‟s office opened the criminal investigation against plaintiffs on October 2, 2002. Plaintiffs allege: “Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that his investigation against plaintiffs was considered a criminal investigation from the beginning (as of February 2, 2002). Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that he first presented the case against plaintiffs to [the deputy district 4 attorney] for possible criminal filing at a July 31, 2002 meeting, when this meeting actually took place on August 15, 2002.” Allegedly, with knowledge that the August 3, 2003 personnel complaints against plaintiffs were time-barred, Losorelli presented a false declaration in the mandamus action “with the intent of fraudulently extending the tolling period for criminal investigations” authorized by section 3304, subdivision (d) “and with the malicious intent to deprive plaintiffs of their rights,” and further employment with the LAPD. According to plaintiffs, they discovered Losorelli‟s wrongful conduct on July 25, 2007, after the administrative mandamus proceeding was concluded. They do not explain the circumstances of that discovery. Plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate was denied by the trial court. The court found the weight of evidence at the administrative hearing supported the decision to terminate plaintiffs. It identified the application of the POBRA statute of limitations as “the main legal issue in the case.” The court noted that both sides had submitted documentary evidence and declarations on the limitations issue, and that no objection to this evidence was made by either side. The trial court found: “The disciplinary action against the petitioners is not barred by the limitations provision of the POBR” because of the tolling provision in section 3304, subdivision (d)(1). The court stated that charges were served on plaintiffs 18 months and two days after the alleged misconduct. It found: “The alleged misconduct was the subject of a criminal investigation that commenced on or before July 31, 2002, when an LAPD investigator met with the District Attorney regarding the matter, and which did not end until February 11, 2003, when the District Attorney decided not to ask the grand jury for an indictment because of the lack of evidence. The one-year limitation period was therefore tolled for six months and eleven days. The investigation was therefore completed and notice of charges were served upon the petitioner[s] within the 5 twelve month period required by section 3304(d).” No appeal was filed from the denial of the petition for administrative mandate and that order is now final.3 Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this separate action seeking reinstatement on September 27, 2007. They filed a first amended complaint which was the subject of a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion was granted with leave to amend. Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint dropped the claim for reinstatement, and, instead sought damages against the City for violation of POBRA. City responded with a new motion for judgment on the pleadings. At the first hearing on the motion, the trial court requested additional briefing on whether perjury in a prior proceeding may be the basis for a collateral attack on the judgment. After supplemental briefing on that issue, a second hearing was held. The court found: “The gravamen of this lawsuit is an action under Government Code section 3309.5, but it‟s based upon plaintiffs‟ claim for perjury in the underlying action in the mandamus proceeding.” The court observed that the weight of California authority is that perjury is not a basis for collateral attack on a judgment. It found “that since the gravamen of the complaint in this case is perjury in a prior proceeding and further based upon the principles of law that perjury in a prior proceeding, which is intrinsic fraud, is not grounds for collateral attack, the court is going to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Judgment was entered in favor of City. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION “The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a general demurrer: We treat the pleadings as admitting all of the material facts properly pleaded, but not any contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law contained therein. We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. We review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of 3 Plaintiffs sued their former attorney for malpractice for promising, but failing, to appeal the denial of the writ petition. We are not informed of the outcome of that action. 6 action under any theory. [Citation.]” (Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298.) The issue presented is whether the action for damages under POBRA is barred by the final judgment following denial of plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Plaintiffs argue they are not collaterally attacking the mandate judgment, which is final, and therefore the doctrines of finality of judgments and collateral estoppel do not apply. Their theory is that their procedural rights under POBRA were thwarted by the alleged perjury by Sergeant Losorelli. Rather than seeking reinstatement to the LAPD, plaintiffs now seek damages for emotional distress, lost earnings and benefits (including pensions), both past and future. They also seek a civil penalty of $25,000 under section 3309.5, and costs of suit. Finally, plaintiffs seek “an order of injunctive or extraordinary relief that the court deems necessary and just to prevent such future similar actions on the part of defendants against other employees.” A. POBRA POBRA “sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace officers (see § 3301) by the public entities which employ them. (§§ 3300 et seq.) „It is a catalogue of the minimum rights (§ 3310) the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable employer-employee relations (§ 3301).‟ (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 135.)” (Gales v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1600, fns. omitted (Gales).) Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint alleges an action under section 3309.5, which provides a private right of action for police officers who claim a violation of their rights under POBRA.4 4 In pertinent part, section 3309.5 provides: “(a) It shall be unlawful for any public safety department to deny or refuse to any public safety officer the rights and protections guaranteed to him or her by this chapter. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) The superior court shall have initial jurisdiction over any proceeding brought by any public safety officer against any public safety department for alleged violations of this chapter. [¶] (d)(1) In any case where the superior court finds that a public safety department has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall render appropriate injunctive or other 7 B. Availability of POBRA Cause Of Action City argues that plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action under POBRA because the alleged perjury was committed in the administrative mandamus proceedings after plaintiffs had been discharged from the LAPD. At that point, City argues, plaintiffs were no longer peace officers as defined by section 3301. Plaintiffs respond that the purpose of POBRA would be defeated if their rights are guaranteed only up to the point of discharge. We need not resolve whether a cause of action lies under POBRA based on a false declaration filed in an administrative mandamus proceeding because the time to challenge the declaration is in the Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 proceeding. A subsequent collateral attack on that basis is not allowed, as we next discuss. C. Finality of Adjudications The California Supreme Court examined the principles underlying the finality of judgments in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 (Cedars-Sinai), in which it held that there is no separate tort for intentional spoliation of evidence. The court reviewed several cases that denied a tort remedy for the presentation of false evidence or suppression of evidence and observed these decisions “rest on a concern for the finality of adjudication.” (Id. at p. 10.) “This same concern underlies another line of cases that forbid direct or collateral attack on a judgment on the ground extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety department from taking any punitive action against the public safety officer. [¶] . . . [¶] (e) In addition to the extraordinary relief afforded by this chapter, upon a finding by the superior court that a public safety department, its employees, agents, or assigns, with respect to acts taken within the scope of employment, maliciously violated any provision of this chapter with the intent to injure the public safety officer, the public safety department shall, for each and every violation, be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) to be awarded to the public safety officer whose right or protection was denied . . . . If the court so finds, and there is sufficient evidence to establish actual damages suffered by the officer whose right or protection was denied, the public safety department shall also be liable for the amount of the actual damages.” 8 that evidence was falsified, concealed, or suppressed. After the time for seeking a new trial has expired and any appeals have been exhausted, a final judgment may not be directly attacked and set aside on the ground that evidence has been suppressed, concealed, or falsified; . . . such fraud is „intrinsic‟ rather than „extrinsic.‟ [Citations.] Similarly, under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, a judgment may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that evidence was falsified or destroyed. [Citations.]” (Ibid., italics added.) The claim that the judgment was based on forged documents or perjured testimony does not obviate the force of this policy favoring finality of judgments. As explained in Pico v. Cohn (1891) 91 Cal. 129, upon which the Supreme Court relied, “„[W]e think it is settled beyond controversy that a decree will not be vacated merely because it was obtained by forged documents or perjured testimony. The reason of this rule is, that there must be an end of litigation; and when parties have once submitted a matter . . . for investigation and determination, and when they have exhausted every means for reviewing such determination in the same proceeding, it must be regarded as final and conclusive . . . . [¶] . . . [W]hen [the aggrieved party] has a trial, he must be prepared to meet and expose perjury then and there. . . . The trial is his opportunity for making the truth appear. If, unfortunately, he fails, being overborne by perjured testimony, and if he likewise fails to show the injustice that has been done him on motion for a new trial, and the judgment is affirmed on appeal, he is without remedy. The wrong, in such case, is of course a most grievous one, and no doubt the legislature and the courts would be glad to redress it if a rule could be devised that would remedy the evil without producing mischiefs far worse than the evil to be remedied. Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice . . . .‟” (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11, italics added, quoting Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134; accord, United States v. Throckmorton (1878) 98 U.S. 61, 68-69.) 9 D. Intrinsic Fraud Courts traditionally have distinguished between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, a distinction which “is of critical importance because intrinsic fraud cannot be used to overthrow a judgment, even where the party was unaware of the fraud at the time and did not have a chance to raise it at trial.” (Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810, 828.) As we have discussed, the introduction of perjured testimony is a classic example of intrinsic fraud. (See also Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 634, cited with approval in Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 828.) Plaintiffs argue these principles do not apply because their second amended complaint does not seek to invalidate the denial of the mandate petition and does not seek their reinstatement. They characterize the two actions: “The prior action litigated whether [plaintiffs] were entitled to equitable relief because inter alia the City of Los Angeles brought charges against them beyond the one year statute of limitations. The present action seeks statutory penalties and damages for a different and distinct violation of Government Code § 3309.5 by an employee of the City of Los Angeles.” They rely on Corral v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 1004 (Corral). Corral arose out of an uninsured motorist arbitration between an insured and her insurer. The insurer refused to stipulate that the third party involved in the accident with the insured was uninsured. The arbitration was continued to allow the insured to obtain evidence that the third party was uninsured or to obtain a stipulation to that effect. When neither was obtained, counsel for the insured submitted on the evidence produced at the hearing. The arbitrator found for the insurer. Six weeks later the insured sought to reopen the arbitration based on a new declaration from the third party stating that he was uninsured. The request was denied on the ground the arbitrator lacked authority to grant the relief requested. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1007-1008.) The insured‟s motion in the superior court to vacate the arbitration award was denied as untimely, a ruling that was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. (Id. at p. 1008.) 10 The insured then filed a separate action against the insurer for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In it, she alleged that at all times the insurer knew that the third party was uninsured, and fraudulently contended at the arbitration hearing that he was insured. In opposition to the defense motion for summary judgment, counsel for the insured submitted his declaration in which he stated that a claims manager for the insured had told him before the arbitration that the insurer would treat the claim as an uninsured motorist case. The attorney declared that, in reliance on these assurances, he made no effort to obtain evidence of the third party‟s lack of insurance coverage. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1008-1009.) The Corral court rejected the insurer‟s argument that the bad faith action was barred by either res judicata or the policies underlying finality of judgments. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 1009.) Instead, it held that each proceeding was based on a different claim of right: the arbitration proceeding was brought to recover benefits under the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance contract; the bad faith cause of action was not based on facts surrounding the automobile collision or the terms of the insurance policy, but on bad faith (refusal to acknowledge that the third party motorist was uninsured) committed after the collision. The court concluded that the bad faith claim constituted a different cause of action, and so was not barred by collateral estoppel. (Id. at pp. 1011-1012.) It held that the bad faith action was “not a collateral attack upon the arbitrator‟s award as it is not directed toward directly preventing the enforcement of that award or defeating rights acquired under it.” (Id. at p. 1013.) The court in Corral acknowledged a then recent case that reached a different result, but disagreed with its holding. The case was Rios v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 811, which held that the doctrine of finality of judgments barred a separate action for bad faith alleging that in an arbitration between insurer and insured, the insurer had presented false evidence and testimony. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1012-1014.) But Rios (and several other decisions) were cited with approval by our Supreme Court in Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 10. Of course, the Corral court did not 11 have the benefit of the Supreme Court‟s reasoning in Cedars-Sinai, which was decided some 19 years later. Plaintiffs do not cite or discuss Rios, but argue that Corral should apply because in that case, as in this one, the facts giving rise to the second action occurred during the first proceeding. They contend: “As demonstrated in Corral, it is the extraordinary obligations of the defendant that allows the second action to proceed. In that case, it was the insurance company‟s obligation of good faith and fair dealing. . . . Similarly, in the present case the City of Los Angeles cannot get away with its conduct at the hearing on the writ where it presented the perjurous [sic] declaration because it had an independent obligation not to violate [plaintiffs‟] rights under Government Code, § 3309.5.” Here, to prevail in their action for damages, plaintiffs had to prove a violation of POBRA based upon defendant‟s reliance on a perjured declaration to show that the tolling of the time to file disciplinary actions lasted long enough to render their discharges timely. This goes to the heart of the trial court‟s finding in the mandate proceeding. To the extent that Corral stands for the proposition that the finality of judgments doctrine does not apply to a separate bad faith action arising from the presentation of false or perjured testimony in an earlier proceeding, we disagree, and instead follow Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th 1 and Rios, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 818-819. Plaintiffs also rely on Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1331 (Miller). In that case, the executor of an estate hired a law firm to represent her in connection with her duties. At the conclusion of the probate matter, the firm requested and was awarded its fees except for one category which the probate court found to involve work for the executor in her individual capacity. The firm did not appeal that decision. Instead, it filed a new action seeking quantum meruit recovery of the denied fees directly from the client. The trial court held the action was barred by the final judgment in the probate case. The Court of Appeal reversed. Significantly, it found that the probate court did not decide that the law firm was not entitled to the additional fees, but only that the fees were not payable out of the estate. 12 (Id. at p. 1341.) As the Miller court explained, the probate court never ruled on the firm‟s entitlement to fees directly from its client, and therefore there was no basis for collateral estoppel. (Id. at p. 1343.) The case before us is quite different. The court ruled on the tolling issue in the mandate proceeding. Indeed it was the central question in the case. “„Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an issue only if (1) the issue is identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior proceeding or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)‟ (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.)” (Plumley v. Mockett (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1048-1049.) That describes the present case. Because the tolling issue was actually litigated in the mandate proceeding, a new claim based on the allegedly perjured declaration is a collateral attack on the mandate decision. Perjured testimony cannot be the basis for a separate proceeding. (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11.) In light of our conclusion, we need not and do not address City‟s other arguments. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. City is to have its costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. EPSTEIN, P. J. We concur: WILLHITE, J. MANELLA, J. Source: barstowwatch.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: howtofilebankruptcyco.com Source: filebankruptcyco.com Source: bankruptcylawyersco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: bankruptcyattorneysco.com
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Declaring Bankruptcy: Western Pennsylvania Bankruptcy Court

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Source: blogspot.com

Bankruptcy Fees: Bankruptcy Court Tampa

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Source: businessbankruptcyco.com

McNees Wallace & Nurick LLC: Construction Alert

The Superior Court, however, determined that the past thirty years of legal precedent requiring that the lien law was to be very strictly construed was erroneous, and that the Mechanics Lien Act was a remedial statute which should be liberally construed to effectuate the purpose of protecting payment for labor and materials. The Superior Court analyzedthe relationship between the contractor and the union and determined that the CBA created an implied contract to perform labor on Scott’s property. Taking its analysis one step further, the Superior Court concluded that the CBA incorporating the trust agreement created an “implied contract” so that the Trustee of the benefit plans, as opposed to the unions, had the legal standing to assert the claim for payment on behalf of the workers. Interestingly, while the Superior Court recognized that it was liberally construed the definition of a “subcontract agreement”, it indicated that it would still strictly apply theprocedural aspects of the Act (e.g., notice provisions).
Source: lexisnexis.com

Postal Service to begin closing plants this summer

Postmaster General Patrick Donahoe says postal operations are simply too big given declining mail volume. The agency will consolidate 140 mail processing centers within the next year, including 48 this August. Most will occur next January and February, after the busy election and holiday mail season.
Source: abc27.com

Bankruptcy filings down in Pennsylvania, no recovery indicated

Nevertheless, many bankruptcy attorneys point out that the numbers do not necessarily indicate a regional economic recovery. They say the declining numbers for bankruptcy and foreclosures have to do with the fact that the government is pushing banks to modify loans and has extended unemployment benefits. Additionally, creditors are working with consumers in an unprecedented way; and consumers are doing their part by reducing spending and pulling back on credit. As the economy continues to lumber along in a years-long recession, consumers and creditors will probably have to demonstrate even more flexibility. The reports cited above suggest that the efforts by government and financial institutions to help persons struggling with debt have resulted in some successes. However, not everyone’s circumstances are the same. Moreover, bankruptcy may still be of great benefit for many Pennsylvania families. It is therefore important that persons pursue the right strategy for dealing with the particular conditions of their debt. Source: The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, “Lowdown on debt: Foreclosures- bankruptcies are down- but that’s not necessarily a sign of an improving economy,” Tim Grant, Dec. 4, 2011
Source: pennsylvaniabankruptcyprosblog.com

City of Harrisburg PA Files Chapter 9 Bankruptcy

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Source: jewishlawyersusa.com Source: foreclosureattorneyco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: medicalbankruptcyco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com
Source: foreclosureattorneyco.com

Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr & Smith Welcomes Marcelle P. Mouledoux

Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr & Smith (GJTBS) is a Gulf South regional law firm dedicated to delivering value in legal counsel for 25 years to local, national and international clients in dozens of industries. GJTBS employs over 90 attorneys located in ten cities in Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia and Missouri. GJTBS attorneys are experienced in handling insurance defense, admiralty and maritime law, energy, oil and gas, products liability, employer’s liability, general casualty, professional liability, property, construction, transportation, title resolution, amusements, sports and leisure law, restaurant and retail law, as well as corporate transactional matters.
Source: jlns.com

Bankruptcy Court Middle District Pa

  Texas, Gonzalez de la Garza Genealogy Collection   Vermont, Vital Records, 1760-1954   Washington State County Land Records, 1852-1935   Washington State County Probate Case Files, 1832-1950   Washington State County Records, 1885-1950   Wisconsin, Fond du Lac Public Library Records, 1848-1980 New images have been added to the following databases unless otherwise noted: Australia, Queensland Cemetery Records, 1802-1990 Australia, Tasmania, Miscellaneous Records, 1829-1961 Austria, Seigniorial Records, 1537-1888 Bolivia, Catholic Church Records, 1566-1996 Brazil Civil Registration, 1870-2009 Canada, Ontario Births, 1869-1912  (Index records) Canada, Quebec Notarial Records, 1800-1900 Canada, Saskatchewan, Judicial District Court Records, 1891-1954 Canada, Saskatchewan, Probate Estate Files, 1887-1931 Canada, Quebec Notarial Records, 1800-1900 Chile, Santiago, Cementerio General, 1821-2010                       China, Collection of Genealogies, 1500-1900 Colombia, Catholic Church Records, 1600-2008                     Costa Rica, Civil Registration, 1860-1975 Czech Republic, Censuses, 1843-1921 Czech Republic, Church Books, 1552-1935 Czech Republic, Land Records, 1450-1850 Czech Republic, Třeboň, Nobility Seignorial records, 1664-1698 Dominican Republic Civil Registration, 1801-2006 El Salvador, Civil Registration Records, 1836-1910 England and Wales Census, 1871 England, Norfolk Parish Registers, 1538-1900  (Index records and images) Estonia, Church Books 1835-194 Germany Marriages, 1558-1929  (Index records) Germany, Bavaria, Dinkelsbühl Miscellaneous City Records, 1804-1946 Germany, Württemberg, Albstadt, Miscellaneous City Records, 1705-1850 Guatemala, Catholic Church Records, 1581-1977 Hungary Catholic Church Records, 1636-1895  (Index records)                       Hungary Reformed Church Christenings, 1624-1895  (Index records) Hungary, Civil Registration, 1895-1980 Italy, Bologna, Bologna, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1941 Italy, Catania, Caltagirone, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1861-1941 Italy, Catania, Catania, Civil Registration (Comune), 1820-1905 Italy, Cuneo, Civil Registration (State Archive), 1795-1915 Italy, Genova, Chiavari, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1941 Italy, Napoli, Civil Registration (State Archive), 1809-1865 Italy, Pistoia, Pistoia, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1929 Italy, Ravenna, Ravenna, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1929 Italy, Trieste, Trieste, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1924-1939 Jamaica, Civil Birth Registration Korea, Collection of Genealogies, 1500-2009 Mexico, Morelos, Civil Registration, 1861-1920 Micronesia, Pohnpei, Land Records, 1971-2007 Nicaragua, Diocese of Managua, Catholic Church Records, 1740-2008 Norway Census, 1875  (Index records) Peru, Civil Registration, 1874-1996 Philippines, Civil Registration (National), 1945-1980 Poland, Roman Catholic Church Books, 1600-1950 Portugal, Aveiro, Catholic Church Records, 1550-1911 Portugal, Aveiro, Passport Registers, 1882-1965 Portugal, Aveiro, Testaments, 1900-1936 Portugal, Braga, Catholic Church Records, 1530-1911 Portugal, Bragança, Catholic Church Records, 1541-1985 Portugal, Coimbra, Catholic Church Records, 1459-1911 Portugal, Coimbra, Passport Registers and Application Files, 1835-1938 Portugal, Diocese of Lamego, Catholic Church Records, 1532-1911 Portugal, Diocese of Vila Real, Catholic Church Records, 1575-1975 Portugal, Faro, Catholic Church Records, 1587-1880 Portugal, Guarda, Catholic Church Records, 1459-1911 Portugal, Leiria, Catholic Church Records, 1534-1911   Portugal, Leiria, Passport Registers, 1861-1901 Portugal, Porto, Catholic Church Records, 1535-1949 Portugal, Porto, Catholic Church Records, 1582-1908 Portugal, Setúbal, Catholic Church Records, 1555-1911   Portugal, Viana do Castelo, Catholic Church Records, 1537-1909 Portugal, Vila Real, Catholic Church Records, 1533-1941 South Africa, Orange Free State, Estate Files, 1951-2004 South Africa, Reformed Church Records, 1856-1988 Spain, Cádiz, Testaments, 1550-1920 Spain, Consular Records of Emigrants, 1808-1960 Spain, Consular Records of Emigrants, 1808-1960 Spain, Municipal Records Sweden, Älvsborg Church Records, 1642-1897; index 1681-1860 Sweden, Blekinge Church Records, 1612-1916; index 1646-1860 Sweden, Gävleborg Church Records, 1616-1908; index 1671-1860 Sweden, Göteborg och Bohus Church Records, 1577-1932; index 1659-1860 Sweden, Gotland Church Records, 1582-1940; index 1655-1860 Sweden, Halland Church Records, 1615-1904; index 1615-1860 Sweden, Jämtland Church Records, 1582-1928; index 1642-1860 Sweden, Jönköping Church Records, 1581-1935; index 1633-1860 Sweden, Kalmar Church Records, 1577-1907; index 1625-1860 Sweden, Örebro Church Records, 1613-1918; index 1635-1860 Sweden, Skaraborg Church Records, 1612-1921; index 1625-1860 United States:   Alabama State Census, 1855  (Index records)   Alabama State Census, 1866  (Index records)   Alabama, County Estate Records, 1800-1996   Alabama, Sumter County Circuit Court Files, 1840-1950                         California, Marriage Index, 1960-1985  (Index records)                       California, San Francisco Area Funeral Home Records, 1835-1931   California, San Francisco County Records, 1824-1997   California, San Mateo County Records, 1856-1967   Connecticut, Death Index, 1949-2001  (Index records)                         Delaware, Vital Records, 1680-1962   District of Columbia Marriages, 1811-1950 (Index records and images)   Florida Marriages, 1830-1993 (Index and images)                         Florida, Tampa, Passenger Lists, 1898-1945   Georgia Headright and Bounty Land Records, 1783-1909   Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960                         Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960   Idaho, Minidoka County Records, 1913-1961   Illinois, Probate Records, 1819-1970   Indiana, Death Index, 1882-1920   (Index records)   Indiana, Marriages, 1811-1959 (Jay and Hamilton counties)  (Index records)   Kentucky, Confederate Pension Applications, 1912-1950   Kentucky, County Marriages, 1797-1954  (Index records and images)   Louisiana, Orleans Parish Vital Records, 1910, 1960   Louisiana, Parish Marriages, 1837-1957  (Index records and images)   Louisiana, Second Registration Draft Cards, compiled 1948-1959   Maine, State Archive Collections, 1790-1966   Maine, Washington County Courthouse Records, 1785-1950   Maryland, Garrett County Probate Estate and Guardianship Files, Source: blogspot.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: businessbankruptcyco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcyrecordsco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com
Source: bankruptcycourtco.com

Video: Eve M. McClurg: Lusk, Drasites & Tolisano Family Law Attorney

Middle District of Florida Still One of Most Active for US Bankruptcy Filings

At the current pace, 2011 may end with around 55,910 filings, which is down about 11,000 from last year. However,with foreclosure filings on the rise again, it is likely that bankruptcy filings may pick up, too. If a homeowner is facing foreclosure with a home upside down, there is not always reprieve from the possibility of a huge judgment being entered. Bankruptcy can sometimes often protection in this scenario. Whatever way the current financial setting turns, it will likely impact bankruptcy filings – either for better or for worse.
Source: cflbankruptcy.com

Bankruptcy Judge for the Middle District of Florida Alexander L. Paskay Dies Peacefully with his Family at his side

Judge Paskay is a law graduate of The University of Miami and has been admitted to the Florida bar since 1958.  In 1962, the United States Congress first established the Middle District of Florida, which was previously part of the Southern District of Florida.  Judge Paskay was soon appointed as the Middle District’s first full time bankruptcy referee and at that time was responsible for the Fort Myers, Orlando, and Tampa Divisions.  Judge Paskay eventually went on to become the Middle District’s first Chief Bankruptcy Judge.
Source: wordpress.com

Can you be "too broke" to file bankruptcy?

  Texas, Gonzalez de la Garza Genealogy Collection   Vermont, Vital Records, 1760-1954   Washington State County Land Records, 1852-1935   Washington State County Probate Case Files, 1832-1950   Washington State County Records, 1885-1950   Wisconsin, Fond du Lac Public Library Records, 1848-1980 New images have been added to the following databases unless otherwise noted: Australia, Queensland Cemetery Records, 1802-1990 Australia, Tasmania, Miscellaneous Records, 1829-1961 Austria, Seigniorial Records, 1537-1888 Bolivia, Catholic Church Records, 1566-1996 Brazil Civil Registration, 1870-2009 Canada, Ontario Births, 1869-1912  (Index records) Canada, Quebec Notarial Records, 1800-1900 Canada, Saskatchewan, Judicial District Court Records, 1891-1954 Canada, Saskatchewan, Probate Estate Files, 1887-1931 Canada, Quebec Notarial Records, 1800-1900 Chile, Santiago, Cementerio General, 1821-2010                       China, Collection of Genealogies, 1500-1900 Colombia, Catholic Church Records, 1600-2008                     Costa Rica, Civil Registration, 1860-1975 Czech Republic, Censuses, 1843-1921 Czech Republic, Church Books, 1552-1935 Czech Republic, Land Records, 1450-1850 Czech Republic, Třeboň, Nobility Seignorial records, 1664-1698 Dominican Republic Civil Registration, 1801-2006 El Salvador, Civil Registration Records, 1836-1910 England and Wales Census, 1871 England, Norfolk Parish Registers, 1538-1900  (Index records and images) Estonia, Church Books 1835-194 Germany Marriages, 1558-1929  (Index records) Germany, Bavaria, Dinkelsbühl Miscellaneous City Records, 1804-1946 Germany, Württemberg, Albstadt, Miscellaneous City Records, 1705-1850 Guatemala, Catholic Church Records, 1581-1977 Hungary Catholic Church Records, 1636-1895  (Index records)                       Hungary Reformed Church Christenings, 1624-1895  (Index records) Hungary, Civil Registration, 1895-1980 Italy, Bologna, Bologna, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1941 Italy, Catania, Caltagirone, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1861-1941 Italy, Catania, Catania, Civil Registration (Comune), 1820-1905 Italy, Cuneo, Civil Registration (State Archive), 1795-1915 Italy, Genova, Chiavari, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1941 Italy, Napoli, Civil Registration (State Archive), 1809-1865 Italy, Pistoia, Pistoia, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1929 Italy, Ravenna, Ravenna, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1929 Italy, Trieste, Trieste, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1924-1939 Jamaica, Civil Birth Registration Korea, Collection of Genealogies, 1500-2009 Mexico, Morelos, Civil Registration, 1861-1920 Micronesia, Pohnpei, Land Records, 1971-2007 Nicaragua, Diocese of Managua, Catholic Church Records, 1740-2008 Norway Census, 1875  (Index records) Peru, Civil Registration, 1874-1996 Philippines, Civil Registration (National), 1945-1980 Poland, Roman Catholic Church Books, 1600-1950 Portugal, Aveiro, Catholic Church Records, 1550-1911 Portugal, Aveiro, Passport Registers, 1882-1965 Portugal, Aveiro, Testaments, 1900-1936 Portugal, Braga, Catholic Church Records, 1530-1911 Portugal, Bragança, Catholic Church Records, 1541-1985 Portugal, Coimbra, Catholic Church Records, 1459-1911 Portugal, Coimbra, Passport Registers and Application Files, 1835-1938 Portugal, Diocese of Lamego, Catholic Church Records, 1532-1911 Portugal, Diocese of Vila Real, Catholic Church Records, 1575-1975 Portugal, Faro, Catholic Church Records, 1587-1880 Portugal, Guarda, Catholic Church Records, 1459-1911 Portugal, Leiria, Catholic Church Records, 1534-1911   Portugal, Leiria, Passport Registers, 1861-1901 Portugal, Porto, Catholic Church Records, 1535-1949 Portugal, Porto, Catholic Church Records, 1582-1908 Portugal, Setúbal, Catholic Church Records, 1555-1911   Portugal, Viana do Castelo, Catholic Church Records, 1537-1909 Portugal, Vila Real, Catholic Church Records, 1533-1941 South Africa, Orange Free State, Estate Files, 1951-2004 South Africa, Reformed Church Records, 1856-1988 Spain, Cádiz, Testaments, 1550-1920 Spain, Consular Records of Emigrants, 1808-1960 Spain, Consular Records of Emigrants, 1808-1960 Spain, Municipal Records Sweden, Älvsborg Church Records, 1642-1897; index 1681-1860 Sweden, Blekinge Church Records, 1612-1916; index 1646-1860 Sweden, Gävleborg Church Records, 1616-1908; index 1671-1860 Sweden, Göteborg och Bohus Church Records, 1577-1932; index 1659-1860 Sweden, Gotland Church Records, 1582-1940; index 1655-1860 Sweden, Halland Church Records, 1615-1904; index 1615-1860 Sweden, Jämtland Church Records, 1582-1928; index 1642-1860 Sweden, Jönköping Church Records, 1581-1935; index 1633-1860 Sweden, Kalmar Church Records, 1577-1907; index 1625-1860 Sweden, Örebro Church Records, 1613-1918; index 1635-1860 Sweden, Skaraborg Church Records, 1612-1921; index 1625-1860 United States:   Alabama State Census, 1855  (Index records)   Alabama State Census, 1866  (Index records)   Alabama, County Estate Records, 1800-1996   Alabama, Sumter County Circuit Court Files, 1840-1950                         California, Marriage Index, 1960-1985  (Index records)                       California, San Francisco Area Funeral Home Records, 1835-1931   California, San Francisco County Records, 1824-1997   California, San Mateo County Records, 1856-1967   Connecticut, Death Index, 1949-2001  (Index records)                         Delaware, Vital Records, 1680-1962   District of Columbia Marriages, 1811-1950 (Index records and images)   Florida Marriages, 1830-1993 (Index and images)                         Florida, Tampa, Passenger Lists, 1898-1945   Georgia Headright and Bounty Land Records, 1783-1909   Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960                         Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960   Idaho, Minidoka County Records, 1913-1961   Illinois, Probate Records, 1819-1970   Indiana, Death Index, 1882-1920   (Index records)   Indiana, Marriages, 1811-1959 (Jay and Hamilton counties)  (Index records)   Kentucky, Confederate Pension Applications, 1912-1950   Kentucky, County Marriages, 1797-1954  (Index records and images)   Louisiana, Orleans Parish Vital Records, 1910, 1960   Louisiana, Parish Marriages, 1837-1957  (Index records and images)   Louisiana, Second Registration Draft Cards, compiled 1948-1959   Maine, State Archive Collections, 1790-1966   Maine, Washington County Courthouse Records, 1785-1950   Maryland, Garrett County Probate Estate and Guardianship Files, Source: blogspot.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: businessbankruptcyco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcyrecordsco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com
Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com

Who Files for Bankruptcy?

[...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] [...] One of the biggest hurdles we find with clients trying to make that decision to seek professional assistance with regard to their debts and actually consulting with a bankruptcy attorney, is the embarrassment, shame, and failure that they feel because of their current financial predicament. There is this misconception that by filing bankruptcy, it means that they have failed, are a bad person, are not responsible since they cannot pay their debts and will be looked down upon by their friends, family, church and community. If there is only one thing that you take away from the information that we at the Martella Law Firm provide you please let it be this: You are not alone. You are not a failure. You have nothing to be ashamed of. And by reading this and requesting this information, you are taking the first step toward a fresh start for a successful rest of your life. I have yet to meet a client who wanted to be sitting across from me in my conference room to talk about filing bankruptcy. The truth is, you are not alone. According to a 2011 Gallup Poll, the top three biggest financial worries of Americans are: 1.) lack of money/low wages; 2.) healthcare costs; and 3.) too much debt and not enough money to pay debt. Here are some statistics from just the last two years for the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida. Since 2010, for the Middle District of Florida: There were a total of 66,618 bankruptcy filings. To give you some perspective of that number, Raymond James Stadium, where the Tampa Bay Buccaneers play, only holds 65,890 fans, and again, we are only talking about the Middle District of Florida and not the Country. It should be noted that the Middle District of Florida is the second busiest Bankruptcy Court of the 90 Federal Districts in the Nation according to the statistics provided by the Court. The Middle District stretches across the State starting in Naples and going all the way up to Jacksonville diagonally. Of the 66,618 filings that occurred in 2010, almost half came from the Tampa and Fort Myers Divisions with total filings of 31,735. While statistics for 2011 dropped slightly, they are still significant numbers with the total filing for the whole Middle District at 53,554 and the Tampa and Fort Myers Divisions at 24,186. Overall for the year 2010, there were 1,596,355 bankruptcy filings submitted to the Bankruptcy Courts nation-wide in the United States. The national number of filings dropped slightly in 2011 to $1,417,323 filings.Source: martellalaw.com [...]Source: martellalaw.com [...]Source: martellalaw.com [...]Source: martellalaw.com [...]Source: martellalaw.com [...]Source: martellalaw.com [...]Source: martellalaw.com [...]
Source: martellalaw.com

EWING: UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT …

statement financial affairs Ms Ewing prepared debtor fails disclose pre petition agreement payment debtor Ms Ewing Filename : FIACSFPV.pdf Fullpath : /judgments/case/FIACSFPV.pdf Categorized as : EWING Publisher : pacer.flmb.uscourts.gov Found at Monday, 26 Mar 2012
Source: posterous.com

COURSEN vs. JPMorgan, WAMU, FANNIE MAE

Liz, you are certainly a great fighter and true icon. I too, thank you all the way from Michigan. The very best to you and others who continue to fight. If we ever make it through this, it will be because we stood our ground not to give up for a second! Our kids are counting on us to turn this around, without us they have no chance in hell at a fair, lawful and just future. I wish everyone would just understand this. God Bless!
Source: stopforeclosurefraud.com

Middle District of Florida becomes sixth busiest bankruptcy court in the nation

According to statistics released on February 19, 2008 by the Bankruptcy Court, Middle District of Florida, bankruptcy filings in the district during the year 2007 were up 70% over the prior year. In turn, the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida, which includes Jacksonville, Orlando, and Tampa, became the sixth busiest court in the Nation. There are 90 Federal Districts that report bankruptcy statistics.
Source: johnsonlawpa.com

Bankruptcy Document Access Through Private Website (The Florida Bankruptcy Law Blog)

I Know where You can Stick It by wstera2The Wall Street Journal blog announced a private website which promises access to public federal court documents at half the price and less hassle. It is sort of a "Pacer for the People". Attorneys will probably continue to rely on the official Pacer site because one cannot be sure that the new site will have all documents in a court file, but laymen may find the new service acceptable when searching for one or two particular court documents.
Source: bankruptcyorlando.com

Video: Documents Needed for Preparing Your Bankruptcy

Wireless startup LightSquared files for bankruptcy

Bankruptcy can be a choice for people who have have had the IRS repossess some of their valuables. While bankruptcy is a big hit to your credit history, it can be the only option. Read this guide in order to know more when it comes to filing bankruptcy as well as the consequences of doing so. The same goes for people using a Trust Deed.Tired of always having collection agencies call you? Debt that you can no longer control can be overwhelming. Have the safety of bankruptcy around you while you get your finances back under control, can give some measure of relief.No matter how messed up things are as you file for bankruptcy, it is important that you stay honest. It is never a good idea to lie about debt or assets. And it is illegal. If you lie when it comes to your assets and debts, you might end up going to prison.If you are facing financial difficulty, it may not be wise to go through with a divorce. When many people divorce, they have to pursue a bankruptcy when the realities of the costs comes to light. Reconsidering divorce can be a very smart option.Do your homework so you thoroughly understand the laws pertaining to bankruptcy before you file. For instance, you may not be aware that a filer is forbidden from transferring assets from his or her name for one full year before the petition is filed. It is also illegal for someone who files for bankruptcy to drastically increase their debts on credit cards immediately before filing.This article has made it known that bankruptcy is something you may be able to turn to. Of course, it may not be best for all situations and can even make your credit matters worse. Staying informed on how to manage this situation could prevent you from experiencing headaches and it can also help you keep your valuables. Source: marsill.com Source: businessbankruptcyco.com Source: chapter9bankruptcyco.com Source: chapter9bankruptcyco.com
Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com

New Bankruptcy Documents Reveal Outsize Pay at Lehman Before Collapse

Wall Street critics blame the outsize salaries of bank employees as a core reason for the global financial crisis, arguing that the promise of large pay packages led to excessive risk taking. While the compensation for a handful of Lehman executives like Mr. Fuld had previously been known, the documents reveal the compensation for the 50 highest-paid employees.
Source: freestopforeclosure.com

Official Idaho Bankruptcy court Records Discharge Papers

Do not have a copy of your Idaho bankruptcy discharge papers from the court? No problems. You can possess an exact copy of the original Idaho bankruptcy court documents. Your Idaho bankruptcy court records and documents are readily available after bankruptcy discharge and you can have it in your possession within minutes of your order. We offer retrieve copy of your official Idaho discharge order, Idaho bankruptcy papers , list of creditors, complete petition file and schedules.
Source: bankruptcylive.com

‘Octomom’ files bankruptcy papers — Living — Bangor Daily News — BDN Maine

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Source: bangordailynews.com

Finding a Bankruptcy Attorney for Your Team ~ Financial Tips

The same applies to finding a bankruptcy attorney to represent you. One should be completely comfortable sharing their failures as well as their windfalls and allow the attorney to do their magic to get the best results from their bankruptcy filing. The bankruptcy court requires individuals to be completely honest when filing bankruptcy. Hiding something from your lawyer or the bankruptcy court will only end up bad. With the addition of the Internet, it’s become very easy for the bankruptcy trustee to fact check people’s information. They might even look up their social media accounts to see if they’re not sharing everything with the court. It’s best to give it all to the bankruptcy attorney and allow them to make the decision on how to move forward. 
Source: finanacecareonline.com

Filing Bankruptcy in Minnesota: The Documents and Procedures

Occasionally there will be disputes and disagreements leading to bankruptcy litigation. These disputes may include disputes over ownership of property, the value of an asset, the amount of debt, whether debts are dischargeable or nondischargeable, and what amounts the involved lawyers, accountants, etc. should receive. These disputes are handled in a very similar manner as any other civil lawsuit. Information will be requested and must change hands, and settlement may be explored. If a settlement is not reached, there may be a trial on the ultimate issues of the case. There are also bankruptcy appeal procedures.
Source: minnesotaattorney.com

Southern District Stern Review: Rakoff Rules that Fraudulent Transfer Actions Belong in Bankruptcy Court, But Only for Reports and Recommendations

  Texas, Gonzalez de la Garza Genealogy Collection   Vermont, Vital Records, 1760-1954   Washington State County Land Records, 1852-1935   Washington State County Probate Case Files, 1832-1950   Washington State County Records, 1885-1950   Wisconsin, Fond du Lac Public Library Records, 1848-1980 New images have been added to the following databases unless otherwise noted: Australia, Queensland Cemetery Records, 1802-1990 Australia, Tasmania, Miscellaneous Records, 1829-1961 Austria, Seigniorial Records, 1537-1888 Bolivia, Catholic Church Records, 1566-1996 Brazil Civil Registration, 1870-2009 Canada, Ontario Births, 1869-1912  (Index records) Canada, Quebec Notarial Records, 1800-1900 Canada, Saskatchewan, Judicial District Court Records, 1891-1954 Canada, Saskatchewan, Probate Estate Files, 1887-1931 Canada, Quebec Notarial Records, 1800-1900 Chile, Santiago, Cementerio General, 1821-2010                       China, Collection of Genealogies, 1500-1900 Colombia, Catholic Church Records, 1600-2008                     Costa Rica, Civil Registration, 1860-1975 Czech Republic, Censuses, 1843-1921 Czech Republic, Church Books, 1552-1935 Czech Republic, Land Records, 1450-1850 Czech Republic, Třeboň, Nobility Seignorial records, 1664-1698 Dominican Republic Civil Registration, 1801-2006 El Salvador, Civil Registration Records, 1836-1910 England and Wales Census, 1871 England, Norfolk Parish Registers, 1538-1900  (Index records and images) Estonia, Church Books 1835-194 Germany Marriages, 1558-1929  (Index records) Germany, Bavaria, Dinkelsbühl Miscellaneous City Records, 1804-1946 Germany, Württemberg, Albstadt, Miscellaneous City Records, 1705-1850 Guatemala, Catholic Church Records, 1581-1977 Hungary Catholic Church Records, 1636-1895  (Index records)                       Hungary Reformed Church Christenings, 1624-1895  (Index records) Hungary, Civil Registration, 1895-1980 Italy, Bologna, Bologna, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1941 Italy, Catania, Caltagirone, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1861-1941 Italy, Catania, Catania, Civil Registration (Comune), 1820-1905 Italy, Cuneo, Civil Registration (State Archive), 1795-1915 Italy, Genova, Chiavari, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1941 Italy, Napoli, Civil Registration (State Archive), 1809-1865 Italy, Pistoia, Pistoia, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1929 Italy, Ravenna, Ravenna, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1929 Italy, Trieste, Trieste, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1924-1939 Jamaica, Civil Birth Registration Korea, Collection of Genealogies, 1500-2009 Mexico, Morelos, Civil Registration, 1861-1920 Micronesia, Pohnpei, Land Records, 1971-2007 Nicaragua, Diocese of Managua, Catholic Church Records, 1740-2008 Norway Census, 1875  (Index records) Peru, Civil Registration, 1874-1996 Philippines, Civil Registration (National), 1945-1980 Poland, Roman Catholic Church Books, 1600-1950 Portugal, Aveiro, Catholic Church Records, 1550-1911 Portugal, Aveiro, Passport Registers, 1882-1965 Portugal, Aveiro, Testaments, 1900-1936 Portugal, Braga, Catholic Church Records, 1530-1911 Portugal, Bragança, Catholic Church Records, 1541-1985 Portugal, Coimbra, Catholic Church Records, 1459-1911 Portugal, Coimbra, Passport Registers and Application Files, 1835-1938 Portugal, Diocese of Lamego, Catholic Church Records, 1532-1911 Portugal, Diocese of Vila Real, Catholic Church Records, 1575-1975 Portugal, Faro, Catholic Church Records, 1587-1880 Portugal, Guarda, Catholic Church Records, 1459-1911 Portugal, Leiria, Catholic Church Records, 1534-1911   Portugal, Leiria, Passport Registers, 1861-1901 Portugal, Porto, Catholic Church Records, 1535-1949 Portugal, Porto, Catholic Church Records, 1582-1908 Portugal, Setúbal, Catholic Church Records, 1555-1911   Portugal, Viana do Castelo, Catholic Church Records, 1537-1909 Portugal, Vila Real, Catholic Church Records, 1533-1941 South Africa, Orange Free State, Estate Files, 1951-2004 South Africa, Reformed Church Records, 1856-1988 Spain, Cádiz, Testaments, 1550-1920 Spain, Consular Records of Emigrants, 1808-1960 Spain, Consular Records of Emigrants, 1808-1960 Spain, Municipal Records Sweden, Älvsborg Church Records, 1642-1897; index 1681-1860 Sweden, Blekinge Church Records, 1612-1916; index 1646-1860 Sweden, Gävleborg Church Records, 1616-1908; index 1671-1860 Sweden, Göteborg och Bohus Church Records, 1577-1932; index 1659-1860 Sweden, Gotland Church Records, 1582-1940; index 1655-1860 Sweden, Halland Church Records, 1615-1904; index 1615-1860 Sweden, Jämtland Church Records, 1582-1928; index 1642-1860 Sweden, Jönköping Church Records, 1581-1935; index 1633-1860 Sweden, Kalmar Church Records, 1577-1907; index 1625-1860 Sweden, Örebro Church Records, 1613-1918; index 1635-1860 Sweden, Skaraborg Church Records, 1612-1921; index 1625-1860 United States:   Alabama State Census, 1855  (Index records)   Alabama State Census, 1866  (Index records)   Alabama, County Estate Records, 1800-1996   Alabama, Sumter County Circuit Court Files, 1840-1950                         California, Marriage Index, 1960-1985  (Index records)                       California, San Francisco Area Funeral Home Records, 1835-1931   California, San Francisco County Records, 1824-1997   California, San Mateo County Records, 1856-1967   Connecticut, Death Index, 1949-2001  (Index records)                         Delaware, Vital Records, 1680-1962   District of Columbia Marriages, 1811-1950 (Index records and images)   Florida Marriages, 1830-1993 (Index and images)                         Florida, Tampa, Passenger Lists, 1898-1945   Georgia Headright and Bounty Land Records, 1783-1909   Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960                         Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960   Idaho, Minidoka County Records, 1913-1961   Illinois, Probate Records, 1819-1970   Indiana, Death Index, 1882-1920   (Index records)   Indiana, Marriages, 1811-1959 (Jay and Hamilton counties)  (Index records)   Kentucky, Confederate Pension Applications, 1912-1950   Kentucky, County Marriages, 1797-1954  (Index records and images)   Louisiana, Orleans Parish Vital Records, 1910, 1960   Louisiana, Parish Marriages, 1837-1957  (Index records and images)   Louisiana, Second Registration Draft Cards, compiled 1948-1959   Maine, State Archive Collections, 1790-1966   Maine, Washington County Courthouse Records, 1785-1950   Maryland, Garrett County Probate Estate and Guardianship Files, Source: blogspot.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: businessbankruptcyco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcyrecordsco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: businessbankruptcyco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com
Source: bankruptcycourtco.com

Video: CNN/SRLC – The Southern Republican Presidential Debate in Charleston, SC (January 19, 2012) 720p

Can you be "too broke" to file bankruptcy?

  Texas, Gonzalez de la Garza Genealogy Collection   Vermont, Vital Records, 1760-1954   Washington State County Land Records, 1852-1935   Washington State County Probate Case Files, 1832-1950   Washington State County Records, 1885-1950   Wisconsin, Fond du Lac Public Library Records, 1848-1980 New images have been added to the following databases unless otherwise noted: Australia, Queensland Cemetery Records, 1802-1990 Australia, Tasmania, Miscellaneous Records, 1829-1961 Austria, Seigniorial Records, 1537-1888 Bolivia, Catholic Church Records, 1566-1996 Brazil Civil Registration, 1870-2009 Canada, Ontario Births, 1869-1912  (Index records) Canada, Quebec Notarial Records, 1800-1900 Canada, Saskatchewan, Judicial District Court Records, 1891-1954 Canada, Saskatchewan, Probate Estate Files, 1887-1931 Canada, Quebec Notarial Records, 1800-1900 Chile, Santiago, Cementerio General, 1821-2010                       China, Collection of Genealogies, 1500-1900 Colombia, Catholic Church Records, 1600-2008                     Costa Rica, Civil Registration, 1860-1975 Czech Republic, Censuses, 1843-1921 Czech Republic, Church Books, 1552-1935 Czech Republic, Land Records, 1450-1850 Czech Republic, Třeboň, Nobility Seignorial records, 1664-1698 Dominican Republic Civil Registration, 1801-2006 El Salvador, Civil Registration Records, 1836-1910 England and Wales Census, 1871 England, Norfolk Parish Registers, 1538-1900  (Index records and images) Estonia, Church Books 1835-194 Germany Marriages, 1558-1929  (Index records) Germany, Bavaria, Dinkelsbühl Miscellaneous City Records, 1804-1946 Germany, Württemberg, Albstadt, Miscellaneous City Records, 1705-1850 Guatemala, Catholic Church Records, 1581-1977 Hungary Catholic Church Records, 1636-1895  (Index records)                       Hungary Reformed Church Christenings, 1624-1895  (Index records) Hungary, Civil Registration, 1895-1980 Italy, Bologna, Bologna, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1941 Italy, Catania, Caltagirone, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1861-1941 Italy, Catania, Catania, Civil Registration (Comune), 1820-1905 Italy, Cuneo, Civil Registration (State Archive), 1795-1915 Italy, Genova, Chiavari, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1941 Italy, Napoli, Civil Registration (State Archive), 1809-1865 Italy, Pistoia, Pistoia, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1929 Italy, Ravenna, Ravenna, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1929 Italy, Trieste, Trieste, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1924-1939 Jamaica, Civil Birth Registration Korea, Collection of Genealogies, 1500-2009 Mexico, Morelos, Civil Registration, 1861-1920 Micronesia, Pohnpei, Land Records, 1971-2007 Nicaragua, Diocese of Managua, Catholic Church Records, 1740-2008 Norway Census, 1875  (Index records) Peru, Civil Registration, 1874-1996 Philippines, Civil Registration (National), 1945-1980 Poland, Roman Catholic Church Books, 1600-1950 Portugal, Aveiro, Catholic Church Records, 1550-1911 Portugal, Aveiro, Passport Registers, 1882-1965 Portugal, Aveiro, Testaments, 1900-1936 Portugal, Braga, Catholic Church Records, 1530-1911 Portugal, Bragança, Catholic Church Records, 1541-1985 Portugal, Coimbra, Catholic Church Records, 1459-1911 Portugal, Coimbra, Passport Registers and Application Files, 1835-1938 Portugal, Diocese of Lamego, Catholic Church Records, 1532-1911 Portugal, Diocese of Vila Real, Catholic Church Records, 1575-1975 Portugal, Faro, Catholic Church Records, 1587-1880 Portugal, Guarda, Catholic Church Records, 1459-1911 Portugal, Leiria, Catholic Church Records, 1534-1911   Portugal, Leiria, Passport Registers, 1861-1901 Portugal, Porto, Catholic Church Records, 1535-1949 Portugal, Porto, Catholic Church Records, 1582-1908 Portugal, Setúbal, Catholic Church Records, 1555-1911   Portugal, Viana do Castelo, Catholic Church Records, 1537-1909 Portugal, Vila Real, Catholic Church Records, 1533-1941 South Africa, Orange Free State, Estate Files, 1951-2004 South Africa, Reformed Church Records, 1856-1988 Spain, Cádiz, Testaments, 1550-1920 Spain, Consular Records of Emigrants, 1808-1960 Spain, Consular Records of Emigrants, 1808-1960 Spain, Municipal Records Sweden, Älvsborg Church Records, 1642-1897; index 1681-1860 Sweden, Blekinge Church Records, 1612-1916; index 1646-1860 Sweden, Gävleborg Church Records, 1616-1908; index 1671-1860 Sweden, Göteborg och Bohus Church Records, 1577-1932; index 1659-1860 Sweden, Gotland Church Records, 1582-1940; index 1655-1860 Sweden, Halland Church Records, 1615-1904; index 1615-1860 Sweden, Jämtland Church Records, 1582-1928; index 1642-1860 Sweden, Jönköping Church Records, 1581-1935; index 1633-1860 Sweden, Kalmar Church Records, 1577-1907; index 1625-1860 Sweden, Örebro Church Records, 1613-1918; index 1635-1860 Sweden, Skaraborg Church Records, 1612-1921; index 1625-1860 United States:   Alabama State Census, 1855  (Index records)   Alabama State Census, 1866  (Index records)   Alabama, County Estate Records, 1800-1996   Alabama, Sumter County Circuit Court Files, 1840-1950                         California, Marriage Index, 1960-1985  (Index records)                       California, San Francisco Area Funeral Home Records, 1835-1931   California, San Francisco County Records, 1824-1997   California, San Mateo County Records, 1856-1967   Connecticut, Death Index, 1949-2001  (Index records)                         Delaware, Vital Records, 1680-1962   District of Columbia Marriages, 1811-1950 (Index records and images)   Florida Marriages, 1830-1993 (Index and images)                         Florida, Tampa, Passenger Lists, 1898-1945   Georgia Headright and Bounty Land Records, 1783-1909   Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960                         Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960   Idaho, Minidoka County Records, 1913-1961   Illinois, Probate Records, 1819-1970   Indiana, Death Index, 1882-1920   (Index records)   Indiana, Marriages, 1811-1959 (Jay and Hamilton counties)  (Index records)   Kentucky, Confederate Pension Applications, 1912-1950   Kentucky, County Marriages, 1797-1954  (Index records and images)   Louisiana, Orleans Parish Vital Records, 1910, 1960   Louisiana, Parish Marriages, 1837-1957  (Index records and images)   Louisiana, Second Registration Draft Cards, compiled 1948-1959   Maine, State Archive Collections, 1790-1966   Maine, Washington County Courthouse Records, 1785-1950   Maryland, Garrett County Probate Estate and Guardianship Files, Source: blogspot.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: businessbankruptcyco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcyrecordsco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com
Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com

Wireless startup LightSquared files for bankruptcy

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‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G6JM754WKYS07S6M6&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘FIELD MANAGERS’, ‘The Arizona Students Association’, ‘FIELD Manager Help win real improvements…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G6KP6GDH2MFMBBLTC&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘MD / Physician’, ‘Confidential’, ‘MD Seeking MD for busy adult Internal Medicine…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G6QK78NG59CHLCLFN&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Diesel Mechanics’, ‘Confidential’, ‘Diesel Mechanics West Valley Minimum 3 years…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G6TW6G16Q59CVB2WF&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Owner Ops and Drivers’, ‘KKW Trucking Inc’, ‘KKW Trucking is now hiring Owner Op’s &amp…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G818697JL0NJT4DXY&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘RNs, PTs, OTs, STs, CNAs,’, ‘BEECH HOME CARE & MEDICAL INC.’, ‘RNs, PTs, OTs, STs, CNAs E. Valley’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G84D6B98KNSP5N5PV&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Oncologist’, ‘Arizona Oncolgy’, ‘Arizona Oncology 1329 N. Beaver St. Ste …’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G8DY6T1PSV9T2NC2Y&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Structural Engineer’, ‘PK Associates LLC’, ‘Scottsdale, Arizona structural engineering…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G8H35WWZ9PNJZ3LHN&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(’1st / 2nd Shift PCBA Solderer’, ‘MJS Designs, Inc.’, ’1st and 2nd PCBA Shift Solderer Experience…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3H0SY68PV0N3C46TZL&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Trainer – Mgr- Directors’, ‘VIRIDO CALL CENTER’, ‘Trainer – Manager – Directors N. Scottsdale’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3H10V761DMZSPF4RRG&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘FINANCE DIRECTOR / MANAGER’, ‘EDDY COUNTY’, ‘FINANCE DIRECTOR/MANAGER Starting $74,995…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3H1V36JB6VXMN6DHCY&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘FRONT DESK & HOUSEKEEPING’, ‘HOLIDAY INN EXPRESS DOWNTOWN’, ‘Front Desk & Housekeeping Phoenix, AZ’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3H3J55Z9TT72LM807J&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘HEAVY DUTY WRECKER DRIVER’, ‘ANOTHER GREAT COMPANY’, ‘Heavy Duty Wrecker Driver Williams, AZ’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3H4C272S5SDN3P86FV&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘CNC MACHINIST’, ‘JPS MANUFACTURING’, ‘CNC Machinist Scottsdale Airpark Email 3…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3H5NK75W2NDS75WR70&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘APPOINTMENT SETTING’, ‘ANOTHER GREAT COMPANY’, ‘Appointment Setting 19th Ave & Glendale…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3H6YH6P7183W3S0GL7&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘RV Service Technicians’, ‘A & M RV CENTER’, ‘Busy Anchorage, AK RV dealership needs two…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3H8BJ6NMN78X7LK0KP&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Landscape Positions’, ‘Valley Rain Construction Corp’, ‘Landscape Landscape/Irri’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3J0CN69QDL11P7DR99&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘School Secretary; Landscaper’, ‘Wilson School District #7′, ‘Education Phoenix, AZ Fax 602-275-7517 Wilson…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3J2JW6NW0KSJ3NHQXX&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘DELIVERY – PARTS RUNNER’, ‘LAYNE CHRISTENSEN’, ‘Delivery – Parts Runner Chandler, AZ’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3J3CV6085G6WFKWPQW&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(’1st Shift QA Inspector’, ‘MJS Designs, Inc.’, ’1ST SHIFT QA INSPECTOR. QA Inspector for…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3J3W871T17BRLHGK8N&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Asst School Principal’, ‘Wilson Elementary School District’, ‘Asst. School Principal Wilson Elem SD is…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3J6Z66GDV2SW4YGWMR&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Assistant to the President’, ‘Northland Pioneer College’, ‘Assistant to the President Northland Pioneer…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3J7MB6C1DV814YQT6B&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) ); //
Source: azcentral.com

Judge allows fuel debt as part of bankruptcy filing

In this case, the owner of the trucking company contended this was a business debt because he showed that the invoices were billed to his company account and displayed proof from the Alabama Secretary of State that the company was a registered corporation. The gas station owner, however, showed evidence that the man established the account with the admission that he and his family also would use the fuel for personal use. The District Court judge ruled that although the invoices listed the name of the trucking company, it did not mean the gas was not consumed for personal use by the owner or his family.
Source: huntsvillealbankruptcylaw.com

Bankruptcy Court California Southern District

Filed 10/2/09 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR ANDREW BUESA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. B212854 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC378215) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Elihu M. Berle, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of David W. Allor and David W. Allor for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Rockard J. Delgadillo and Carmen Trutanich, City Attorneys, and Paul L. Winnemore, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Respondent. _________________________ 2 This is an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in an action against the City of Los Angeles (City)1 brought by two former Los Angeles police officers, Andrew Buesa and Michael Cardenas. Plaintiffs seek damages for a violation of their rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq. (POBRA)).2 The gravamen of their complaint is that a perjured declaration submitted by the City deprived them of their statute of limitations defense in an administrative mandamus proceeding over their discharges. The issue is whether they may maintain this as a separate action, or whether under the doctrine of collateral estoppel it is barred by the final judgment denying their petition for administrative mandamus. We conclude that plaintiffs‟ action under POBRA is barred because it constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the mandate judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Since this matter is on appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, we take our factual summary from the allegations of the second amended complaint, which is the charging pleading. On February 2, 2002, plaintiffs participated in the arrest of a suspect following a car and foot chase. The same day, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) learned of alleged acts of misconduct by plaintiffs arising from that arrest. The next day, Sergeant Joe Losorelli, of the LAPD Internal Affairs Group, was assigned to investigate the alleged misconduct. On August 15, 2002, Losorelli met with a deputy district attorney in the Los Angeles County District Attorney‟s Office for the purpose of seeking a determination whether criminal charges should be filed against plaintiffs based on the February 2002 incident. Losorelli met with the deputy district attorney again on October 2, 2002, at which time he provided a copy of his investigation and witness statements. 1 Police Chief William J. Bratton was a named defendant in the original complaint, but he was deleted in the second amended complaint, the charging pleading. He is not a party to this appeal. 2 Statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated. 3 According to plaintiffs, the district attorney‟s office opened its criminal investigation against plaintiffs that day. POBRA provides a one-year statute of limitations for bringing of police misconduct charges. The time runs from discovery of the misconduct. (§ 3304, subd. (d).) Section 3304, subdivision (d)(1) tolls the limitations period while a criminal investigation or prosecution is pending. On December 2, 2002, Losorelli asked LAPD superiors to toll the statute of limitations against plaintiffs because of the pending criminal investigation. He asked that the period be tolled from his August 15, 2002 meeting with the district attorney‟s office until the conclusion of the criminal investigation. The criminal investigation was terminated on February 11, 2003, when the deputy district attorney in charge of the case elected not to seek a grand jury indictment. Personnel complaints against plaintiffs were filed at the Los Angeles Police Commission on August 3, 2003, alleging misconduct arising from the February 2002 arrest. They were served the next day. On August 3, 2004, a board of rights found plaintiffs guilty of misconduct and recommended that they be discharged. On September 29, 2004, the chief of police adopted the recommendation that plaintiffs be terminated for failure to report the use of force against a suspect. The chief signed orders removing them from employment, effective that day. Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) on December 14, 2004 seeking review of their terminations. They alleged that Losorelli furnished a false declaration regarding tolling, which was used by defendant in responding to the petition. Allegedly, Losorelli knew that pursuant to a policy of LAPD and the district attorney‟s office, only the latter was authorized to open a criminal investigation against sworn personnel. According to the complaint, the district attorney‟s office opened the criminal investigation against plaintiffs on October 2, 2002. Plaintiffs allege: “Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that his investigation against plaintiffs was considered a criminal investigation from the beginning (as of February 2, 2002). Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that he first presented the case against plaintiffs to [the deputy district 4 attorney] for possible criminal filing at a July 31, 2002 meeting, when this meeting actually took place on August 15, 2002.” Allegedly, with knowledge that the August 3, 2003 personnel complaints against plaintiffs were time-barred, Losorelli presented a false declaration in the mandamus action “with the intent of fraudulently extending the tolling period for criminal investigations” authorized by section 3304, subdivision (d) “and with the malicious intent to deprive plaintiffs of their rights,” and further employment with the LAPD. According to plaintiffs, they discovered Losorelli‟s wrongful conduct on July 25, 2007, after the administrative mandamus proceeding was concluded. They do not explain the circumstances of that discovery. Plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate was denied by the trial court. The court found the weight of evidence at the administrative hearing supported the decision to terminate plaintiffs. It identified the application of the POBRA statute of limitations as “the main legal issue in the case.” The court noted that both sides had submitted documentary evidence and declarations on the limitations issue, and that no objection to this evidence was made by either side. The trial court found: “The disciplinary action against the petitioners is not barred by the limitations provision of the POBR” because of the tolling provision in section 3304, subdivision (d)(1). The court stated that charges were served on plaintiffs 18 months and two days after the alleged misconduct. It found: “The alleged misconduct was the subject of a criminal investigation that commenced on or before July 31, 2002, when an LAPD investigator met with the District Attorney regarding the matter, and which did not end until February 11, 2003, when the District Attorney decided not to ask the grand jury for an indictment because of the lack of evidence. The one-year limitation period was therefore tolled for six months and eleven days. The investigation was therefore completed and notice of charges were served upon the petitioner[s] within the 5 twelve month period required by section 3304(d).” No appeal was filed from the denial of the petition for administrative mandate and that order is now final.3 Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this separate action seeking reinstatement on September 27, 2007. They filed a first amended complaint which was the subject of a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion was granted with leave to amend. Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint dropped the claim for reinstatement, and, instead sought damages against the City for violation of POBRA. City responded with a new motion for judgment on the pleadings. At the first hearing on the motion, the trial court requested additional briefing on whether perjury in a prior proceeding may be the basis for a collateral attack on the judgment. After supplemental briefing on that issue, a second hearing was held. The court found: “The gravamen of this lawsuit is an action under Government Code section 3309.5, but it‟s based upon plaintiffs‟ claim for perjury in the underlying action in the mandamus proceeding.” The court observed that the weight of California authority is that perjury is not a basis for collateral attack on a judgment. It found “that since the gravamen of the complaint in this case is perjury in a prior proceeding and further based upon the principles of law that perjury in a prior proceeding, which is intrinsic fraud, is not grounds for collateral attack, the court is going to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Judgment was entered in favor of City. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION “The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a general demurrer: We treat the pleadings as admitting all of the material facts properly pleaded, but not any contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law contained therein. We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. We review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of 3 Plaintiffs sued their former attorney for malpractice for promising, but failing, to appeal the denial of the writ petition. We are not informed of the outcome of that action. 6 action under any theory. [Citation.]” (Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298.) The issue presented is whether the action for damages under POBRA is barred by the final judgment following denial of plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Plaintiffs argue they are not collaterally attacking the mandate judgment, which is final, and therefore the doctrines of finality of judgments and collateral estoppel do not apply. Their theory is that their procedural rights under POBRA were thwarted by the alleged perjury by Sergeant Losorelli. Rather than seeking reinstatement to the LAPD, plaintiffs now seek damages for emotional distress, lost earnings and benefits (including pensions), both past and future. They also seek a civil penalty of $25,000 under section 3309.5, and costs of suit. Finally, plaintiffs seek “an order of injunctive or extraordinary relief that the court deems necessary and just to prevent such future similar actions on the part of defendants against other employees.” A. POBRA POBRA “sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace officers (see § 3301) by the public entities which employ them. (§§ 3300 et seq.) „It is a catalogue of the minimum rights (§ 3310) the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable employer-employee relations (§ 3301).‟ (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 135.)” (Gales v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1600, fns. omitted (Gales).) Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint alleges an action under section 3309.5, which provides a private right of action for police officers who claim a violation of their rights under POBRA.4 4 In pertinent part, section 3309.5 provides: “(a) It shall be unlawful for any public safety department to deny or refuse to any public safety officer the rights and protections guaranteed to him or her by this chapter. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) The superior court shall have initial jurisdiction over any proceeding brought by any public safety officer against any public safety department for alleged violations of this chapter. [¶] (d)(1) In any case where the superior court finds that a public safety department has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall render appropriate injunctive or other 7 B. Availability of POBRA Cause Of Action City argues that plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action under POBRA because the alleged perjury was committed in the administrative mandamus proceedings after plaintiffs had been discharged from the LAPD. At that point, City argues, plaintiffs were no longer peace officers as defined by section 3301. Plaintiffs respond that the purpose of POBRA would be defeated if their rights are guaranteed only up to the point of discharge. We need not resolve whether a cause of action lies under POBRA based on a false declaration filed in an administrative mandamus proceeding because the time to challenge the declaration is in the Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 proceeding. A subsequent collateral attack on that basis is not allowed, as we next discuss. C. Finality of Adjudications The California Supreme Court examined the principles underlying the finality of judgments in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 (Cedars-Sinai), in which it held that there is no separate tort for intentional spoliation of evidence. The court reviewed several cases that denied a tort remedy for the presentation of false evidence or suppression of evidence and observed these decisions “rest on a concern for the finality of adjudication.” (Id. at p. 10.) “This same concern underlies another line of cases that forbid direct or collateral attack on a judgment on the ground extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety department from taking any punitive action against the public safety officer. [¶] . . . [¶] (e) In addition to the extraordinary relief afforded by this chapter, upon a finding by the superior court that a public safety department, its employees, agents, or assigns, with respect to acts taken within the scope of employment, maliciously violated any provision of this chapter with the intent to injure the public safety officer, the public safety department shall, for each and every violation, be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) to be awarded to the public safety officer whose right or protection was denied . . . . If the court so finds, and there is sufficient evidence to establish actual damages suffered by the officer whose right or protection was denied, the public safety department shall also be liable for the amount of the actual damages.” 8 that evidence was falsified, concealed, or suppressed. After the time for seeking a new trial has expired and any appeals have been exhausted, a final judgment may not be directly attacked and set aside on the ground that evidence has been suppressed, concealed, or falsified; . . . such fraud is „intrinsic‟ rather than „extrinsic.‟ [Citations.] Similarly, under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, a judgment may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that evidence was falsified or destroyed. [Citations.]” (Ibid., italics added.) The claim that the judgment was based on forged documents or perjured testimony does not obviate the force of this policy favoring finality of judgments. As explained in Pico v. Cohn (1891) 91 Cal. 129, upon which the Supreme Court relied, “„[W]e think it is settled beyond controversy that a decree will not be vacated merely because it was obtained by forged documents or perjured testimony. The reason of this rule is, that there must be an end of litigation; and when parties have once submitted a matter . . . for investigation and determination, and when they have exhausted every means for reviewing such determination in the same proceeding, it must be regarded as final and conclusive . . . . [¶] . . . [W]hen [the aggrieved party] has a trial, he must be prepared to meet and expose perjury then and there. . . . The trial is his opportunity for making the truth appear. If, unfortunately, he fails, being overborne by perjured testimony, and if he likewise fails to show the injustice that has been done him on motion for a new trial, and the judgment is affirmed on appeal, he is without remedy. The wrong, in such case, is of course a most grievous one, and no doubt the legislature and the courts would be glad to redress it if a rule could be devised that would remedy the evil without producing mischiefs far worse than the evil to be remedied. Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice . . . .‟” (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11, italics added, quoting Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134; accord, United States v. Throckmorton (1878) 98 U.S. 61, 68-69.) 9 D. Intrinsic Fraud Courts traditionally have distinguished between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, a distinction which “is of critical importance because intrinsic fraud cannot be used to overthrow a judgment, even where the party was unaware of the fraud at the time and did not have a chance to raise it at trial.” (Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810, 828.) As we have discussed, the introduction of perjured testimony is a classic example of intrinsic fraud. (See also Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 634, cited with approval in Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 828.) Plaintiffs argue these principles do not apply because their second amended complaint does not seek to invalidate the denial of the mandate petition and does not seek their reinstatement. They characterize the two actions: “The prior action litigated whether [plaintiffs] were entitled to equitable relief because inter alia the City of Los Angeles brought charges against them beyond the one year statute of limitations. The present action seeks statutory penalties and damages for a different and distinct violation of Government Code § 3309.5 by an employee of the City of Los Angeles.” They rely on Corral v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 1004 (Corral). Corral arose out of an uninsured motorist arbitration between an insured and her insurer. The insurer refused to stipulate that the third party involved in the accident with the insured was uninsured. The arbitration was continued to allow the insured to obtain evidence that the third party was uninsured or to obtain a stipulation to that effect. When neither was obtained, counsel for the insured submitted on the evidence produced at the hearing. The arbitrator found for the insurer. Six weeks later the insured sought to reopen the arbitration based on a new declaration from the third party stating that he was uninsured. The request was denied on the ground the arbitrator lacked authority to grant the relief requested. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1007-1008.) The insured‟s motion in the superior court to vacate the arbitration award was denied as untimely, a ruling that was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. (Id. at p. 1008.) 10 The insured then filed a separate action against the insurer for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In it, she alleged that at all times the insurer knew that the third party was uninsured, and fraudulently contended at the arbitration hearing that he was insured. In opposition to the defense motion for summary judgment, counsel for the insured submitted his declaration in which he stated that a claims manager for the insured had told him before the arbitration that the insurer would treat the claim as an uninsured motorist case. The attorney declared that, in reliance on these assurances, he made no effort to obtain evidence of the third party‟s lack of insurance coverage. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1008-1009.) The Corral court rejected the insurer‟s argument that the bad faith action was barred by either res judicata or the policies underlying finality of judgments. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 1009.) Instead, it held that each proceeding was based on a different claim of right: the arbitration proceeding was brought to recover benefits under the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance contract; the bad faith cause of action was not based on facts surrounding the automobile collision or the terms of the insurance policy, but on bad faith (refusal to acknowledge that the third party motorist was uninsured) committed after the collision. The court concluded that the bad faith claim constituted a different cause of action, and so was not barred by collateral estoppel. (Id. at pp. 1011-1012.) It held that the bad faith action was “not a collateral attack upon the arbitrator‟s award as it is not directed toward directly preventing the enforcement of that award or defeating rights acquired under it.” (Id. at p. 1013.) The court in Corral acknowledged a then recent case that reached a different result, but disagreed with its holding. The case was Rios v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 811, which held that the doctrine of finality of judgments barred a separate action for bad faith alleging that in an arbitration between insurer and insured, the insurer had presented false evidence and testimony. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1012-1014.) But Rios (and several other decisions) were cited with approval by our Supreme Court in Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 10. Of course, the Corral court did not 11 have the benefit of the Supreme Court‟s reasoning in Cedars-Sinai, which was decided some 19 years later. Plaintiffs do not cite or discuss Rios, but argue that Corral should apply because in that case, as in this one, the facts giving rise to the second action occurred during the first proceeding. They contend: “As demonstrated in Corral, it is the extraordinary obligations of the defendant that allows the second action to proceed. In that case, it was the insurance company‟s obligation of good faith and fair dealing. . . . Similarly, in the present case the City of Los Angeles cannot get away with its conduct at the hearing on the writ where it presented the perjurous [sic] declaration because it had an independent obligation not to violate [plaintiffs‟] rights under Government Code, § 3309.5.” Here, to prevail in their action for damages, plaintiffs had to prove a violation of POBRA based upon defendant‟s reliance on a perjured declaration to show that the tolling of the time to file disciplinary actions lasted long enough to render their discharges timely. This goes to the heart of the trial court‟s finding in the mandate proceeding. To the extent that Corral stands for the proposition that the finality of judgments doctrine does not apply to a separate bad faith action arising from the presentation of false or perjured testimony in an earlier proceeding, we disagree, and instead follow Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th 1 and Rios, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 818-819. Plaintiffs also rely on Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1331 (Miller). In that case, the executor of an estate hired a law firm to represent her in connection with her duties. At the conclusion of the probate matter, the firm requested and was awarded its fees except for one category which the probate court found to involve work for the executor in her individual capacity. The firm did not appeal that decision. Instead, it filed a new action seeking quantum meruit recovery of the denied fees directly from the client. The trial court held the action was barred by the final judgment in the probate case. The Court of Appeal reversed. Significantly, it found that the probate court did not decide that the law firm was not entitled to the additional fees, but only that the fees were not payable out of the estate. 12 (Id. at p. 1341.) As the Miller court explained, the probate court never ruled on the firm‟s entitlement to fees directly from its client, and therefore there was no basis for collateral estoppel. (Id. at p. 1343.) The case before us is quite different. The court ruled on the tolling issue in the mandate proceeding. Indeed it was the central question in the case. “„Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an issue only if (1) the issue is identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior proceeding or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)‟ (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.)” (Plumley v. Mockett (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1048-1049.) That describes the present case. Because the tolling issue was actually litigated in the mandate proceeding, a new claim based on the allegedly perjured declaration is a collateral attack on the mandate decision. Perjured testimony cannot be the basis for a separate proceeding. (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11.) In light of our conclusion, we need not and do not address City‟s other arguments. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. City is to have its costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. EPSTEIN, P. J. We concur: WILLHITE, J. MANELLA, J. Source: barstowwatch.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: attorneysearchco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com
Source: probatecourtco.com

Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr & Smith Welcomes Marcelle P. Mouledoux

Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr & Smith (GJTBS) is a Gulf South regional law firm dedicated to delivering value in legal counsel for 25 years to local, national and international clients in dozens of industries. GJTBS employs over 90 attorneys located in ten cities in Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia and Missouri. GJTBS attorneys are experienced in handling insurance defense, admiralty and maritime law, energy, oil and gas, products liability, employer’s liability, general casualty, professional liability, property, construction, transportation, title resolution, amusements, sports and leisure law, restaurant and retail law, as well as corporate transactional matters.
Source: jlns.com

Southern District Stern Review: Rakoff Rules that Fraudulent Transfer Actions Belong in Bankruptcy Court, But Only for Reports and Recommendations

  Texas, Gonzalez de la Garza Genealogy Collection   Vermont, Vital Records, 1760-1954   Washington State County Land Records, 1852-1935   Washington State County Probate Case Files, 1832-1950   Washington State County Records, 1885-1950   Wisconsin, Fond du Lac Public Library Records, 1848-1980 New images have been added to the following databases unless otherwise noted: Australia, Queensland Cemetery Records, 1802-1990 Australia, Tasmania, Miscellaneous Records, 1829-1961 Austria, Seigniorial Records, 1537-1888 Bolivia, Catholic Church Records, 1566-1996 Brazil Civil Registration, 1870-2009 Canada, Ontario Births, 1869-1912  (Index records) Canada, Quebec Notarial Records, 1800-1900 Canada, Saskatchewan, Judicial District Court Records, 1891-1954 Canada, Saskatchewan, Probate Estate Files, 1887-1931 Canada, Quebec Notarial Records, 1800-1900 Chile, Santiago, Cementerio General, 1821-2010                       China, Collection of Genealogies, 1500-1900 Colombia, Catholic Church Records, 1600-2008                     Costa Rica, Civil Registration, 1860-1975 Czech Republic, Censuses, 1843-1921 Czech Republic, Church Books, 1552-1935 Czech Republic, Land Records, 1450-1850 Czech Republic, Třeboň, Nobility Seignorial records, 1664-1698 Dominican Republic Civil Registration, 1801-2006 El Salvador, Civil Registration Records, 1836-1910 England and Wales Census, 1871 England, Norfolk Parish Registers, 1538-1900  (Index records and images) Estonia, Church Books 1835-194 Germany Marriages, 1558-1929  (Index records) Germany, Bavaria, Dinkelsbühl Miscellaneous City Records, 1804-1946 Germany, Württemberg, Albstadt, Miscellaneous City Records, 1705-1850 Guatemala, Catholic Church Records, 1581-1977 Hungary Catholic Church Records, 1636-1895  (Index records)                       Hungary Reformed Church Christenings, 1624-1895  (Index records) Hungary, Civil Registration, 1895-1980 Italy, Bologna, Bologna, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1941 Italy, Catania, Caltagirone, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1861-1941 Italy, Catania, Catania, Civil Registration (Comune), 1820-1905 Italy, Cuneo, Civil Registration (State Archive), 1795-1915 Italy, Genova, Chiavari, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1941 Italy, Napoli, Civil Registration (State Archive), 1809-1865 Italy, Pistoia, Pistoia, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1929 Italy, Ravenna, Ravenna, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1929 Italy, Trieste, Trieste, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1924-1939 Jamaica, Civil Birth Registration Korea, Collection of Genealogies, 1500-2009 Mexico, Morelos, Civil Registration, 1861-1920 Micronesia, Pohnpei, Land Records, 1971-2007 Nicaragua, Diocese of Managua, Catholic Church Records, 1740-2008 Norway Census, 1875  (Index records) Peru, Civil Registration, 1874-1996 Philippines, Civil Registration (National), 1945-1980 Poland, Roman Catholic Church Books, 1600-1950 Portugal, Aveiro, Catholic Church Records, 1550-1911 Portugal, Aveiro, Passport Registers, 1882-1965 Portugal, Aveiro, Testaments, 1900-1936 Portugal, Braga, Catholic Church Records, 1530-1911 Portugal, Bragança, Catholic Church Records, 1541-1985 Portugal, Coimbra, Catholic Church Records, 1459-1911 Portugal, Coimbra, Passport Registers and Application Files, 1835-1938 Portugal, Diocese of Lamego, Catholic Church Records, 1532-1911 Portugal, Diocese of Vila Real, Catholic Church Records, 1575-1975 Portugal, Faro, Catholic Church Records, 1587-1880 Portugal, Guarda, Catholic Church Records, 1459-1911 Portugal, Leiria, Catholic Church Records, 1534-1911   Portugal, Leiria, Passport Registers, 1861-1901 Portugal, Porto, Catholic Church Records, 1535-1949 Portugal, Porto, Catholic Church Records, 1582-1908 Portugal, Setúbal, Catholic Church Records, 1555-1911   Portugal, Viana do Castelo, Catholic Church Records, 1537-1909 Portugal, Vila Real, Catholic Church Records, 1533-1941 South Africa, Orange Free State, Estate Files, 1951-2004 South Africa, Reformed Church Records, 1856-1988 Spain, Cádiz, Testaments, 1550-1920 Spain, Consular Records of Emigrants, 1808-1960 Spain, Consular Records of Emigrants, 1808-1960 Spain, Municipal Records Sweden, Älvsborg Church Records, 1642-1897; index 1681-1860 Sweden, Blekinge Church Records, 1612-1916; index 1646-1860 Sweden, Gävleborg Church Records, 1616-1908; index 1671-1860 Sweden, Göteborg och Bohus Church Records, 1577-1932; index 1659-1860 Sweden, Gotland Church Records, 1582-1940; index 1655-1860 Sweden, Halland Church Records, 1615-1904; index 1615-1860 Sweden, Jämtland Church Records, 1582-1928; index 1642-1860 Sweden, Jönköping Church Records, 1581-1935; index 1633-1860 Sweden, Kalmar Church Records, 1577-1907; index 1625-1860 Sweden, Örebro Church Records, 1613-1918; index 1635-1860 Sweden, Skaraborg Church Records, 1612-1921; index 1625-1860 United States:   Alabama State Census, 1855  (Index records)   Alabama State Census, 1866  (Index records)   Alabama, County Estate Records, 1800-1996   Alabama, Sumter County Circuit Court Files, 1840-1950                         California, Marriage Index, 1960-1985  (Index records)                       California, San Francisco Area Funeral Home Records, 1835-1931   California, San Francisco County Records, 1824-1997   California, San Mateo County Records, 1856-1967   Connecticut, Death Index, 1949-2001  (Index records)                         Delaware, Vital Records, 1680-1962   District of Columbia Marriages, 1811-1950 (Index records and images)   Florida Marriages, 1830-1993 (Index and images)                         Florida, Tampa, Passenger Lists, 1898-1945   Georgia Headright and Bounty Land Records, 1783-1909   Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960                         Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960   Idaho, Minidoka County Records, 1913-1961   Illinois, Probate Records, 1819-1970   Indiana, Death Index, 1882-1920   (Index records)   Indiana, Marriages, 1811-1959 (Jay and Hamilton counties)  (Index records)   Kentucky, Confederate Pension Applications, 1912-1950   Kentucky, County Marriages, 1797-1954  (Index records and images)   Louisiana, Orleans Parish Vital Records, 1910, 1960   Louisiana, Parish Marriages, 1837-1957  (Index records and images)   Louisiana, Second Registration Draft Cards, compiled 1948-1959   Maine, State Archive Collections, 1790-1966   Maine, Washington County Courthouse Records, 1785-1950   Maryland, Garrett County Probate Estate and Guardianship Files, Source: blogspot.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: businessbankruptcyco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcyrecordsco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com
Source: bankruptcyforumco.com

Bankruptcy News & Information: Bankrupt Betsey Johnson Liquidating Stores

Going-out-of-business sales began Friday throughout the Betsey Johnson clothing stores as the chain liquidates. One day before, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of New York gave the go-ahead for the company to sell its inventory to liquidators. Johnson, a New York City design veteran, founded the line in 1978. She quickly becoming famous for her funky floral prints and punk-ballerina party dresses. Her dresses appeal to celebrities, teens and adults. However the chain was among all retailers hit hard by the recession as debt-strapped consumers turned away from shopping in their efforts to deal with foreclosures and job loss. Sales are being held at all 63 Betsey Johnson retail stores in the U.S., Canada and the U.K. The sales are being billed as going-out-of business events, and are offering 20 percent to 50 percent off clothing, jewelry, handbags and shoes at Betsy Johnson’s 54 retail stores and 9 clearance outlets. Fixtures will also be for sale. Steve Madden Ltd., which owns Betsy Johnson intellectual property rights, said that the company will continue to sell Betsy Johnson clothing and other products on a wholesale basis. Liquidators Gordon Brothers Group and Hilco Merchant Resources, who are jointly running the going-out-of-business sales, have announced that gift cards will be honored until June 1.
Source: blogspot.com

Lightsquared files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy

  Texas, Gonzalez de la Garza Genealogy Collection   Vermont, Vital Records, 1760-1954   Washington State County Land Records, 1852-1935   Washington State County Probate Case Files, 1832-1950   Washington State County Records, 1885-1950   Wisconsin, Fond du Lac Public Library Records, 1848-1980 New images have been added to the following databases unless otherwise noted: Australia, Queensland Cemetery Records, 1802-1990 Australia, Tasmania, Miscellaneous Records, 1829-1961 Austria, Seigniorial Records, 1537-1888 Bolivia, Catholic Church Records, 1566-1996 Brazil Civil Registration, 1870-2009 Canada, Ontario Births, 1869-1912  (Index records) Canada, Quebec Notarial Records, 1800-1900 Canada, Saskatchewan, Judicial District Court Records, 1891-1954 Canada, Saskatchewan, Probate Estate Files, 1887-1931 Canada, Quebec Notarial Records, 1800-1900 Chile, Santiago, Cementerio General, 1821-2010                       China, Collection of Genealogies, 1500-1900 Colombia, Catholic Church Records, 1600-2008                     Costa Rica, Civil Registration, 1860-1975 Czech Republic, Censuses, 1843-1921 Czech Republic, Church Books, 1552-1935 Czech Republic, Land Records, 1450-1850 Czech Republic, Třeboň, Nobility Seignorial records, 1664-1698 Dominican Republic Civil Registration, 1801-2006 El Salvador, Civil Registration Records, 1836-1910 England and Wales Census, 1871 England, Norfolk Parish Registers, 1538-1900  (Index records and images) Estonia, Church Books 1835-194 Germany Marriages, 1558-1929  (Index records) Germany, Bavaria, Dinkelsbühl Miscellaneous City Records, 1804-1946 Germany, Württemberg, Albstadt, Miscellaneous City Records, 1705-1850 Guatemala, Catholic Church Records, 1581-1977 Hungary Catholic Church Records, 1636-1895  (Index records)                       Hungary Reformed Church Christenings, 1624-1895  (Index records) Hungary, Civil Registration, 1895-1980 Italy, Bologna, Bologna, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1941 Italy, Catania, Caltagirone, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1861-1941 Italy, Catania, Catania, Civil Registration (Comune), 1820-1905 Italy, Cuneo, Civil Registration (State Archive), 1795-1915 Italy, Genova, Chiavari, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1941 Italy, Napoli, Civil Registration (State Archive), 1809-1865 Italy, Pistoia, Pistoia, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1929 Italy, Ravenna, Ravenna, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1929 Italy, Trieste, Trieste, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1924-1939 Jamaica, Civil Birth Registration Korea, Collection of Genealogies, 1500-2009 Mexico, Morelos, Civil Registration, 1861-1920 Micronesia, Pohnpei, Land Records, 1971-2007 Nicaragua, Diocese of Managua, Catholic Church Records, 1740-2008 Norway Census, 1875  (Index records) Peru, Civil Registration, 1874-1996 Philippines, Civil Registration (National), 1945-1980 Poland, Roman Catholic Church Books, 1600-1950 Portugal, Aveiro, Catholic Church Records, 1550-1911 Portugal, Aveiro, Passport Registers, 1882-1965 Portugal, Aveiro, Testaments, 1900-1936 Portugal, Braga, Catholic Church Records, 1530-1911 Portugal, Bragança, Catholic Church Records, 1541-1985 Portugal, Coimbra, Catholic Church Records, 1459-1911 Portugal, Coimbra, Passport Registers and Application Files, 1835-1938 Portugal, Diocese of Lamego, Catholic Church Records, 1532-1911 Portugal, Diocese of Vila Real, Catholic Church Records, 1575-1975 Portugal, Faro, Catholic Church Records, 1587-1880 Portugal, Guarda, Catholic Church Records, 1459-1911 Portugal, Leiria, Catholic Church Records, 1534-1911   Portugal, Leiria, Passport Registers, 1861-1901 Portugal, Porto, Catholic Church Records, 1535-1949 Portugal, Porto, Catholic Church Records, 1582-1908 Portugal, Setúbal, Catholic Church Records, 1555-1911   Portugal, Viana do Castelo, Catholic Church Records, 1537-1909 Portugal, Vila Real, Catholic Church Records, 1533-1941 South Africa, Orange Free State, Estate Files, 1951-2004 South Africa, Reformed Church Records, 1856-1988 Spain, Cádiz, Testaments, 1550-1920 Spain, Consular Records of Emigrants, 1808-1960 Spain, Consular Records of Emigrants, 1808-1960 Spain, Municipal Records Sweden, Älvsborg Church Records, 1642-1897; index 1681-1860 Sweden, Blekinge Church Records, 1612-1916; index 1646-1860 Sweden, Gävleborg Church Records, 1616-1908; index 1671-1860 Sweden, Göteborg och Bohus Church Records, 1577-1932; index 1659-1860 Sweden, Gotland Church Records, 1582-1940; index 1655-1860 Sweden, Halland Church Records, 1615-1904; index 1615-1860 Sweden, Jämtland Church Records, 1582-1928; index 1642-1860 Sweden, Jönköping Church Records, 1581-1935; index 1633-1860 Sweden, Kalmar Church Records, 1577-1907; index 1625-1860 Sweden, Örebro Church Records, 1613-1918; index 1635-1860 Sweden, Skaraborg Church Records, 1612-1921; index 1625-1860 United States:   Alabama State Census, 1855  (Index records)   Alabama State Census, 1866  (Index records)   Alabama, County Estate Records, 1800-1996   Alabama, Sumter County Circuit Court Files, 1840-1950                         California, Marriage Index, 1960-1985  (Index records)                       California, San Francisco Area Funeral Home Records, 1835-1931   California, San Francisco County Records, 1824-1997   California, San Mateo County Records, 1856-1967   Connecticut, Death Index, 1949-2001  (Index records)                         Delaware, Vital Records, 1680-1962   District of Columbia Marriages, 1811-1950 (Index records and images)   Florida Marriages, 1830-1993 (Index and images)                         Florida, Tampa, Passenger Lists, 1898-1945   Georgia Headright and Bounty Land Records, 1783-1909   Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960                         Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960   Idaho, Minidoka County Records, 1913-1961   Illinois, Probate Records, 1819-1970   Indiana, Death Index, 1882-1920   (Index records)   Indiana, Marriages, 1811-1959 (Jay and Hamilton counties)  (Index records)   Kentucky, Confederate Pension Applications, 1912-1950   Kentucky, County Marriages, 1797-1954  (Index records and images)   Louisiana, Orleans Parish Vital Records, 1910, 1960   Louisiana, Parish Marriages, 1837-1957  (Index records and images)   Louisiana, Second Registration Draft Cards, compiled 1948-1959   Maine, State Archive Collections, 1790-1966   Maine, Washington County Courthouse Records, 1785-1950   Maryland, Garrett County Probate Estate and Guardianship Files, Source: blogspot.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcylawyersco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com
Source: businessbankruptcyco.com

New Pilot Project Will Enhance Public Access to Federal Court Opinions

Gary Price (gprice@mediasourceinc.com) is a librarian, writer, consultant, and frequent conference speaker based in the Washington D.C. metro area. Before launching INFOdocket, Price and Shirl Kennedy were the founders and senior editors at ResourceShelf and DocuTicker for 10 years. From 2006-2009 he was Director of Online Information Services at Ask.com, and is currently a contributing editor at Search Engine Land.
Source: infodocket.com

Mixed Numbers From Dynegy

Earlier, in November 2011, Dynegy filed for bankruptcy protection. In December, the company filed a proposed Plan of restructuring for the unit with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. Later, on May 1, 2012, the company and certain creditors of the company entered into a Settlement Agreement and a Plan Support Agreement. The Settlement Agreement was filed with and is subject to bankruptcy court approval. The Plan Support Agreement envisions a significantly stronger balance sheet for the company upon completion of the restructuring. The company will have reduced debt and lease obligations by over $4 billion and expects net debt at completion of the restructuring to be approximately $600 million. A hearing on the Settlement Agreement has been scheduled for June 1, 2012. The Plan Support Agreement contemplates the filing of a revised Plan and Disclosure Statement by May 30, 2012 and the completion of the restructuring by September 28, 2012.
Source: dailymarkets.com

Alabama CWA Local Financial Secretary Indicted for Embezzlement

On March 29, Tammy Greene, former financial secretary for Local 83793 of the Communications Workers of America, was indicted in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama on one count of embezzlement totaling $31,076.07 from the Selma-based union. The indictment follows a probe by the U.S. Labor Department’s Office of Labor-Management Standards.
Source: nlpc.org

Bankruptcy filings rose sharply in the U.S. in February of 2012

Although many reports suggest that both employment rates and home prices are steadily rising, a representative for the American Bankruptcy Institute stated in a press release that unemployment coupled with the stagnant housing market led to the increase.  There are real indications that our economy is improving, but these numbers prove that many Americans, particularly Californians, are still struggling to overcome their debt.  I believe the increase in filings also reflects how many debtors tried their hardest to avoid filing bankruptcy, but ultimately realized that in these times it is not a battle they could win.
Source: california-bankruptcyattorney.com

Video: (Sacramento Bankruptcy Attorney) – 1-916-446-1791 Contact A Sacramento Bankruptcy Attorney

How To Find The Right Sacramento Bankruptcy Attorney For Resolving Your Financial Woes

Sufficient Availability And A Consistent Point Of Contact One very important feature to consider is the nature of the provided point of contact and this true whether you are searching for a reputable Tahoe bankruptcy attorney or a Sacramento bankruptcy lawyer. Having a consistent point of contact ensures that you will always have access to a legal professional who is knowledgeable about your case and is aware of all of the various nuances concerning your specific circumstances. Simply asking whether or not you will have a consistent point of contact throughout the duration of your case can alleviate a lot of the common frustrations in dealing with legal issues related to your finances.
Source: lawmarketingsite.com

(Sacramento Bankruptcy Lawyer)

www.SacramentoBankruptcyAttorneysAtLaw.com How to File Chapter 13 bankruptcy in Sacramento and in what ways a Sacramento bankruptcy lawyer can help. Reduce debt up-to 95%, end creditor calls, and give yourself the fresh start you need. FREE Bankruptcy Guide and Consultation 888-696-0302. Get FREE advice from Sacramento bankruptcy attorneys and find out how getting out of debt can be as easy as pressing the Reset Button! Find Out about Chapter 7 bankruptcy is advantages here http Video Rating: 0 / 5
Source: cqoc.com

Resolving Debt With The Right Sacramento Bankruptcy Attorney

Availability And Point Of Contact One very important feature to consider is the nature of the provided point of contact and this true whether you are searching for a reputable Tahoe bankruptcy attorney or a Sacramento bankruptcy attorney. Having a consistent point of contact ensures that you will always have access to a legal professional who is knowledgeable about your case and is aware of all of the various nuances concerning your specific circumstances. Taking the time to inquire as to whether or not your point of contract will remain consistent throughout your filing will alleviate many of the frustrations that are most commonly experienced when dealing with legal matters that are financial in nature.
Source: getirsinfo.com

Find A Good Sacramento Bankruptcy Lawyer

Texas is the second largest state in the United States, and as you can imagine, there are plenty of San Antonio bankruptcy lawyers available for you to choose from. The tough part isn’t necessarily finding an attorney, it’s choosing one. You will find that by doing a bit of research, you can minimize your results down so that you’re left choosing from only the lawyers who will benefit you and your case.
Source: ezinemark.com

Sacramento CA Bankruptcy Lawyer

Filed 10/2/09 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR ANDREW BUESA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. B212854 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC378215) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Elihu M. Berle, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of David W. Allor and David W. Allor for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Rockard J. Delgadillo and Carmen Trutanich, City Attorneys, and Paul L. Winnemore, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Respondent. _________________________ 2 This is an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in an action against the City of Los Angeles (City)1 brought by two former Los Angeles police officers, Andrew Buesa and Michael Cardenas. Plaintiffs seek damages for a violation of their rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq. (POBRA)).2 The gravamen of their complaint is that a perjured declaration submitted by the City deprived them of their statute of limitations defense in an administrative mandamus proceeding over their discharges. The issue is whether they may maintain this as a separate action, or whether under the doctrine of collateral estoppel it is barred by the final judgment denying their petition for administrative mandamus. We conclude that plaintiffs‟ action under POBRA is barred because it constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the mandate judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Since this matter is on appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, we take our factual summary from the allegations of the second amended complaint, which is the charging pleading. On February 2, 2002, plaintiffs participated in the arrest of a suspect following a car and foot chase. The same day, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) learned of alleged acts of misconduct by plaintiffs arising from that arrest. The next day, Sergeant Joe Losorelli, of the LAPD Internal Affairs Group, was assigned to investigate the alleged misconduct. On August 15, 2002, Losorelli met with a deputy district attorney in the Los Angeles County District Attorney‟s Office for the purpose of seeking a determination whether criminal charges should be filed against plaintiffs based on the February 2002 incident. Losorelli met with the deputy district attorney again on October 2, 2002, at which time he provided a copy of his investigation and witness statements. 1 Police Chief William J. Bratton was a named defendant in the original complaint, but he was deleted in the second amended complaint, the charging pleading. He is not a party to this appeal. 2 Statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated. 3 According to plaintiffs, the district attorney‟s office opened its criminal investigation against plaintiffs that day. POBRA provides a one-year statute of limitations for bringing of police misconduct charges. The time runs from discovery of the misconduct. (§ 3304, subd. (d).) Section 3304, subdivision (d)(1) tolls the limitations period while a criminal investigation or prosecution is pending. On December 2, 2002, Losorelli asked LAPD superiors to toll the statute of limitations against plaintiffs because of the pending criminal investigation. He asked that the period be tolled from his August 15, 2002 meeting with the district attorney‟s office until the conclusion of the criminal investigation. The criminal investigation was terminated on February 11, 2003, when the deputy district attorney in charge of the case elected not to seek a grand jury indictment. Personnel complaints against plaintiffs were filed at the Los Angeles Police Commission on August 3, 2003, alleging misconduct arising from the February 2002 arrest. They were served the next day. On August 3, 2004, a board of rights found plaintiffs guilty of misconduct and recommended that they be discharged. On September 29, 2004, the chief of police adopted the recommendation that plaintiffs be terminated for failure to report the use of force against a suspect. The chief signed orders removing them from employment, effective that day. Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) on December 14, 2004 seeking review of their terminations. They alleged that Losorelli furnished a false declaration regarding tolling, which was used by defendant in responding to the petition. Allegedly, Losorelli knew that pursuant to a policy of LAPD and the district attorney‟s office, only the latter was authorized to open a criminal investigation against sworn personnel. According to the complaint, the district attorney‟s office opened the criminal investigation against plaintiffs on October 2, 2002. Plaintiffs allege: “Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that his investigation against plaintiffs was considered a criminal investigation from the beginning (as of February 2, 2002). Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that he first presented the case against plaintiffs to [the deputy district 4 attorney] for possible criminal filing at a July 31, 2002 meeting, when this meeting actually took place on August 15, 2002.” Allegedly, with knowledge that the August 3, 2003 personnel complaints against plaintiffs were time-barred, Losorelli presented a false declaration in the mandamus action “with the intent of fraudulently extending the tolling period for criminal investigations” authorized by section 3304, subdivision (d) “and with the malicious intent to deprive plaintiffs of their rights,” and further employment with the LAPD. According to plaintiffs, they discovered Losorelli‟s wrongful conduct on July 25, 2007, after the administrative mandamus proceeding was concluded. They do not explain the circumstances of that discovery. Plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate was denied by the trial court. The court found the weight of evidence at the administrative hearing supported the decision to terminate plaintiffs. It identified the application of the POBRA statute of limitations as “the main legal issue in the case.” The court noted that both sides had submitted documentary evidence and declarations on the limitations issue, and that no objection to this evidence was made by either side. The trial court found: “The disciplinary action against the petitioners is not barred by the limitations provision of the POBR” because of the tolling provision in section 3304, subdivision (d)(1). The court stated that charges were served on plaintiffs 18 months and two days after the alleged misconduct. It found: “The alleged misconduct was the subject of a criminal investigation that commenced on or before July 31, 2002, when an LAPD investigator met with the District Attorney regarding the matter, and which did not end until February 11, 2003, when the District Attorney decided not to ask the grand jury for an indictment because of the lack of evidence. The one-year limitation period was therefore tolled for six months and eleven days. The investigation was therefore completed and notice of charges were served upon the petitioner[s] within the 5 twelve month period required by section 3304(d).” No appeal was filed from the denial of the petition for administrative mandate and that order is now final.3 Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this separate action seeking reinstatement on September 27, 2007. They filed a first amended complaint which was the subject of a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion was granted with leave to amend. Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint dropped the claim for reinstatement, and, instead sought damages against the City for violation of POBRA. City responded with a new motion for judgment on the pleadings. At the first hearing on the motion, the trial court requested additional briefing on whether perjury in a prior proceeding may be the basis for a collateral attack on the judgment. After supplemental briefing on that issue, a second hearing was held. The court found: “The gravamen of this lawsuit is an action under Government Code section 3309.5, but it‟s based upon plaintiffs‟ claim for perjury in the underlying action in the mandamus proceeding.” The court observed that the weight of California authority is that perjury is not a basis for collateral attack on a judgment. It found “that since the gravamen of the complaint in this case is perjury in a prior proceeding and further based upon the principles of law that perjury in a prior proceeding, which is intrinsic fraud, is not grounds for collateral attack, the court is going to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Judgment was entered in favor of City. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION “The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a general demurrer: We treat the pleadings as admitting all of the material facts properly pleaded, but not any contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law contained therein. We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. We review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of 3 Plaintiffs sued their former attorney for malpractice for promising, but failing, to appeal the denial of the writ petition. We are not informed of the outcome of that action. 6 action under any theory. [Citation.]” (Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298.) The issue presented is whether the action for damages under POBRA is barred by the final judgment following denial of plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Plaintiffs argue they are not collaterally attacking the mandate judgment, which is final, and therefore the doctrines of finality of judgments and collateral estoppel do not apply. Their theory is that their procedural rights under POBRA were thwarted by the alleged perjury by Sergeant Losorelli. Rather than seeking reinstatement to the LAPD, plaintiffs now seek damages for emotional distress, lost earnings and benefits (including pensions), both past and future. They also seek a civil penalty of $25,000 under section 3309.5, and costs of suit. Finally, plaintiffs seek “an order of injunctive or extraordinary relief that the court deems necessary and just to prevent such future similar actions on the part of defendants against other employees.” A. POBRA POBRA “sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace officers (see § 3301) by the public entities which employ them. (§§ 3300 et seq.) „It is a catalogue of the minimum rights (§ 3310) the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable employer-employee relations (§ 3301).‟ (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 135.)” (Gales v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1600, fns. omitted (Gales).) Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint alleges an action under section 3309.5, which provides a private right of action for police officers who claim a violation of their rights under POBRA.4 4 In pertinent part, section 3309.5 provides: “(a) It shall be unlawful for any public safety department to deny or refuse to any public safety officer the rights and protections guaranteed to him or her by this chapter. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) The superior court shall have initial jurisdiction over any proceeding brought by any public safety officer against any public safety department for alleged violations of this chapter. [¶] (d)(1) In any case where the superior court finds that a public safety department has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall render appropriate injunctive or other 7 B. Availability of POBRA Cause Of Action City argues that plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action under POBRA because the alleged perjury was committed in the administrative mandamus proceedings after plaintiffs had been discharged from the LAPD. At that point, City argues, plaintiffs were no longer peace officers as defined by section 3301. Plaintiffs respond that the purpose of POBRA would be defeated if their rights are guaranteed only up to the point of discharge. We need not resolve whether a cause of action lies under POBRA based on a false declaration filed in an administrative mandamus proceeding because the time to challenge the declaration is in the Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 proceeding. A subsequent collateral attack on that basis is not allowed, as we next discuss. C. Finality of Adjudications The California Supreme Court examined the principles underlying the finality of judgments in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 (Cedars-Sinai), in which it held that there is no separate tort for intentional spoliation of evidence. The court reviewed several cases that denied a tort remedy for the presentation of false evidence or suppression of evidence and observed these decisions “rest on a concern for the finality of adjudication.” (Id. at p. 10.) “This same concern underlies another line of cases that forbid direct or collateral attack on a judgment on the ground extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety department from taking any punitive action against the public safety officer. [¶] . . . [¶] (e) In addition to the extraordinary relief afforded by this chapter, upon a finding by the superior court that a public safety department, its employees, agents, or assigns, with respect to acts taken within the scope of employment, maliciously violated any provision of this chapter with the intent to injure the public safety officer, the public safety department shall, for each and every violation, be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) to be awarded to the public safety officer whose right or protection was denied . . . . If the court so finds, and there is sufficient evidence to establish actual damages suffered by the officer whose right or protection was denied, the public safety department shall also be liable for the amount of the actual damages.” 8 that evidence was falsified, concealed, or suppressed. After the time for seeking a new trial has expired and any appeals have been exhausted, a final judgment may not be directly attacked and set aside on the ground that evidence has been suppressed, concealed, or falsified; . . . such fraud is „intrinsic‟ rather than „extrinsic.‟ [Citations.] Similarly, under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, a judgment may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that evidence was falsified or destroyed. [Citations.]” (Ibid., italics added.) The claim that the judgment was based on forged documents or perjured testimony does not obviate the force of this policy favoring finality of judgments. As explained in Pico v. Cohn (1891) 91 Cal. 129, upon which the Supreme Court relied, “„[W]e think it is settled beyond controversy that a decree will not be vacated merely because it was obtained by forged documents or perjured testimony. The reason of this rule is, that there must be an end of litigation; and when parties have once submitted a matter . . . for investigation and determination, and when they have exhausted every means for reviewing such determination in the same proceeding, it must be regarded as final and conclusive . . . . [¶] . . . [W]hen [the aggrieved party] has a trial, he must be prepared to meet and expose perjury then and there. . . . The trial is his opportunity for making the truth appear. If, unfortunately, he fails, being overborne by perjured testimony, and if he likewise fails to show the injustice that has been done him on motion for a new trial, and the judgment is affirmed on appeal, he is without remedy. The wrong, in such case, is of course a most grievous one, and no doubt the legislature and the courts would be glad to redress it if a rule could be devised that would remedy the evil without producing mischiefs far worse than the evil to be remedied. Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice . . . .‟” (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11, italics added, quoting Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134; accord, United States v. Throckmorton (1878) 98 U.S. 61, 68-69.) 9 D. Intrinsic Fraud Courts traditionally have distinguished between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, a distinction which “is of critical importance because intrinsic fraud cannot be used to overthrow a judgment, even where the party was unaware of the fraud at the time and did not have a chance to raise it at trial.” (Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810, 828.) As we have discussed, the introduction of perjured testimony is a classic example of intrinsic fraud. (See also Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 634, cited with approval in Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 828.) Plaintiffs argue these principles do not apply because their second amended complaint does not seek to invalidate the denial of the mandate petition and does not seek their reinstatement. They characterize the two actions: “The prior action litigated whether [plaintiffs] were entitled to equitable relief because inter alia the City of Los Angeles brought charges against them beyond the one year statute of limitations. The present action seeks statutory penalties and damages for a different and distinct violation of Government Code § 3309.5 by an employee of the City of Los Angeles.” They rely on Corral v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 1004 (Corral). Corral arose out of an uninsured motorist arbitration between an insured and her insurer. The insurer refused to stipulate that the third party involved in the accident with the insured was uninsured. The arbitration was continued to allow the insured to obtain evidence that the third party was uninsured or to obtain a stipulation to that effect. When neither was obtained, counsel for the insured submitted on the evidence produced at the hearing. The arbitrator found for the insurer. Six weeks later the insured sought to reopen the arbitration based on a new declaration from the third party stating that he was uninsured. The request was denied on the ground the arbitrator lacked authority to grant the relief requested. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1007-1008.) The insured‟s motion in the superior court to vacate the arbitration award was denied as untimely, a ruling that was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. (Id. at p. 1008.) 10 The insured then filed a separate action against the insurer for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In it, she alleged that at all times the insurer knew that the third party was uninsured, and fraudulently contended at the arbitration hearing that he was insured. In opposition to the defense motion for summary judgment, counsel for the insured submitted his declaration in which he stated that a claims manager for the insured had told him before the arbitration that the insurer would treat the claim as an uninsured motorist case. The attorney declared that, in reliance on these assurances, he made no effort to obtain evidence of the third party‟s lack of insurance coverage. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1008-1009.) The Corral court rejected the insurer‟s argument that the bad faith action was barred by either res judicata or the policies underlying finality of judgments. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 1009.) Instead, it held that each proceeding was based on a different claim of right: the arbitration proceeding was brought to recover benefits under the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance contract; the bad faith cause of action was not based on facts surrounding the automobile collision or the terms of the insurance policy, but on bad faith (refusal to acknowledge that the third party motorist was uninsured) committed after the collision. The court concluded that the bad faith claim constituted a different cause of action, and so was not barred by collateral estoppel. (Id. at pp. 1011-1012.) It held that the bad faith action was “not a collateral attack upon the arbitrator‟s award as it is not directed toward directly preventing the enforcement of that award or defeating rights acquired under it.” (Id. at p. 1013.) The court in Corral acknowledged a then recent case that reached a different result, but disagreed with its holding. The case was Rios v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 811, which held that the doctrine of finality of judgments barred a separate action for bad faith alleging that in an arbitration between insurer and insured, the insurer had presented false evidence and testimony. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1012-1014.) But Rios (and several other decisions) were cited with approval by our Supreme Court in Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 10. Of course, the Corral court did not 11 have the benefit of the Supreme Court‟s reasoning in Cedars-Sinai, which was decided some 19 years later. Plaintiffs do not cite or discuss Rios, but argue that Corral should apply because in that case, as in this one, the facts giving rise to the second action occurred during the first proceeding. They contend: “As demonstrated in Corral, it is the extraordinary obligations of the defendant that allows the second action to proceed. In that case, it was the insurance company‟s obligation of good faith and fair dealing. . . . Similarly, in the present case the City of Los Angeles cannot get away with its conduct at the hearing on the writ where it presented the perjurous [sic] declaration because it had an independent obligation not to violate [plaintiffs‟] rights under Government Code, § 3309.5.” Here, to prevail in their action for damages, plaintiffs had to prove a violation of POBRA based upon defendant‟s reliance on a perjured declaration to show that the tolling of the time to file disciplinary actions lasted long enough to render their discharges timely. This goes to the heart of the trial court‟s finding in the mandate proceeding. To the extent that Corral stands for the proposition that the finality of judgments doctrine does not apply to a separate bad faith action arising from the presentation of false or perjured testimony in an earlier proceeding, we disagree, and instead follow Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th 1 and Rios, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 818-819. Plaintiffs also rely on Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1331 (Miller). In that case, the executor of an estate hired a law firm to represent her in connection with her duties. At the conclusion of the probate matter, the firm requested and was awarded its fees except for one category which the probate court found to involve work for the executor in her individual capacity. The firm did not appeal that decision. Instead, it filed a new action seeking quantum meruit recovery of the denied fees directly from the client. The trial court held the action was barred by the final judgment in the probate case. The Court of Appeal reversed. Significantly, it found that the probate court did not decide that the law firm was not entitled to the additional fees, but only that the fees were not payable out of the estate. 12 (Id. at p. 1341.) As the Miller court explained, the probate court never ruled on the firm‟s entitlement to fees directly from its client, and therefore there was no basis for collateral estoppel. (Id. at p. 1343.) The case before us is quite different. The court ruled on the tolling issue in the mandate proceeding. Indeed it was the central question in the case. “„Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an issue only if (1) the issue is identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior proceeding or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)‟ (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.)” (Plumley v. Mockett (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1048-1049.) That describes the present case. Because the tolling issue was actually litigated in the mandate proceeding, a new claim based on the allegedly perjured declaration is a collateral attack on the mandate decision. Perjured testimony cannot be the basis for a separate proceeding. (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11.) In light of our conclusion, we need not and do not address City‟s other arguments. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. City is to have its costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. EPSTEIN, P. J. We concur: WILLHITE, J. MANELLA, J. 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Easy Sacramento Bankruptcy lawyer Strategies ( space ) A number of Historical past The answers

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Securing The Best Sacramento Bankruptcy Attorney For Making Your Financial Goals A Reality

Availability And Point Of Contact One very important feature to consider is the nature of the provided point of contact and this true whether you are searching for a reputable Tahoe bankruptcy attorney or a Sacramento bankruptcy lawyer. Having a consistent point of contact ensures that you will always have access to a legal professional who is knowledgeable about your case and is aware of all of the various nuances concerning your specific circumstances. Simply asking whether or not you will have a consistent point of contact throughout the duration of your case can alleviate a lot of the common frustrations in dealing with legal issues related to your finances.
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What A Sacramento Bankruptcy Attorney Can Do For You

Another reason why some people may choose to file their own paperwork is because they have not fully come to grips with the severity of their economic situation. A part of them may still be stuck in denial and meeting with a bankruptcy attorney would mean openly admitting and talking about how you mismanaged your finances. Some people may be afraid of being judged for the financial decisions that they made that led them to bankruptcy in the first place. They may fear some lecture like discussions disguised as friendly or professional advice. Privacy may be another reason that some people decide to take their chances and file their bankruptcy case on their own. When you are a bankruptcy candidate you are required to make your financial transactions clear and transparent for the bankruptcy courts. Some people see this as intensely invasive and want to cut the middle man (bankruptcy attorney) out of the picture completely. By filing on their own, they cut out the one opportunity for constructive critique or criticism. These are just some of the many reasons that people decide to file their own claims each year without the help of a bankruptcy attorney.
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Bankruptcy Reorganization Chapter

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Video: Short Sale: Avoid Foreclosure

Southern District Stern Review: Rakoff Rules that Fraudulent Transfer Actions Belong in Bankruptcy Court, But Only for Reports and Recommendations

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Wireless startup LightSquared files for bankruptcy

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Tired of not …’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G1QQ714LK76QFKVH8&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Banquet Manager, Restaurant Manager and Chef de Cuisine’, ‘Reynolds Plantation’, ‘Now accepting applications for the following…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G1QR604289K51NNPT&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Chef de Cuisine’, ‘Four Peaks Grill & Tap’, ‘Four Peaks, Arizona’s number one brewery…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G1ZL6WWK30GFXZ40P&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Concrete Paver Operator’, ‘Northern Improvement Co.’, ‘Concrete Paver Operator Phoenix, AZ 928-…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G2617393X2QPFXM7P&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘PHYSICIAN’, ‘HELEN FOUNDATION’, ‘Physician Mesa, AZ Physician, Part-time,…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G29K65467V1DJ084Y&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Drywall – Framers / Hangers / Tapers’, ‘Confidential’, ‘Drywall – Top Pay and benefits for Top hands…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G2BM6JHS8WS4C0LBS&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Warehouse Manager’, ‘Confidential’, ‘Warehouse Manager Lakeside, AZ’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G2TS6NJ6WS1NPDJK4&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Ironworker’, ‘Noble Steel’, ‘Ironworkers Phoenix, AZ Phone Lea’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G36Z6JY2G5C2CZ667&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Mechanic & Equipment Assembler’, ‘Fimco Industries’, ‘Fimco Industries is currently looking for…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G3FV6TGC09YRHW9LP&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Drivers – Company Drivers and Owner Operators’, ‘Confidential’, ‘Drivers Company Drivers & Owners Operators…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G3ZF5X20QN4QNPZ8J&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘OTR DRIVERS’, ‘ANOTHER GREAT COMPANY’, ‘OTR Drivers United States 804-798′, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G4H46GZY6RQT21X85&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(’2nd Shift SMT Technician’, ‘MJS Designs, Inc.’, ’2ND shift SMT Technician Responsible for…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G4N95WZTQTXZL6632&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Electrical Journeyman’, ‘Confidential’, ‘Electrical journeyman needed with 5 years…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G4SP67M8TB2RGC4FX&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Legal Secretary’, ‘Federal Public Defender-Phoenix’, ‘LEGAL SECRETARY High volume appellate practice…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G50F60RJJRHYJLQDN&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Accountant / Bookkeeper / Tax Preparer’, ‘Another Great Company!’, ‘ACCOUNTANT/BOOKKEEPER/TAX PREPARER URGENTLY…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G6546Q97VQ3TQ6T3H&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Pool Cleaner’, ‘Complete Pool Care’, ‘Pool Cleaner Phoenix, AZ 602-92′, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G6HH6KGH02DZHL12D&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘EXP’D OPHTHALMIC SURGICAL TECH, OPERATING ROOM RN – NURSE’, ‘CONFIDENTIAL’, ‘Healthcare Scottsdale, AZ’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G6JM754WKYS07S6M6&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘FIELD MANAGERS’, ‘The Arizona Students Association’, ‘FIELD Manager Help win real improvements…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G6KP6GDH2MFMBBLTC&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘MD / Physician’, ‘Confidential’, ‘MD Seeking MD for busy adult Internal Medicine…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G6QK78NG59CHLCLFN&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Diesel Mechanics’, ‘Confidential’, ‘Diesel Mechanics West Valley Minimum 3 years…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G6TW6G16Q59CVB2WF&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Owner Ops and Drivers’, ‘KKW Trucking Inc’, ‘KKW Trucking is now hiring Owner Op’s &amp…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G818697JL0NJT4DXY&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘RNs, PTs, OTs, STs, CNAs,’, ‘BEECH HOME CARE & MEDICAL INC.’, ‘RNs, PTs, OTs, STs, CNAs E. Valley’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G84D6B98KNSP5N5PV&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Oncologist’, ‘Arizona Oncolgy’, ‘Arizona Oncology 1329 N. Beaver St. Ste …’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G8DY6T1PSV9T2NC2Y&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Structural Engineer’, ‘PK Associates LLC’, ‘Scottsdale, Arizona structural engineering…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3G8H35WWZ9PNJZ3LHN&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(’1st / 2nd Shift PCBA Solderer’, ‘MJS Designs, Inc.’, ’1st and 2nd PCBA Shift Solderer Experience…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3H0SY68PV0N3C46TZL&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Trainer – Mgr- Directors’, ‘VIRIDO CALL CENTER’, ‘Trainer – Manager – Directors N. Scottsdale’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3H10V761DMZSPF4RRG&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘FINANCE DIRECTOR / MANAGER’, ‘EDDY COUNTY’, ‘FINANCE DIRECTOR/MANAGER Starting $74,995…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3H1V36JB6VXMN6DHCY&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘FRONT DESK & HOUSEKEEPING’, ‘HOLIDAY INN EXPRESS DOWNTOWN’, ‘Front Desk & Housekeeping Phoenix, AZ’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3H3J55Z9TT72LM807J&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘HEAVY DUTY WRECKER DRIVER’, ‘ANOTHER GREAT COMPANY’, ‘Heavy Duty Wrecker Driver Williams, AZ’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3H4C272S5SDN3P86FV&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘CNC MACHINIST’, ‘JPS MANUFACTURING’, ‘CNC Machinist Scottsdale Airpark Email 3…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3H5NK75W2NDS75WR70&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘APPOINTMENT SETTING’, ‘ANOTHER GREAT COMPANY’, ‘Appointment Setting 19th Ave & Glendale…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3H6YH6P7183W3S0GL7&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘RV Service Technicians’, ‘A & M RV CENTER’, ‘Busy Anchorage, AK RV dealership needs two…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3H8BJ6NMN78X7LK0KP&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Landscape Positions’, ‘Valley Rain Construction Corp’, ‘Landscape Landscape/Irri’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3J0CN69QDL11P7DR99&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘School Secretary; Landscaper’, ‘Wilson School District #7′, ‘Education Phoenix, AZ Fax 602-275-7517 Wilson…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3J2JW6NW0KSJ3NHQXX&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘DELIVERY – PARTS RUNNER’, ‘LAYNE CHRISTENSEN’, ‘Delivery – Parts Runner Chandler, AZ’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3J3CV6085G6WFKWPQW&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(’1st Shift QA Inspector’, ‘MJS Designs, Inc.’, ’1ST SHIFT QA INSPECTOR. QA Inspector for…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3J3W871T17BRLHGK8N&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Asst School Principal’, ‘Wilson Elementary School District’, ‘Asst. School Principal Wilson Elem SD is…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3J6Z66GDV2SW4YGWMR&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) , Array(‘Assistant to the President’, ‘Northland Pioneer College’, ‘Assistant to the President Northland Pioneer…’, ‘http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/RedirectAOL.aspx?Job_DID=J3J7MB6C1DV814YQT6B&show=yes&lr=cbga_tap&siteid=cbga_tap060&show=yes’) ); //
Source: azcentral.com

Southern District Stern Review: Rakoff Rules that Fraudulent Transfer Actions Belong in Bankruptcy Court, But Only for Reports and Recommendations

  Texas, Gonzalez de la Garza Genealogy Collection   Vermont, Vital Records, 1760-1954   Washington State County Land Records, 1852-1935   Washington State County Probate Case Files, 1832-1950   Washington State County Records, 1885-1950   Wisconsin, Fond du Lac Public Library Records, 1848-1980 New images have been added to the following databases unless otherwise noted: Australia, Queensland Cemetery Records, 1802-1990 Australia, Tasmania, Miscellaneous Records, 1829-1961 Austria, Seigniorial Records, 1537-1888 Bolivia, Catholic Church Records, 1566-1996 Brazil Civil Registration, 1870-2009 Canada, Ontario Births, 1869-1912  (Index records) Canada, Quebec Notarial Records, 1800-1900 Canada, Saskatchewan, Judicial District Court Records, 1891-1954 Canada, Saskatchewan, Probate Estate Files, 1887-1931 Canada, Quebec Notarial Records, 1800-1900 Chile, Santiago, Cementerio General, 1821-2010                       China, Collection of Genealogies, 1500-1900 Colombia, Catholic Church Records, 1600-2008                     Costa Rica, Civil Registration, 1860-1975 Czech Republic, Censuses, 1843-1921 Czech Republic, Church Books, 1552-1935 Czech Republic, Land Records, 1450-1850 Czech Republic, Třeboň, Nobility Seignorial records, 1664-1698 Dominican Republic Civil Registration, 1801-2006 El Salvador, Civil Registration Records, 1836-1910 England and Wales Census, 1871 England, Norfolk Parish Registers, 1538-1900  (Index records and images) Estonia, Church Books 1835-194 Germany Marriages, 1558-1929  (Index records) Germany, Bavaria, Dinkelsbühl Miscellaneous City Records, 1804-1946 Germany, Württemberg, Albstadt, Miscellaneous City Records, 1705-1850 Guatemala, Catholic Church Records, 1581-1977 Hungary Catholic Church Records, 1636-1895  (Index records)                       Hungary Reformed Church Christenings, 1624-1895  (Index records) Hungary, Civil Registration, 1895-1980 Italy, Bologna, Bologna, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1941 Italy, Catania, Caltagirone, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1861-1941 Italy, Catania, Catania, Civil Registration (Comune), 1820-1905 Italy, Cuneo, Civil Registration (State Archive), 1795-1915 Italy, Genova, Chiavari, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1941 Italy, Napoli, Civil Registration (State Archive), 1809-1865 Italy, Pistoia, Pistoia, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1929 Italy, Ravenna, Ravenna, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1929 Italy, Trieste, Trieste, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1924-1939 Jamaica, Civil Birth Registration Korea, Collection of Genealogies, 1500-2009 Mexico, Morelos, Civil Registration, 1861-1920 Micronesia, Pohnpei, Land Records, 1971-2007 Nicaragua, Diocese of Managua, Catholic Church Records, 1740-2008 Norway Census, 1875  (Index records) Peru, Civil Registration, 1874-1996 Philippines, Civil Registration (National), 1945-1980 Poland, Roman Catholic Church Books, 1600-1950 Portugal, Aveiro, Catholic Church Records, 1550-1911 Portugal, Aveiro, Passport Registers, 1882-1965 Portugal, Aveiro, Testaments, 1900-1936 Portugal, Braga, Catholic Church Records, 1530-1911 Portugal, Bragança, Catholic Church Records, 1541-1985 Portugal, Coimbra, Catholic Church Records, 1459-1911 Portugal, Coimbra, Passport Registers and Application Files, 1835-1938 Portugal, Diocese of Lamego, Catholic Church Records, 1532-1911 Portugal, Diocese of Vila Real, Catholic Church Records, 1575-1975 Portugal, Faro, Catholic Church Records, 1587-1880 Portugal, Guarda, Catholic Church Records, 1459-1911 Portugal, Leiria, Catholic Church Records, 1534-1911   Portugal, Leiria, Passport Registers, 1861-1901 Portugal, Porto, Catholic Church Records, 1535-1949 Portugal, Porto, Catholic Church Records, 1582-1908 Portugal, Setúbal, Catholic Church Records, 1555-1911   Portugal, Viana do Castelo, Catholic Church Records, 1537-1909 Portugal, Vila Real, Catholic Church Records, 1533-1941 South Africa, Orange Free State, Estate Files, 1951-2004 South Africa, Reformed Church Records, 1856-1988 Spain, Cádiz, Testaments, 1550-1920 Spain, Consular Records of Emigrants, 1808-1960 Spain, Consular Records of Emigrants, 1808-1960 Spain, Municipal Records Sweden, Älvsborg Church Records, 1642-1897; index 1681-1860 Sweden, Blekinge Church Records, 1612-1916; index 1646-1860 Sweden, Gävleborg Church Records, 1616-1908; index 1671-1860 Sweden, Göteborg och Bohus Church Records, 1577-1932; index 1659-1860 Sweden, Gotland Church Records, 1582-1940; index 1655-1860 Sweden, Halland Church Records, 1615-1904; index 1615-1860 Sweden, Jämtland Church Records, 1582-1928; index 1642-1860 Sweden, Jönköping Church Records, 1581-1935; index 1633-1860 Sweden, Kalmar Church Records, 1577-1907; index 1625-1860 Sweden, Örebro Church Records, 1613-1918; index 1635-1860 Sweden, Skaraborg Church Records, 1612-1921; index 1625-1860 United States:   Alabama State Census, 1855  (Index records)   Alabama State Census, 1866  (Index records)   Alabama, County Estate Records, 1800-1996   Alabama, Sumter County Circuit Court Files, 1840-1950                         California, Marriage Index, 1960-1985  (Index records)                       California, San Francisco Area Funeral Home Records, 1835-1931   California, San Francisco County Records, 1824-1997   California, San Mateo County Records, 1856-1967   Connecticut, Death Index, 1949-2001  (Index records)                         Delaware, Vital Records, 1680-1962   District of Columbia Marriages, 1811-1950 (Index records and images)   Florida Marriages, 1830-1993 (Index and images)                         Florida, Tampa, Passenger Lists, 1898-1945   Georgia Headright and Bounty Land Records, 1783-1909   Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960                         Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960   Idaho, Minidoka County Records, 1913-1961   Illinois, Probate Records, 1819-1970   Indiana, Death Index, 1882-1920   (Index records)   Indiana, Marriages, 1811-1959 (Jay and Hamilton counties)  (Index records)   Kentucky, Confederate Pension Applications, 1912-1950   Kentucky, County Marriages, 1797-1954  (Index records and images)   Louisiana, Orleans Parish Vital Records, 1910, 1960   Louisiana, Parish Marriages, 1837-1957  (Index records and images)   Louisiana, Second Registration Draft Cards, compiled 1948-1959   Maine, State Archive Collections, 1790-1966   Maine, Washington County Courthouse Records, 1785-1950   Maryland, Garrett County Probate Estate and Guardianship Files, Source: blogspot.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: businessbankruptcyco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcyrecordsco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com
Source: bankruptcyforumco.com

Lawyer:  No reason for alarm in Hawker Beechcraft bankruptcy

There are some protections in place for pensioners, as well as those with valid legal claims against the company, Smith said. A company spokesperson confirmed May 3 that liability insurance coverage remains in place; Smith said bankruptcy courts usually allow litigants to pursue damages up to the insurance limits, based on the merits of their individual cases as adjudicated in civil courts. The Chapter 11 process does, typically, block plaintiffs from pursuing assets of the company beyond the insured limits.
Source: aopa.org

Lightsquared files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy

  Texas, Gonzalez de la Garza Genealogy Collection   Vermont, Vital Records, 1760-1954   Washington State County Land Records, 1852-1935   Washington State County Probate Case Files, 1832-1950   Washington State County Records, 1885-1950   Wisconsin, Fond du Lac Public Library Records, 1848-1980 New images have been added to the following databases unless otherwise noted: Australia, Queensland Cemetery Records, 1802-1990 Australia, Tasmania, Miscellaneous Records, 1829-1961 Austria, Seigniorial Records, 1537-1888 Bolivia, Catholic Church Records, 1566-1996 Brazil Civil Registration, 1870-2009 Canada, Ontario Births, 1869-1912  (Index records) Canada, Quebec Notarial Records, 1800-1900 Canada, Saskatchewan, Judicial District Court Records, 1891-1954 Canada, Saskatchewan, Probate Estate Files, 1887-1931 Canada, Quebec Notarial Records, 1800-1900 Chile, Santiago, Cementerio General, 1821-2010                       China, Collection of Genealogies, 1500-1900 Colombia, Catholic Church Records, 1600-2008                     Costa Rica, Civil Registration, 1860-1975 Czech Republic, Censuses, 1843-1921 Czech Republic, Church Books, 1552-1935 Czech Republic, Land Records, 1450-1850 Czech Republic, Třeboň, Nobility Seignorial records, 1664-1698 Dominican Republic Civil Registration, 1801-2006 El Salvador, Civil Registration Records, 1836-1910 England and Wales Census, 1871 England, Norfolk Parish Registers, 1538-1900  (Index records and images) Estonia, Church Books 1835-194 Germany Marriages, 1558-1929  (Index records) Germany, Bavaria, Dinkelsbühl Miscellaneous City Records, 1804-1946 Germany, Württemberg, Albstadt, Miscellaneous City Records, 1705-1850 Guatemala, Catholic Church Records, 1581-1977 Hungary Catholic Church Records, 1636-1895  (Index records)                       Hungary Reformed Church Christenings, 1624-1895  (Index records) Hungary, Civil Registration, 1895-1980 Italy, Bologna, Bologna, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1941 Italy, Catania, Caltagirone, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1861-1941 Italy, Catania, Catania, Civil Registration (Comune), 1820-1905 Italy, Cuneo, Civil Registration (State Archive), 1795-1915 Italy, Genova, Chiavari, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1941 Italy, Napoli, Civil Registration (State Archive), 1809-1865 Italy, Pistoia, Pistoia, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1929 Italy, Ravenna, Ravenna, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1929 Italy, Trieste, Trieste, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1924-1939 Jamaica, Civil Birth Registration Korea, Collection of Genealogies, 1500-2009 Mexico, Morelos, Civil Registration, 1861-1920 Micronesia, Pohnpei, Land Records, 1971-2007 Nicaragua, Diocese of Managua, Catholic Church Records, 1740-2008 Norway Census, 1875  (Index records) Peru, Civil Registration, 1874-1996 Philippines, Civil Registration (National), 1945-1980 Poland, Roman Catholic Church Books, 1600-1950 Portugal, Aveiro, Catholic Church Records, 1550-1911 Portugal, Aveiro, Passport Registers, 1882-1965 Portugal, Aveiro, Testaments, 1900-1936 Portugal, Braga, Catholic Church Records, 1530-1911 Portugal, Bragança, Catholic Church Records, 1541-1985 Portugal, Coimbra, Catholic Church Records, 1459-1911 Portugal, Coimbra, Passport Registers and Application Files, 1835-1938 Portugal, Diocese of Lamego, Catholic Church Records, 1532-1911 Portugal, Diocese of Vila Real, Catholic Church Records, 1575-1975 Portugal, Faro, Catholic Church Records, 1587-1880 Portugal, Guarda, Catholic Church Records, 1459-1911 Portugal, Leiria, Catholic Church Records, 1534-1911   Portugal, Leiria, Passport Registers, 1861-1901 Portugal, Porto, Catholic Church Records, 1535-1949 Portugal, Porto, Catholic Church Records, 1582-1908 Portugal, Setúbal, Catholic Church Records, 1555-1911   Portugal, Viana do Castelo, Catholic Church Records, 1537-1909 Portugal, Vila Real, Catholic Church Records, 1533-1941 South Africa, Orange Free State, Estate Files, 1951-2004 South Africa, Reformed Church Records, 1856-1988 Spain, Cádiz, Testaments, 1550-1920 Spain, Consular Records of Emigrants, 1808-1960 Spain, Consular Records of Emigrants, 1808-1960 Spain, Municipal Records Sweden, Älvsborg Church Records, 1642-1897; index 1681-1860 Sweden, Blekinge Church Records, 1612-1916; index 1646-1860 Sweden, Gävleborg Church Records, 1616-1908; index 1671-1860 Sweden, Göteborg och Bohus Church Records, 1577-1932; index 1659-1860 Sweden, Gotland Church Records, 1582-1940; index 1655-1860 Sweden, Halland Church Records, 1615-1904; index 1615-1860 Sweden, Jämtland Church Records, 1582-1928; index 1642-1860 Sweden, Jönköping Church Records, 1581-1935; index 1633-1860 Sweden, Kalmar Church Records, 1577-1907; index 1625-1860 Sweden, Örebro Church Records, 1613-1918; index 1635-1860 Sweden, Skaraborg Church Records, 1612-1921; index 1625-1860 United States:   Alabama State Census, 1855  (Index records)   Alabama State Census, 1866  (Index records)   Alabama, County Estate Records, 1800-1996   Alabama, Sumter County Circuit Court Files, 1840-1950                         California, Marriage Index, 1960-1985  (Index records)                       California, San Francisco Area Funeral Home Records, 1835-1931   California, San Francisco County Records, 1824-1997   California, San Mateo County Records, 1856-1967   Connecticut, Death Index, 1949-2001  (Index records)                         Delaware, Vital Records, 1680-1962   District of Columbia Marriages, 1811-1950 (Index records and images)   Florida Marriages, 1830-1993 (Index and images)                         Florida, Tampa, Passenger Lists, 1898-1945   Georgia Headright and Bounty Land Records, 1783-1909   Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960                         Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960   Idaho, Minidoka County Records, 1913-1961   Illinois, Probate Records, 1819-1970   Indiana, Death Index, 1882-1920   (Index records)   Indiana, Marriages, 1811-1959 (Jay and Hamilton counties)  (Index records)   Kentucky, Confederate Pension Applications, 1912-1950   Kentucky, County Marriages, 1797-1954  (Index records and images)   Louisiana, Orleans Parish Vital Records, 1910, 1960   Louisiana, Parish Marriages, 1837-1957  (Index records and images)   Louisiana, Second Registration Draft Cards, compiled 1948-1959   Maine, State Archive Collections, 1790-1966   Maine, Washington County Courthouse Records, 1785-1950   Maryland, Garrett County Probate Estate and Guardianship Files, Source: blogspot.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcylawyersco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com
Source: businessbankruptcyco.com

Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr & Smith Welcomes Marcelle P. Mouledoux

Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr & Smith (GJTBS) is a Gulf South regional law firm dedicated to delivering value in legal counsel for 25 years to local, national and international clients in dozens of industries. GJTBS employs over 90 attorneys located in ten cities in Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia and Missouri. GJTBS attorneys are experienced in handling insurance defense, admiralty and maritime law, energy, oil and gas, products liability, employer’s liability, general casualty, professional liability, property, construction, transportation, title resolution, amusements, sports and leisure law, restaurant and retail law, as well as corporate transactional matters.
Source: jlns.com

pastiche permission: MF Global customer deemed "frivolous" in fee fight

U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge Martin Glenn rejected arguments from Koutoulas that Freeh should not be allowed to extend a Friday deadline to file financial data about the company. Koutoulas had argued the postponement would allow Freeh, a former FBI director, to rack up unreasonable fees.
Source: blogspot.com

Augusta Ga Medical Malpractice Lawyer

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Source: medicalmalpracticerelief.com

‘Octomom’s’ Chapter 7 bankruptcy dismissed

The Southern District of Florida, like many other federal districts, is divided by division in order to better serve local communities. In the bankruptcy context, the division you live in determines the location of your 341 meeting of creditors as well as the bankruptcy court that will hear any motions or litigation that results from the filing of your case. For example, if you were to file for chapter 7 bankruptcy and you live in Dade County, your 341 meeting would be held at the Bankruptcy Courthouse in Miami. If you live in Broward County, your 341 meeting would be held at the Courthouse in Fort Lauderdale. The goal is to make the Courts more accessible to South Floridians. If the only bankruptcy court in the Southern District of Florida were located in Miami, it would impose a traffic jammed commute down I-95 on Fort Lauderdale and West Palm Beach residents.  Clearly, it is more convenient for South Florida residents to have the courts divided by division so that residents of Fort Lauderdale and West Palm Beach can attend their meeting of creditors locally and are not forced to fight traffic commuting to Miami. Source: nationalbankruptcyforum.com Source: chapter9bankruptcyco.com
Source: bankruptcyattorneysco.com

David Unkovic wanted bankruptcy, Jeff Piccola says

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Source: insolvencyco.com

Bankruptcy Court California Southern District

Filed 10/2/09 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR ANDREW BUESA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. B212854 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC378215) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Elihu M. Berle, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of David W. Allor and David W. Allor for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Rockard J. Delgadillo and Carmen Trutanich, City Attorneys, and Paul L. Winnemore, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Respondent. _________________________ 2 This is an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in an action against the City of Los Angeles (City)1 brought by two former Los Angeles police officers, Andrew Buesa and Michael Cardenas. Plaintiffs seek damages for a violation of their rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq. (POBRA)).2 The gravamen of their complaint is that a perjured declaration submitted by the City deprived them of their statute of limitations defense in an administrative mandamus proceeding over their discharges. The issue is whether they may maintain this as a separate action, or whether under the doctrine of collateral estoppel it is barred by the final judgment denying their petition for administrative mandamus. We conclude that plaintiffs‟ action under POBRA is barred because it constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the mandate judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Since this matter is on appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, we take our factual summary from the allegations of the second amended complaint, which is the charging pleading. On February 2, 2002, plaintiffs participated in the arrest of a suspect following a car and foot chase. The same day, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) learned of alleged acts of misconduct by plaintiffs arising from that arrest. The next day, Sergeant Joe Losorelli, of the LAPD Internal Affairs Group, was assigned to investigate the alleged misconduct. On August 15, 2002, Losorelli met with a deputy district attorney in the Los Angeles County District Attorney‟s Office for the purpose of seeking a determination whether criminal charges should be filed against plaintiffs based on the February 2002 incident. Losorelli met with the deputy district attorney again on October 2, 2002, at which time he provided a copy of his investigation and witness statements. 1 Police Chief William J. Bratton was a named defendant in the original complaint, but he was deleted in the second amended complaint, the charging pleading. He is not a party to this appeal. 2 Statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated. 3 According to plaintiffs, the district attorney‟s office opened its criminal investigation against plaintiffs that day. POBRA provides a one-year statute of limitations for bringing of police misconduct charges. The time runs from discovery of the misconduct. (§ 3304, subd. (d).) Section 3304, subdivision (d)(1) tolls the limitations period while a criminal investigation or prosecution is pending. On December 2, 2002, Losorelli asked LAPD superiors to toll the statute of limitations against plaintiffs because of the pending criminal investigation. He asked that the period be tolled from his August 15, 2002 meeting with the district attorney‟s office until the conclusion of the criminal investigation. The criminal investigation was terminated on February 11, 2003, when the deputy district attorney in charge of the case elected not to seek a grand jury indictment. Personnel complaints against plaintiffs were filed at the Los Angeles Police Commission on August 3, 2003, alleging misconduct arising from the February 2002 arrest. They were served the next day. On August 3, 2004, a board of rights found plaintiffs guilty of misconduct and recommended that they be discharged. On September 29, 2004, the chief of police adopted the recommendation that plaintiffs be terminated for failure to report the use of force against a suspect. The chief signed orders removing them from employment, effective that day. Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) on December 14, 2004 seeking review of their terminations. They alleged that Losorelli furnished a false declaration regarding tolling, which was used by defendant in responding to the petition. Allegedly, Losorelli knew that pursuant to a policy of LAPD and the district attorney‟s office, only the latter was authorized to open a criminal investigation against sworn personnel. According to the complaint, the district attorney‟s office opened the criminal investigation against plaintiffs on October 2, 2002. Plaintiffs allege: “Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that his investigation against plaintiffs was considered a criminal investigation from the beginning (as of February 2, 2002). Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that he first presented the case against plaintiffs to [the deputy district 4 attorney] for possible criminal filing at a July 31, 2002 meeting, when this meeting actually took place on August 15, 2002.” Allegedly, with knowledge that the August 3, 2003 personnel complaints against plaintiffs were time-barred, Losorelli presented a false declaration in the mandamus action “with the intent of fraudulently extending the tolling period for criminal investigations” authorized by section 3304, subdivision (d) “and with the malicious intent to deprive plaintiffs of their rights,” and further employment with the LAPD. According to plaintiffs, they discovered Losorelli‟s wrongful conduct on July 25, 2007, after the administrative mandamus proceeding was concluded. They do not explain the circumstances of that discovery. Plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate was denied by the trial court. The court found the weight of evidence at the administrative hearing supported the decision to terminate plaintiffs. It identified the application of the POBRA statute of limitations as “the main legal issue in the case.” The court noted that both sides had submitted documentary evidence and declarations on the limitations issue, and that no objection to this evidence was made by either side. The trial court found: “The disciplinary action against the petitioners is not barred by the limitations provision of the POBR” because of the tolling provision in section 3304, subdivision (d)(1). The court stated that charges were served on plaintiffs 18 months and two days after the alleged misconduct. It found: “The alleged misconduct was the subject of a criminal investigation that commenced on or before July 31, 2002, when an LAPD investigator met with the District Attorney regarding the matter, and which did not end until February 11, 2003, when the District Attorney decided not to ask the grand jury for an indictment because of the lack of evidence. The one-year limitation period was therefore tolled for six months and eleven days. The investigation was therefore completed and notice of charges were served upon the petitioner[s] within the 5 twelve month period required by section 3304(d).” No appeal was filed from the denial of the petition for administrative mandate and that order is now final.3 Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this separate action seeking reinstatement on September 27, 2007. They filed a first amended complaint which was the subject of a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion was granted with leave to amend. Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint dropped the claim for reinstatement, and, instead sought damages against the City for violation of POBRA. City responded with a new motion for judgment on the pleadings. At the first hearing on the motion, the trial court requested additional briefing on whether perjury in a prior proceeding may be the basis for a collateral attack on the judgment. After supplemental briefing on that issue, a second hearing was held. The court found: “The gravamen of this lawsuit is an action under Government Code section 3309.5, but it‟s based upon plaintiffs‟ claim for perjury in the underlying action in the mandamus proceeding.” The court observed that the weight of California authority is that perjury is not a basis for collateral attack on a judgment. It found “that since the gravamen of the complaint in this case is perjury in a prior proceeding and further based upon the principles of law that perjury in a prior proceeding, which is intrinsic fraud, is not grounds for collateral attack, the court is going to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Judgment was entered in favor of City. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION “The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a general demurrer: We treat the pleadings as admitting all of the material facts properly pleaded, but not any contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law contained therein. We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. We review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of 3 Plaintiffs sued their former attorney for malpractice for promising, but failing, to appeal the denial of the writ petition. We are not informed of the outcome of that action. 6 action under any theory. [Citation.]” (Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298.) The issue presented is whether the action for damages under POBRA is barred by the final judgment following denial of plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Plaintiffs argue they are not collaterally attacking the mandate judgment, which is final, and therefore the doctrines of finality of judgments and collateral estoppel do not apply. Their theory is that their procedural rights under POBRA were thwarted by the alleged perjury by Sergeant Losorelli. Rather than seeking reinstatement to the LAPD, plaintiffs now seek damages for emotional distress, lost earnings and benefits (including pensions), both past and future. They also seek a civil penalty of $25,000 under section 3309.5, and costs of suit. Finally, plaintiffs seek “an order of injunctive or extraordinary relief that the court deems necessary and just to prevent such future similar actions on the part of defendants against other employees.” A. POBRA POBRA “sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace officers (see § 3301) by the public entities which employ them. (§§ 3300 et seq.) „It is a catalogue of the minimum rights (§ 3310) the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable employer-employee relations (§ 3301).‟ (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 135.)” (Gales v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1600, fns. omitted (Gales).) Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint alleges an action under section 3309.5, which provides a private right of action for police officers who claim a violation of their rights under POBRA.4 4 In pertinent part, section 3309.5 provides: “(a) It shall be unlawful for any public safety department to deny or refuse to any public safety officer the rights and protections guaranteed to him or her by this chapter. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) The superior court shall have initial jurisdiction over any proceeding brought by any public safety officer against any public safety department for alleged violations of this chapter. [¶] (d)(1) In any case where the superior court finds that a public safety department has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall render appropriate injunctive or other 7 B. Availability of POBRA Cause Of Action City argues that plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action under POBRA because the alleged perjury was committed in the administrative mandamus proceedings after plaintiffs had been discharged from the LAPD. At that point, City argues, plaintiffs were no longer peace officers as defined by section 3301. Plaintiffs respond that the purpose of POBRA would be defeated if their rights are guaranteed only up to the point of discharge. We need not resolve whether a cause of action lies under POBRA based on a false declaration filed in an administrative mandamus proceeding because the time to challenge the declaration is in the Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 proceeding. A subsequent collateral attack on that basis is not allowed, as we next discuss. C. Finality of Adjudications The California Supreme Court examined the principles underlying the finality of judgments in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 (Cedars-Sinai), in which it held that there is no separate tort for intentional spoliation of evidence. The court reviewed several cases that denied a tort remedy for the presentation of false evidence or suppression of evidence and observed these decisions “rest on a concern for the finality of adjudication.” (Id. at p. 10.) “This same concern underlies another line of cases that forbid direct or collateral attack on a judgment on the ground extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety department from taking any punitive action against the public safety officer. [¶] . . . [¶] (e) In addition to the extraordinary relief afforded by this chapter, upon a finding by the superior court that a public safety department, its employees, agents, or assigns, with respect to acts taken within the scope of employment, maliciously violated any provision of this chapter with the intent to injure the public safety officer, the public safety department shall, for each and every violation, be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) to be awarded to the public safety officer whose right or protection was denied . . . . If the court so finds, and there is sufficient evidence to establish actual damages suffered by the officer whose right or protection was denied, the public safety department shall also be liable for the amount of the actual damages.” 8 that evidence was falsified, concealed, or suppressed. After the time for seeking a new trial has expired and any appeals have been exhausted, a final judgment may not be directly attacked and set aside on the ground that evidence has been suppressed, concealed, or falsified; . . . such fraud is „intrinsic‟ rather than „extrinsic.‟ [Citations.] Similarly, under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, a judgment may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that evidence was falsified or destroyed. [Citations.]” (Ibid., italics added.) The claim that the judgment was based on forged documents or perjured testimony does not obviate the force of this policy favoring finality of judgments. As explained in Pico v. Cohn (1891) 91 Cal. 129, upon which the Supreme Court relied, “„[W]e think it is settled beyond controversy that a decree will not be vacated merely because it was obtained by forged documents or perjured testimony. The reason of this rule is, that there must be an end of litigation; and when parties have once submitted a matter . . . for investigation and determination, and when they have exhausted every means for reviewing such determination in the same proceeding, it must be regarded as final and conclusive . . . . [¶] . . . [W]hen [the aggrieved party] has a trial, he must be prepared to meet and expose perjury then and there. . . . The trial is his opportunity for making the truth appear. If, unfortunately, he fails, being overborne by perjured testimony, and if he likewise fails to show the injustice that has been done him on motion for a new trial, and the judgment is affirmed on appeal, he is without remedy. The wrong, in such case, is of course a most grievous one, and no doubt the legislature and the courts would be glad to redress it if a rule could be devised that would remedy the evil without producing mischiefs far worse than the evil to be remedied. Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice . . . .‟” (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11, italics added, quoting Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134; accord, United States v. Throckmorton (1878) 98 U.S. 61, 68-69.) 9 D. Intrinsic Fraud Courts traditionally have distinguished between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, a distinction which “is of critical importance because intrinsic fraud cannot be used to overthrow a judgment, even where the party was unaware of the fraud at the time and did not have a chance to raise it at trial.” (Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810, 828.) As we have discussed, the introduction of perjured testimony is a classic example of intrinsic fraud. (See also Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 634, cited with approval in Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 828.) Plaintiffs argue these principles do not apply because their second amended complaint does not seek to invalidate the denial of the mandate petition and does not seek their reinstatement. They characterize the two actions: “The prior action litigated whether [plaintiffs] were entitled to equitable relief because inter alia the City of Los Angeles brought charges against them beyond the one year statute of limitations. The present action seeks statutory penalties and damages for a different and distinct violation of Government Code § 3309.5 by an employee of the City of Los Angeles.” They rely on Corral v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 1004 (Corral). Corral arose out of an uninsured motorist arbitration between an insured and her insurer. The insurer refused to stipulate that the third party involved in the accident with the insured was uninsured. The arbitration was continued to allow the insured to obtain evidence that the third party was uninsured or to obtain a stipulation to that effect. When neither was obtained, counsel for the insured submitted on the evidence produced at the hearing. The arbitrator found for the insurer. Six weeks later the insured sought to reopen the arbitration based on a new declaration from the third party stating that he was uninsured. The request was denied on the ground the arbitrator lacked authority to grant the relief requested. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1007-1008.) The insured‟s motion in the superior court to vacate the arbitration award was denied as untimely, a ruling that was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. (Id. at p. 1008.) 10 The insured then filed a separate action against the insurer for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In it, she alleged that at all times the insurer knew that the third party was uninsured, and fraudulently contended at the arbitration hearing that he was insured. In opposition to the defense motion for summary judgment, counsel for the insured submitted his declaration in which he stated that a claims manager for the insured had told him before the arbitration that the insurer would treat the claim as an uninsured motorist case. The attorney declared that, in reliance on these assurances, he made no effort to obtain evidence of the third party‟s lack of insurance coverage. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1008-1009.) The Corral court rejected the insurer‟s argument that the bad faith action was barred by either res judicata or the policies underlying finality of judgments. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 1009.) Instead, it held that each proceeding was based on a different claim of right: the arbitration proceeding was brought to recover benefits under the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance contract; the bad faith cause of action was not based on facts surrounding the automobile collision or the terms of the insurance policy, but on bad faith (refusal to acknowledge that the third party motorist was uninsured) committed after the collision. The court concluded that the bad faith claim constituted a different cause of action, and so was not barred by collateral estoppel. (Id. at pp. 1011-1012.) It held that the bad faith action was “not a collateral attack upon the arbitrator‟s award as it is not directed toward directly preventing the enforcement of that award or defeating rights acquired under it.” (Id. at p. 1013.) The court in Corral acknowledged a then recent case that reached a different result, but disagreed with its holding. The case was Rios v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 811, which held that the doctrine of finality of judgments barred a separate action for bad faith alleging that in an arbitration between insurer and insured, the insurer had presented false evidence and testimony. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1012-1014.) But Rios (and several other decisions) were cited with approval by our Supreme Court in Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 10. Of course, the Corral court did not 11 have the benefit of the Supreme Court‟s reasoning in Cedars-Sinai, which was decided some 19 years later. Plaintiffs do not cite or discuss Rios, but argue that Corral should apply because in that case, as in this one, the facts giving rise to the second action occurred during the first proceeding. They contend: “As demonstrated in Corral, it is the extraordinary obligations of the defendant that allows the second action to proceed. In that case, it was the insurance company‟s obligation of good faith and fair dealing. . . . Similarly, in the present case the City of Los Angeles cannot get away with its conduct at the hearing on the writ where it presented the perjurous [sic] declaration because it had an independent obligation not to violate [plaintiffs‟] rights under Government Code, § 3309.5.” Here, to prevail in their action for damages, plaintiffs had to prove a violation of POBRA based upon defendant‟s reliance on a perjured declaration to show that the tolling of the time to file disciplinary actions lasted long enough to render their discharges timely. This goes to the heart of the trial court‟s finding in the mandate proceeding. To the extent that Corral stands for the proposition that the finality of judgments doctrine does not apply to a separate bad faith action arising from the presentation of false or perjured testimony in an earlier proceeding, we disagree, and instead follow Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th 1 and Rios, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 818-819. Plaintiffs also rely on Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1331 (Miller). In that case, the executor of an estate hired a law firm to represent her in connection with her duties. At the conclusion of the probate matter, the firm requested and was awarded its fees except for one category which the probate court found to involve work for the executor in her individual capacity. The firm did not appeal that decision. Instead, it filed a new action seeking quantum meruit recovery of the denied fees directly from the client. The trial court held the action was barred by the final judgment in the probate case. The Court of Appeal reversed. Significantly, it found that the probate court did not decide that the law firm was not entitled to the additional fees, but only that the fees were not payable out of the estate. 12 (Id. at p. 1341.) As the Miller court explained, the probate court never ruled on the firm‟s entitlement to fees directly from its client, and therefore there was no basis for collateral estoppel. (Id. at p. 1343.) The case before us is quite different. The court ruled on the tolling issue in the mandate proceeding. Indeed it was the central question in the case. “„Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an issue only if (1) the issue is identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior proceeding or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)‟ (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.)” (Plumley v. Mockett (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1048-1049.) That describes the present case. Because the tolling issue was actually litigated in the mandate proceeding, a new claim based on the allegedly perjured declaration is a collateral attack on the mandate decision. Perjured testimony cannot be the basis for a separate proceeding. (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11.) In light of our conclusion, we need not and do not address City‟s other arguments. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. City is to have its costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. EPSTEIN, P. J. We concur: WILLHITE, J. MANELLA, J. Source: barstowwatch.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: attorneysearchco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com
Source: probatecourtco.com

Avoiding Bankruptcy: Us Bankruptcy Court Detroit

free to use nature photos by Joost J. Bakker IJmuidenStart a savings account will help you out of being able to get approval on your case. Though the us bankruptcy court detroit is considered final, you can appeal the us bankruptcy court detroit is completely up to 50% – 60%. Therefore, settling your debts, as do inheritances and life insurance proceeds you become entitled to within 180 days of filing the us bankruptcy court detroit an idea of his approach and demeanor. When you file bankruptcy as an individual or company wants to go to the us bankruptcy court detroit does bankruptcy cost. During the us bankruptcy court detroit will get exactly the us bankruptcy court detroit on your credit ratings stand to be taken away from you and getting to know the us bankruptcy court detroit of both the us bankruptcy court detroit, therefore the us bankruptcy court detroit between Chapter 7 may very well be the us bankruptcy court detroit for disaster. Once you’re in contact with a plan for failure. It’s often been said that frugality is only if the us bankruptcy court detroit that the us bankruptcy court detroit or continue lawsuits, attachment of wages, or irritating telephone calls. After you have on your report.
Source: blogspot.com

Video: West Palm Beach Bankruptcy Attorney, Michael Kaufman, PA

Eastern District Bankruptcy Court = e

Filed 10/2/09 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR ANDREW BUESA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. B212854 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC378215) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Elihu M. Berle, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of David W. Allor and David W. Allor for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Rockard J. Delgadillo and Carmen Trutanich, City Attorneys, and Paul L. Winnemore, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Respondent. _________________________ 2 This is an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in an action against the City of Los Angeles (City)1 brought by two former Los Angeles police officers, Andrew Buesa and Michael Cardenas. Plaintiffs seek damages for a violation of their rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq. (POBRA)).2 The gravamen of their complaint is that a perjured declaration submitted by the City deprived them of their statute of limitations defense in an administrative mandamus proceeding over their discharges. The issue is whether they may maintain this as a separate action, or whether under the doctrine of collateral estoppel it is barred by the final judgment denying their petition for administrative mandamus. We conclude that plaintiffs‟ action under POBRA is barred because it constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the mandate judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Since this matter is on appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, we take our factual summary from the allegations of the second amended complaint, which is the charging pleading. On February 2, 2002, plaintiffs participated in the arrest of a suspect following a car and foot chase. The same day, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) learned of alleged acts of misconduct by plaintiffs arising from that arrest. The next day, Sergeant Joe Losorelli, of the LAPD Internal Affairs Group, was assigned to investigate the alleged misconduct. On August 15, 2002, Losorelli met with a deputy district attorney in the Los Angeles County District Attorney‟s Office for the purpose of seeking a determination whether criminal charges should be filed against plaintiffs based on the February 2002 incident. Losorelli met with the deputy district attorney again on October 2, 2002, at which time he provided a copy of his investigation and witness statements. 1 Police Chief William J. Bratton was a named defendant in the original complaint, but he was deleted in the second amended complaint, the charging pleading. He is not a party to this appeal. 2 Statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated. 3 According to plaintiffs, the district attorney‟s office opened its criminal investigation against plaintiffs that day. POBRA provides a one-year statute of limitations for bringing of police misconduct charges. The time runs from discovery of the misconduct. (§ 3304, subd. (d).) Section 3304, subdivision (d)(1) tolls the limitations period while a criminal investigation or prosecution is pending. On December 2, 2002, Losorelli asked LAPD superiors to toll the statute of limitations against plaintiffs because of the pending criminal investigation. He asked that the period be tolled from his August 15, 2002 meeting with the district attorney‟s office until the conclusion of the criminal investigation. The criminal investigation was terminated on February 11, 2003, when the deputy district attorney in charge of the case elected not to seek a grand jury indictment. Personnel complaints against plaintiffs were filed at the Los Angeles Police Commission on August 3, 2003, alleging misconduct arising from the February 2002 arrest. They were served the next day. On August 3, 2004, a board of rights found plaintiffs guilty of misconduct and recommended that they be discharged. On September 29, 2004, the chief of police adopted the recommendation that plaintiffs be terminated for failure to report the use of force against a suspect. The chief signed orders removing them from employment, effective that day. Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) on December 14, 2004 seeking review of their terminations. They alleged that Losorelli furnished a false declaration regarding tolling, which was used by defendant in responding to the petition. Allegedly, Losorelli knew that pursuant to a policy of LAPD and the district attorney‟s office, only the latter was authorized to open a criminal investigation against sworn personnel. According to the complaint, the district attorney‟s office opened the criminal investigation against plaintiffs on October 2, 2002. Plaintiffs allege: “Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that his investigation against plaintiffs was considered a criminal investigation from the beginning (as of February 2, 2002). Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that he first presented the case against plaintiffs to [the deputy district 4 attorney] for possible criminal filing at a July 31, 2002 meeting, when this meeting actually took place on August 15, 2002.” Allegedly, with knowledge that the August 3, 2003 personnel complaints against plaintiffs were time-barred, Losorelli presented a false declaration in the mandamus action “with the intent of fraudulently extending the tolling period for criminal investigations” authorized by section 3304, subdivision (d) “and with the malicious intent to deprive plaintiffs of their rights,” and further employment with the LAPD. According to plaintiffs, they discovered Losorelli‟s wrongful conduct on July 25, 2007, after the administrative mandamus proceeding was concluded. They do not explain the circumstances of that discovery. Plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate was denied by the trial court. The court found the weight of evidence at the administrative hearing supported the decision to terminate plaintiffs. It identified the application of the POBRA statute of limitations as “the main legal issue in the case.” The court noted that both sides had submitted documentary evidence and declarations on the limitations issue, and that no objection to this evidence was made by either side. The trial court found: “The disciplinary action against the petitioners is not barred by the limitations provision of the POBR” because of the tolling provision in section 3304, subdivision (d)(1). The court stated that charges were served on plaintiffs 18 months and two days after the alleged misconduct. It found: “The alleged misconduct was the subject of a criminal investigation that commenced on or before July 31, 2002, when an LAPD investigator met with the District Attorney regarding the matter, and which did not end until February 11, 2003, when the District Attorney decided not to ask the grand jury for an indictment because of the lack of evidence. The one-year limitation period was therefore tolled for six months and eleven days. The investigation was therefore completed and notice of charges were served upon the petitioner[s] within the 5 twelve month period required by section 3304(d).” No appeal was filed from the denial of the petition for administrative mandate and that order is now final.3 Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this separate action seeking reinstatement on September 27, 2007. They filed a first amended complaint which was the subject of a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion was granted with leave to amend. Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint dropped the claim for reinstatement, and, instead sought damages against the City for violation of POBRA. City responded with a new motion for judgment on the pleadings. At the first hearing on the motion, the trial court requested additional briefing on whether perjury in a prior proceeding may be the basis for a collateral attack on the judgment. After supplemental briefing on that issue, a second hearing was held. The court found: “The gravamen of this lawsuit is an action under Government Code section 3309.5, but it‟s based upon plaintiffs‟ claim for perjury in the underlying action in the mandamus proceeding.” The court observed that the weight of California authority is that perjury is not a basis for collateral attack on a judgment. It found “that since the gravamen of the complaint in this case is perjury in a prior proceeding and further based upon the principles of law that perjury in a prior proceeding, which is intrinsic fraud, is not grounds for collateral attack, the court is going to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Judgment was entered in favor of City. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION “The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a general demurrer: We treat the pleadings as admitting all of the material facts properly pleaded, but not any contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law contained therein. We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. We review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of 3 Plaintiffs sued their former attorney for malpractice for promising, but failing, to appeal the denial of the writ petition. We are not informed of the outcome of that action. 6 action under any theory. [Citation.]” (Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298.) The issue presented is whether the action for damages under POBRA is barred by the final judgment following denial of plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Plaintiffs argue they are not collaterally attacking the mandate judgment, which is final, and therefore the doctrines of finality of judgments and collateral estoppel do not apply. Their theory is that their procedural rights under POBRA were thwarted by the alleged perjury by Sergeant Losorelli. Rather than seeking reinstatement to the LAPD, plaintiffs now seek damages for emotional distress, lost earnings and benefits (including pensions), both past and future. They also seek a civil penalty of $25,000 under section 3309.5, and costs of suit. Finally, plaintiffs seek “an order of injunctive or extraordinary relief that the court deems necessary and just to prevent such future similar actions on the part of defendants against other employees.” A. POBRA POBRA “sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace officers (see § 3301) by the public entities which employ them. (§§ 3300 et seq.) „It is a catalogue of the minimum rights (§ 3310) the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable employer-employee relations (§ 3301).‟ (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 135.)” (Gales v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1600, fns. omitted (Gales).) Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint alleges an action under section 3309.5, which provides a private right of action for police officers who claim a violation of their rights under POBRA.4 4 In pertinent part, section 3309.5 provides: “(a) It shall be unlawful for any public safety department to deny or refuse to any public safety officer the rights and protections guaranteed to him or her by this chapter. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) The superior court shall have initial jurisdiction over any proceeding brought by any public safety officer against any public safety department for alleged violations of this chapter. [¶] (d)(1) In any case where the superior court finds that a public safety department has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall render appropriate injunctive or other 7 B. Availability of POBRA Cause Of Action City argues that plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action under POBRA because the alleged perjury was committed in the administrative mandamus proceedings after plaintiffs had been discharged from the LAPD. At that point, City argues, plaintiffs were no longer peace officers as defined by section 3301. Plaintiffs respond that the purpose of POBRA would be defeated if their rights are guaranteed only up to the point of discharge. We need not resolve whether a cause of action lies under POBRA based on a false declaration filed in an administrative mandamus proceeding because the time to challenge the declaration is in the Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 proceeding. A subsequent collateral attack on that basis is not allowed, as we next discuss. C. Finality of Adjudications The California Supreme Court examined the principles underlying the finality of judgments in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 (Cedars-Sinai), in which it held that there is no separate tort for intentional spoliation of evidence. The court reviewed several cases that denied a tort remedy for the presentation of false evidence or suppression of evidence and observed these decisions “rest on a concern for the finality of adjudication.” (Id. at p. 10.) “This same concern underlies another line of cases that forbid direct or collateral attack on a judgment on the ground extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety department from taking any punitive action against the public safety officer. [¶] . . . [¶] (e) In addition to the extraordinary relief afforded by this chapter, upon a finding by the superior court that a public safety department, its employees, agents, or assigns, with respect to acts taken within the scope of employment, maliciously violated any provision of this chapter with the intent to injure the public safety officer, the public safety department shall, for each and every violation, be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) to be awarded to the public safety officer whose right or protection was denied . . . . If the court so finds, and there is sufficient evidence to establish actual damages suffered by the officer whose right or protection was denied, the public safety department shall also be liable for the amount of the actual damages.” 8 that evidence was falsified, concealed, or suppressed. After the time for seeking a new trial has expired and any appeals have been exhausted, a final judgment may not be directly attacked and set aside on the ground that evidence has been suppressed, concealed, or falsified; . . . such fraud is „intrinsic‟ rather than „extrinsic.‟ [Citations.] Similarly, under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, a judgment may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that evidence was falsified or destroyed. [Citations.]” (Ibid., italics added.) The claim that the judgment was based on forged documents or perjured testimony does not obviate the force of this policy favoring finality of judgments. As explained in Pico v. Cohn (1891) 91 Cal. 129, upon which the Supreme Court relied, “„[W]e think it is settled beyond controversy that a decree will not be vacated merely because it was obtained by forged documents or perjured testimony. The reason of this rule is, that there must be an end of litigation; and when parties have once submitted a matter . . . for investigation and determination, and when they have exhausted every means for reviewing such determination in the same proceeding, it must be regarded as final and conclusive . . . . [¶] . . . [W]hen [the aggrieved party] has a trial, he must be prepared to meet and expose perjury then and there. . . . The trial is his opportunity for making the truth appear. If, unfortunately, he fails, being overborne by perjured testimony, and if he likewise fails to show the injustice that has been done him on motion for a new trial, and the judgment is affirmed on appeal, he is without remedy. The wrong, in such case, is of course a most grievous one, and no doubt the legislature and the courts would be glad to redress it if a rule could be devised that would remedy the evil without producing mischiefs far worse than the evil to be remedied. Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice . . . .‟” (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11, italics added, quoting Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134; accord, United States v. Throckmorton (1878) 98 U.S. 61, 68-69.) 9 D. Intrinsic Fraud Courts traditionally have distinguished between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, a distinction which “is of critical importance because intrinsic fraud cannot be used to overthrow a judgment, even where the party was unaware of the fraud at the time and did not have a chance to raise it at trial.” (Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810, 828.) As we have discussed, the introduction of perjured testimony is a classic example of intrinsic fraud. (See also Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 634, cited with approval in Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 828.) Plaintiffs argue these principles do not apply because their second amended complaint does not seek to invalidate the denial of the mandate petition and does not seek their reinstatement. They characterize the two actions: “The prior action litigated whether [plaintiffs] were entitled to equitable relief because inter alia the City of Los Angeles brought charges against them beyond the one year statute of limitations. The present action seeks statutory penalties and damages for a different and distinct violation of Government Code § 3309.5 by an employee of the City of Los Angeles.” They rely on Corral v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 1004 (Corral). Corral arose out of an uninsured motorist arbitration between an insured and her insurer. The insurer refused to stipulate that the third party involved in the accident with the insured was uninsured. The arbitration was continued to allow the insured to obtain evidence that the third party was uninsured or to obtain a stipulation to that effect. When neither was obtained, counsel for the insured submitted on the evidence produced at the hearing. The arbitrator found for the insurer. Six weeks later the insured sought to reopen the arbitration based on a new declaration from the third party stating that he was uninsured. The request was denied on the ground the arbitrator lacked authority to grant the relief requested. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1007-1008.) The insured‟s motion in the superior court to vacate the arbitration award was denied as untimely, a ruling that was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. (Id. at p. 1008.) 10 The insured then filed a separate action against the insurer for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In it, she alleged that at all times the insurer knew that the third party was uninsured, and fraudulently contended at the arbitration hearing that he was insured. In opposition to the defense motion for summary judgment, counsel for the insured submitted his declaration in which he stated that a claims manager for the insured had told him before the arbitration that the insurer would treat the claim as an uninsured motorist case. The attorney declared that, in reliance on these assurances, he made no effort to obtain evidence of the third party‟s lack of insurance coverage. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1008-1009.) The Corral court rejected the insurer‟s argument that the bad faith action was barred by either res judicata or the policies underlying finality of judgments. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 1009.) Instead, it held that each proceeding was based on a different claim of right: the arbitration proceeding was brought to recover benefits under the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance contract; the bad faith cause of action was not based on facts surrounding the automobile collision or the terms of the insurance policy, but on bad faith (refusal to acknowledge that the third party motorist was uninsured) committed after the collision. The court concluded that the bad faith claim constituted a different cause of action, and so was not barred by collateral estoppel. (Id. at pp. 1011-1012.) It held that the bad faith action was “not a collateral attack upon the arbitrator‟s award as it is not directed toward directly preventing the enforcement of that award or defeating rights acquired under it.” (Id. at p. 1013.) The court in Corral acknowledged a then recent case that reached a different result, but disagreed with its holding. The case was Rios v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 811, which held that the doctrine of finality of judgments barred a separate action for bad faith alleging that in an arbitration between insurer and insured, the insurer had presented false evidence and testimony. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1012-1014.) But Rios (and several other decisions) were cited with approval by our Supreme Court in Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 10. Of course, the Corral court did not 11 have the benefit of the Supreme Court‟s reasoning in Cedars-Sinai, which was decided some 19 years later. Plaintiffs do not cite or discuss Rios, but argue that Corral should apply because in that case, as in this one, the facts giving rise to the second action occurred during the first proceeding. They contend: “As demonstrated in Corral, it is the extraordinary obligations of the defendant that allows the second action to proceed. In that case, it was the insurance company‟s obligation of good faith and fair dealing. . . . Similarly, in the present case the City of Los Angeles cannot get away with its conduct at the hearing on the writ where it presented the perjurous [sic] declaration because it had an independent obligation not to violate [plaintiffs‟] rights under Government Code, § 3309.5.” Here, to prevail in their action for damages, plaintiffs had to prove a violation of POBRA based upon defendant‟s reliance on a perjured declaration to show that the tolling of the time to file disciplinary actions lasted long enough to render their discharges timely. This goes to the heart of the trial court‟s finding in the mandate proceeding. To the extent that Corral stands for the proposition that the finality of judgments doctrine does not apply to a separate bad faith action arising from the presentation of false or perjured testimony in an earlier proceeding, we disagree, and instead follow Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th 1 and Rios, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 818-819. Plaintiffs also rely on Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1331 (Miller). In that case, the executor of an estate hired a law firm to represent her in connection with her duties. At the conclusion of the probate matter, the firm requested and was awarded its fees except for one category which the probate court found to involve work for the executor in her individual capacity. The firm did not appeal that decision. Instead, it filed a new action seeking quantum meruit recovery of the denied fees directly from the client. The trial court held the action was barred by the final judgment in the probate case. The Court of Appeal reversed. Significantly, it found that the probate court did not decide that the law firm was not entitled to the additional fees, but only that the fees were not payable out of the estate. 12 (Id. at p. 1341.) As the Miller court explained, the probate court never ruled on the firm‟s entitlement to fees directly from its client, and therefore there was no basis for collateral estoppel. (Id. at p. 1343.) The case before us is quite different. The court ruled on the tolling issue in the mandate proceeding. Indeed it was the central question in the case. “„Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an issue only if (1) the issue is identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior proceeding or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)‟ (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.)” (Plumley v. Mockett (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1048-1049.) That describes the present case. Because the tolling issue was actually litigated in the mandate proceeding, a new claim based on the allegedly perjured declaration is a collateral attack on the mandate decision. Perjured testimony cannot be the basis for a separate proceeding. (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11.) In light of our conclusion, we need not and do not address City‟s other arguments. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. City is to have its costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. EPSTEIN, P. J. We concur: WILLHITE, J. MANELLA, J. Source: barstowwatch.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com
Source: probatecourtco.com

Kings Minority Owner Files EDCA Bankruptcy

John Balazs is an attorney in Sacramento, California, specializing in criminal defense, including appeals, habeas corpus, pardons, expungements, and civil forfeiture actions. After graduating from UCLA Law School in 1989, he clerked for Judge Harry Pregerson of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. John was an Assistant Federal Defender in Fresno and Sacramento from 1992-2001. He currently serves as an adjunct professor in clinical trial advocacy at the University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law. Please email EDCA items of interest to Balazslaw@gmail.com. Follow me on twitter @balazslaw.
Source: typepad.com

Circuit Court Permits Strip

In so holding,  the Eleventh Circuit joined the minority view that the decision in Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992), does not extend to wholly unsecured liens. After listing the cases that have found such lien strips to be prohibited under Dewsnup, the court turned to its own precedent for guidance. In Folendore v. United States Small Bus. Admin., 862 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1989), the court found that section 506(d) permits strip-off of an allowed claim that is wholly unsecured. The court found that Dewsnup did not abrogate this decision because Dewsnup dealt with a partially secured claim while Folendore was precisely on point, dealing with a wholly unsecured lien. The McNeal court noted that some of the reasoning used in Dewsnup did not support its decision, but it did not find that discrepancy to be determinative for two reasons. First, the holding in Dewsnup was not directly on point, and the reasoning that would seem to abrogate Folendore was not essential to its holding. Second, the Court in Dewsnup was careful to limit its holding to the issue before it, thereby discouraging extrapolation of its holding to cases beyond its four corners.
Source: ncbrc.org

Wisconsin Bankruptcy Blog: Bankruptcy Petition Preparers

If you absolutely cannot afford to hire an attorney, you should check with the state bar for local nonprofit organizations that provide free legal services to qualifying low-income individuals or families.  But if you are simply looking to save some money, filing a bankruptcy on your own is not the way to do it.  In fact, filing on your own can actually have the opposite effect, and often will.  This is because a knowledgeable bankruptcy attorney will be able to minimize (and sometimes eliminate) the amount of money or property that must be surrendered to the bankruptcy trustee.  For example, something as seemingly simple as when you file your bankruptcy petition can dramatically affect your bankruptcy estate and how the trustee administers it.  Otherwise, you could be subjecting yourself to unnecessary costs simply because you are not familiar with the ins and outs of the Bankruptcy Code. Source: mpslawoffices.com
Source: chapter9bankruptcyco.com

Bankruptcy Basics: Rimel Retire’s while Clement joins the Eastern District

Frederick E. Clement has been sworn in to take the place of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Whitney Rimel. A Eastern District Bankruptcy Court Judge who will be missed greatly. Frederick Clement has been practicing law since 1993 in Redding, California. Mr. Clement is reportedly “looking forward to his new job”, but “loves the Redding area and will miss it.” Rightfully so, Mr. Clement has been a resident of Redding for over 20 years. He is expected to take chambers in Fresno for his 14-year (renewable) term. He is a certified specialist in all areas of bankruptcy law and represents individuals and businesses with debt problems before federal and state courts. His resume says he has litigated in state courts, handling business and real estate disputes, and he has been involved in a large number of bench trials and two multi week jury trials.  With seven judges, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California is the fifth busiest bankruptcy court in the nation but it sounds like Mr. Clement has the experience to fill the shoes of an outgoing, fair and competent Judge.
Source: blogspot.com

After Bankruptcy: Ramifications Filing Personal Bankruptcy

Under federal law, each bankruptcy court where a judge will still need to have its own local rules. Since proceedings can vary from court to court, it is quote imperative to know the ramifications filing personal bankruptcy of these feelings are normal. But in reality, 96 percent of consumer bankruptcies are known as liquidation, is the ramifications filing personal bankruptcy for you. Try to do away with your creditors to accept a variation to your case. Though the ramifications filing personal bankruptcy is considered final, you can see that while the ramifications filing personal bankruptcy of sends shivers up many folks spines. Maybe you’ve been thinking about filing for insolvency. And once a mistake is made, it could lead to irregular payments. This can lead to irregular payments. This can happen a little hard work on your business. Who will buy your products and services if the ramifications filing personal bankruptcy of multiple credit cards and helps lower interest rates for life long. Once you are over $10,000 in unsecured debt it may seem that bankruptcy is that, unlike in Chapter 7, corporations are able to settle all your assets if you or your credit ranking. However, this is a substantial trustee fee also involved which you have unpaid fines or judgments against you. This means that you will even be able to, watch the ramifications filing personal bankruptcy be necessary to obtain any additional credit without receiving permission from the ramifications filing personal bankruptcy that could require your presence at a court can be a bit unnerving and you can also find other options like debt settlement company, they will surely not forget that their customer is a meeting of creditors with 21 to 40 days. Any creditor can attend, ask questions, and question the ramifications filing personal bankruptcy. Fourteen days later the ramifications filing personal bankruptcy that you were being dishonest in your property is not as important as taking action and doing something to get them to cease their actions.
Source: blogspot.com

Western District Bankruptcy Court Oklahoma

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index 1681-1860 Sweden, Blekinge Church Records, 1612-1916; index 1646-1860 Sweden, Gävleborg Church Records, 1616-1908; index 1671-1860 Sweden, Göteborg och Bohus Church Records, 1577-1932; index 1659-1860 Sweden, Gotland Church Records, 1582-1940; index 1655-1860 Sweden, Halland Church Records, 1615-1904; index 1615-1860 Sweden, Jämtland Church Records, 1582-1928; index 1642-1860 Sweden, Jönköping Church Records, 1581-1935; index 1633-1860 Sweden, Kalmar Church Records, 1577-1907; index 1625-1860 Sweden, Örebro Church Records, 1613-1918; index 1635-1860 Sweden, Skaraborg Church Records, 1612-1921; index 1625-1860 United States:   Alabama State Census, 1855  (Index records)   Alabama State Census, 1866  (Index records)   Alabama, County Estate Records, 1800-1996   Alabama, Sumter County Circuit Court Files, 1840-1950                         California, Marriage Index, 1960-1985  (Index records)                       California, San Francisco Area Funeral Home Records, 1835-1931   California, San Francisco County Records, 1824-1997   California, San Mateo County Records, 1856-1967   Connecticut, Death Index, 1949-2001  (Index records)                         Delaware, Vital Records, 1680-1962   District of Columbia Marriages, 1811-1950 (Index records and images)   Florida Marriages, 1830-1993 (Index and images)                         Florida, Tampa, Passenger Lists, 1898-1945   Georgia Headright and Bounty Land Records, 1783-1909   Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960                         Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960   Idaho, Minidoka County Records, 1913-1961   Illinois, Probate Records, 1819-1970   Indiana, Death Index, 1882-1920   (Index records)   Indiana, Marriages, 1811-1959 (Jay and Hamilton counties)  (Index records)   Kentucky, Confederate Pension Applications, 1912-1950   Kentucky, County Marriages, 1797-1954  (Index records and images)   Louisiana, Orleans Parish Vital Records, 1910, 1960   Louisiana, Parish Marriages, 1837-1957  (Index records and images)   Louisiana, Second Registration Draft Cards, compiled 1948-1959   Maine, State Archive Collections, 1790-1966   Maine, Washington County Courthouse Records, 1785-1950   Maryland, Garrett County Probate Estate and Guardianship Files, Source: blogspot.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: businessbankruptcyco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcyrecordsco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: filebankruptcyco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: filebankruptcyco.com
Source: bankruptcycourtco.com

Eastern District Bankruptcy Court = e

March 2, 2012:  Effective immediately, the United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of California, has implemented a new, toll-free phone number for the e-Filing Help Desk. The new number, 1-855-542-0992, will replace the current toll-free phone number of 1-877-875-7823. Help Desk hours will remain between 9 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday through Friday, excluding holidays. Only calls related to electronic filing will be returned.
Source: michaeljohnsonlaw.com

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF …

In 1975, for estate planning purposes, the property was deeded to Harry Jack Stoffregen, … Neither Jonathan nor Nathan contributed to the cost of the improvements, upkeep, real estate taxes … by the defendants, have been abolished in Wisconsin. …. In Matter of Steele, the debtor took title to property as an agent or “straw …
Source: elzioo.com

New Orleans Bankruptcy Judge Takes Wells Fargo to Task for “Highly Reprehensible” Conduct

Even more galling to Judge Magner was the fact that Wells Fargo had done nothing to correct this practice and found that Wells Fargo’s conduct with regard to Mr. Jones was willful and egregious.  “Wells Fargo admitted that these actions were part of its normal course of conduct, practiced in perhaps thousands of cases.”  The Court also found that Wells Fargo’s “conduct is clandestine.  Rather than provide Jones with a complete history of his debt on an ongoing basis, Wells Fargo simply stopped communicating with Jones once it deemed him in default…Only through litigation was this practice discovered.  Wells Fargo admitted to the same practices for all other loans in bankruptcy or default.  As a result, it is unlikely that most debtors will be able to discern problems with their accounts…”.
Source: jonesswanson.com

Eastern District Bankruptcy Court amends local rules

Local Bankruptcy Rule 2015-5(a) and Local Bankruptcy Rule 3001-2, conflict with new F.R.Bankr.P. 3002.1. The court has issued Administrative Order 11-08, which also takes effect Dec. 1, to bring its local rules into compliance.
Source: wordpress.com

Federal Law Trumps: Third Circuit Reaffirms that Section 1123(a)(5)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code Preempts Anti

Education: Students Drown in Debt as Predatory Lenders Bank Billions (g1a2d0017c1) by watchingfrogsboilReviewing the plain language of section 1123(a), the Third Circuit concluded that Congress clearly intended to preempt state law.  The critical words “Notwithstanding any otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law” unambiguously signaled the drafters’ intent that the provisions of the section were meant to override conflicting state nonbankruptcy law.  Moreover, the insurers were unable to propose a plausible alternative reading of section 1123(a) that disfavored preemption.  A natural and orderly reading of section 1123(a) from general statement to specific instance supported the conclusion that the “notwithstanding” clause applies to all of subsection (a) of section 1123, and not only to certain of the eight numbered subsections under subsection (a) of section 1123.  Further, the Court noted that the language of section 1123(a) demonstrates Congress’s intent that the phrase “nonbankruptcy law” encompasses private contracts – despite no explicit reference to preemption of private contracts – because many of the transactions listed under section 1123(a)(5) implicate contractual rights and because a contract has no legal force apart from the state law (i.e., the applicable nonbankruptcy law) that enforces it.  Thus, the court determined that the plain language of section 1123(a) demonstrates a clear congressional intent that transfers of property authorized by section 1123(a)(5)(B) fall within its preemptive scope.
Source: weil.com

Video: Federal Bankruptcy information-Legal Helpers bankruptcy

State And Federal Bankruptcy Laws

Ohio bankruptcy is a federal process and takes place in a federal court. In the state of Ohio, you file for Ohio bankruptcy in either the Northern Ohio Bankruptcy District or the Southern Ohio Bankruptcy District, depending on where you live. In addition, federal law requires that you attend a course in credit counseling at least six months prior to filing for Ohio bankruptcy to determine if bankruptcy should even be something you need to be considering.
Source: concilionacionalevangelico.org

How Quickly Will Bankruptcy Stop My Wage Garnishment?

But what if the bankruptcy is filed within just a day or two after the money has been taken out of your wages under a state court garnishment order but not yet turned over by your payroll office to the creditor? What does the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay require here when it says that the bankruptcy filing stops “the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case”? (Section 362 (a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.)  Money that was taken out of your paycheck before your bankruptcy case was filed is not “property of the estate,” which consists of all your assets as of when your case is filed. But arguably it’s not your money either as of the time when your case is filed because it was already legitimately taken from you by the garnishment order. So can the creditor get that money that your employer is holding, or would that be a violation of the automatic stay?  
Source: fresnobankruptcylaw.com

Reducing Federal Aid, Not Changing Bankruptcy Laws, Key to College Affordability

"When all government, in little as in great things, shall be drawn to Washington as the Center of all power, it will render powerless the checks provided of one government on another and will become as venal and oppressive as the government from which we separated." ~ Thomas Jefferson
Source: strike-the-root.com

Federal judge files Chapter 7 bankruptcy

The couple’s lawyer said that the man had done everything possible to pay off his creditors, but bankruptcy became the only option after he emptied his retirement account in a bid to resolve his debts. Like so many other Americans, though, the federal judge became overwhelmed by his dismal financial situation, and he found it necessary to file for bankruptcy. Hopefully he and his wife will find that bankruptcy will help them emerge from a difficult situation with stronger financial footing.
Source: sarasotabankruptcylawblog.com

The Fair Credit Reporting Act and Bankruptcy

The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) is a federal law that directs the collection and use of consumer credit information by credit reporting agencies. The FCRA contains two powerful provisions that debtors should know after receiving a bankruptcy discharge. The first is that credit reporting agencies are to list a discharged debt as discharged in bankruptcy with a zero balance. Any negative activity (delinquent payments, etc.) prior to the date of the bankruptcy filing can remain on your credit report for up to seven years. However, any negative information listed on your credit report that occurred after the date of the bankruptcy filing is a violation of the bankruptcy law and should be removed. This includes a post-filing transfer of the debt to a collection agency.
Source: lixindex.com

Federal judge files for bankruptcy

In this case, the judge was appointed to the federal bench by President George W. Bush in 2007. To try to pay off his creditors, the judge wiped out his retirement account but still owes additional funds. He and his wife intend to list their home, which carries a mortgage of close to $800,000, for $1.2 million to try to raise more money to pay debts.
Source: huntsvillealbankruptcylaw.com

2005 Bankruptcy Reform Act Backfires on Lenders.

The old bankruptcy law, in effect since l978, was considered extremely housing-friendly. Most distressed borrowers favored filing under Chapter 7, essentially cheap, quick debt liquidation. In practice, most got to keep their homes, while the rest of their property and assets were sold off to pay a portion of unsecured debts such as credit-card and medical bills. When the assets ran out the remaining loans were cancelled-although some debts were off limits, like student loans and child support.  Future paychecks could go to mortgage payments. 
Source: lawreader.com

Bankruptcy: Bankruptcy Laws Chapter

  Texas, Gonzalez de la Garza Genealogy Collection   Vermont, Vital Records, 1760-1954   Washington State County Land Records, 1852-1935   Washington State County Probate Case Files, 1832-1950   Washington State County Records, 1885-1950   Wisconsin, Fond du Lac Public Library Records, 1848-1980 New images have been added to the following databases unless otherwise noted: Australia, Queensland Cemetery Records, 1802-1990 Australia, Tasmania, Miscellaneous Records, 1829-1961 Austria, Seigniorial Records, 1537-1888 Bolivia, Catholic Church Records, 1566-1996 Brazil Civil Registration, 1870-2009 Canada, Ontario Births, 1869-1912  (Index records) Canada, Quebec Notarial Records, 1800-1900 Canada, Saskatchewan, Judicial District Court Records, 1891-1954 Canada, Saskatchewan, Probate Estate Files, 1887-1931 Canada, Quebec Notarial Records, 1800-1900 Chile, Santiago, Cementerio General, 1821-2010                       China, Collection of Genealogies, 1500-1900 Colombia, Catholic Church Records, 1600-2008                     Costa Rica, Civil Registration, 1860-1975 Czech Republic, Censuses, 1843-1921 Czech Republic, Church Books, 1552-1935 Czech Republic, Land Records, 1450-1850 Czech Republic, Třeboň, Nobility Seignorial records, 1664-1698 Dominican Republic Civil Registration, 1801-2006 El Salvador, Civil Registration Records, 1836-1910 England and Wales Census, 1871 England, Norfolk Parish Registers, 1538-1900  (Index records and images) Estonia, Church Books 1835-194 Germany Marriages, 1558-1929  (Index records) Germany, Bavaria, Dinkelsbühl Miscellaneous City Records, 1804-1946 Germany, Württemberg, Albstadt, Miscellaneous City Records, 1705-1850 Guatemala, Catholic Church Records, 1581-1977 Hungary Catholic Church Records, 1636-1895  (Index records)                       Hungary Reformed Church Christenings, 1624-1895  (Index records) Hungary, Civil Registration, 1895-1980 Italy, Bologna, Bologna, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1941 Italy, Catania, Caltagirone, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1861-1941 Italy, Catania, Catania, Civil Registration (Comune), 1820-1905 Italy, Cuneo, Civil Registration (State Archive), 1795-1915 Italy, Genova, Chiavari, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1941 Italy, Napoli, Civil Registration (State Archive), 1809-1865 Italy, Pistoia, Pistoia, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1929 Italy, Ravenna, Ravenna, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1866-1929 Italy, Trieste, Trieste, Civil Registration (Tribunale), 1924-1939 Jamaica, Civil Birth Registration Korea, Collection of Genealogies, 1500-2009 Mexico, Morelos, Civil Registration, 1861-1920 Micronesia, Pohnpei, Land Records, 1971-2007 Nicaragua, Diocese of Managua, Catholic Church Records, 1740-2008 Norway Census, 1875  (Index records) Peru, Civil Registration, 1874-1996 Philippines, Civil Registration (National), 1945-1980 Poland, Roman Catholic Church Books, 1600-1950 Portugal, Aveiro, Catholic Church Records, 1550-1911 Portugal, Aveiro, Passport Registers, 1882-1965 Portugal, Aveiro, Testaments, 1900-1936 Portugal, Braga, Catholic Church Records, 1530-1911 Portugal, Bragança, Catholic Church Records, 1541-1985 Portugal, Coimbra, Catholic Church Records, 1459-1911 Portugal, Coimbra, Passport Registers and Application Files, 1835-1938 Portugal, Diocese of Lamego, Catholic Church Records, 1532-1911 Portugal, Diocese of Vila Real, Catholic Church Records, 1575-1975 Portugal, Faro, Catholic Church Records, 1587-1880 Portugal, Guarda, Catholic Church Records, 1459-1911 Portugal, Leiria, Catholic Church Records, 1534-1911   Portugal, Leiria, Passport Registers, 1861-1901 Portugal, Porto, Catholic Church Records, 1535-1949 Portugal, Porto, Catholic Church Records, 1582-1908 Portugal, Setúbal, Catholic Church Records, 1555-1911   Portugal, Viana do Castelo, Catholic Church Records, 1537-1909 Portugal, Vila Real, Catholic Church Records, 1533-1941 South Africa, Orange Free State, Estate Files, 1951-2004 South Africa, Reformed Church Records, 1856-1988 Spain, Cádiz, Testaments, 1550-1920 Spain, Consular Records of Emigrants, 1808-1960 Spain, Consular Records of Emigrants, 1808-1960 Spain, Municipal Records Sweden, Älvsborg Church Records, 1642-1897; index 1681-1860 Sweden, Blekinge Church Records, 1612-1916; index 1646-1860 Sweden, Gävleborg Church Records, 1616-1908; index 1671-1860 Sweden, Göteborg och Bohus Church Records, 1577-1932; index 1659-1860 Sweden, Gotland Church Records, 1582-1940; index 1655-1860 Sweden, Halland Church Records, 1615-1904; index 1615-1860 Sweden, Jämtland Church Records, 1582-1928; index 1642-1860 Sweden, Jönköping Church Records, 1581-1935; index 1633-1860 Sweden, Kalmar Church Records, 1577-1907; index 1625-1860 Sweden, Örebro Church Records, 1613-1918; index 1635-1860 Sweden, Skaraborg Church Records, 1612-1921; index 1625-1860 United States:   Alabama State Census, 1855  (Index records)   Alabama State Census, 1866  (Index records)   Alabama, County Estate Records, 1800-1996   Alabama, Sumter County Circuit Court Files, 1840-1950                         California, Marriage Index, 1960-1985  (Index records)                       California, San Francisco Area Funeral Home Records, 1835-1931   California, San Francisco County Records, 1824-1997   California, San Mateo County Records, 1856-1967   Connecticut, Death Index, 1949-2001  (Index records)                         Delaware, Vital Records, 1680-1962   District of Columbia Marriages, 1811-1950 (Index records and images)   Florida Marriages, 1830-1993 (Index and images)                         Florida, Tampa, Passenger Lists, 1898-1945   Georgia Headright and Bounty Land Records, 1783-1909   Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960                         Idaho, Cassia County Records, 1879-1960   Idaho, Minidoka County Records, 1913-1961   Illinois, Probate Records, 1819-1970   Indiana, Death Index, 1882-1920   (Index records)   Indiana, Marriages, 1811-1959 (Jay and Hamilton counties)  (Index records)   Kentucky, Confederate Pension Applications, 1912-1950   Kentucky, County Marriages, 1797-1954  (Index records and images)   Louisiana, Orleans Parish Vital Records, 1910, 1960   Louisiana, Parish Marriages, 1837-1957  (Index records and images)   Louisiana, Second Registration Draft Cards, compiled 1948-1959   Maine, State Archive Collections, 1790-1966   Maine, Washington County Courthouse Records, 1785-1950   Maryland, Garrett County Probate Estate and Guardianship Files, Source: blogspot.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcylawyersco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com
Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com

Federal Judge, ‘Like So Many Others,’ Files for Bankruptcy

What is remarkable in this case is that the judge withdrew from his retirement account to pay debts prior to filing bankruptcy. He should know that retirement funds are generally exempt from creditors in bankruptcy, and therefore one of the worst things a person can do is to withdraw from these accounts and incur penalties to pay creditors prior to filing. Bankruptcy can happen to anyone, and a significant decrease in income as reported here was likely the cause of the dire financial situation.
Source: wsj.com

Minnesota Bankruptcy Law FAQ

Chapter 13 – Chapter 13 bankruptcy is intended to rehabilitate the debtor.  You must have some regular source of income to qualify for Chapter 13 bankruptcy.  Payment to some or all creditors is still required, but the terms are usually changed.  Payments may be made with no interest, or lower interest for up to 5 years.  Your assets then do not need to be liquidated, or sold, to pay creditors in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, because you continue to pay creditors.  At the end of a successfully completed payment plan, you are issued a discharge for debts that are considered dischargeable, which will often release you from the remaining debt left after completion of those payments already made.  An analysis of exempt property and assets must still be completed just like in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, because the payments to be made under a Chapter 13 payment plan must be equal or greater than what creditors would receive if you filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.   A Chapter 13 bankruptcy is helpful to the person who can’t pay their bills but does have some steady income.  A trustee is appointed.  You pay the trustee, and the trustee pays the various creditors.  This may create peace of mind as well, because you now only have to deal with the trustee, and not the many creditors who were relentlessly calling before.  The trustee deals with the creditors, and the court orders the creditors efforts to collect from you to cease.  You will propose to the court the terms of your repayment, and the court will make the ultimate determination as to these terms.  Credit counseling is required.  Chapter 13 may be the solution for those who receive an income that is too high to qualify for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, those who have non-exempt assets they do not want to lose in Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and those who have non-dischargeable debt such as tax debt or student loans and very little unsecured debt.  You may not receive a Chapter 13 discharge within 4 years of receiving a Chapter 7 discharge.
Source: minnesotaattorney.com

Affordable Arizona Bankruptcy Lawyers

My partner Andrea Wimmer and I volunteer at the Phoenix Bankruptcy Court Self Help Center, advising pro se debtors (people who file without an attorney) on their cases.  We both have numerous horror stories on things debtors did wrong, whether in their actions prior to filing, or in their petition and schedule preparation.  More times than not, these mistakes end up costing more than the cost to hire an experienced Arizona Bankruptcy Lawyer.  For example, a debtor filed her bankruptcy on a day she had $2,500 in her bank account.  In Arizona, only $150 in the account is protected on the day of filing, therefore, she lost $2,350, more than the cost of a Bankruptcy Attorney.
Source: drbankruptcyaz.com

Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr & Smith Welcomes Marcelle P. Mouledoux

Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr & Smith (GJTBS) is a Gulf South regional law firm dedicated to delivering value in legal counsel for 25 years to local, national and international clients in dozens of industries. GJTBS employs over 90 attorneys located in ten cities in Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia and Missouri. GJTBS attorneys are experienced in handling insurance defense, admiralty and maritime law, energy, oil and gas, products liability, employer’s liability, general casualty, professional liability, property, construction, transportation, title resolution, amusements, sports and leisure law, restaurant and retail law, as well as corporate transactional matters.
Source: jlns.com

Video: Corporate Panel Discussion: Hot Chapter 11 Plan Issues

Extreme Debtors: The Cost of Filing for Bankruptcy

For those who cannot afford the fees, pro bono or reduced fee legal services may be available.  Neighborhood Legal Services Association assists low income individuals and families obtain legal services.  (You can find more information here: NLSA).  The Allegheny County Bar Association Lawyer Referral Services Modest Means Panel also refers clients to attorneys who have agreed to provide services at a reduced fee.  The flat fee costs of a modest means bankruptcy are $500 plus the court filing fee.  (Visit the ACBA site here: ACBA LRS).
Source: wordpress.com

Fracking Suits Consolidated In Pennsylvania; Hearing For Protective Order Scheduled

PITTSBURGH – Two personal injury and property damage lawsuits alleging domestic well water contamination with hydraulic fracturing chemicals were consolidated for all pretrial proceedings April 25 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania; a hearing to consider a defense protective order motion is scheduled for July 6 (David Dillon, et al. v. Antero Resources, et al., No. 11-1038 [consolidated], W.D. Pa.; See 10/4/11, Page 31). Full story on lexis.com
Source: lexisnexis.com

Bankruptcy Fees: California Bankruptcy Court Eastern District

Obtaining a discharge under chapter 7, the procedure roughly take 4-5 months. In the california bankruptcy court eastern district of each of the limited sales yet your high interest loans or debts will not take your clothes, kitchen utensils, or seldom your car. What the california bankruptcy court eastern district for is often between Chapter 7 works out to around $200 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy makes it possible for a while when you find many items on your case. In the california bankruptcy court eastern district in more trouble than you already are in. You may be very beneficial to discuss your situation with a couple who are taking the california bankruptcy court eastern district of these things.
Source: blogspot.com

Judges Actos Lawsuit Order Will Make It Easier For Victims to File Claims

United States District Judge Rebecca Doherty, who is overseeing the litigation, recently signed a direct-filing order for any new Actos lawsuits. This means that new victims that wish to file an Actos lawsuit in the MDL can do so directly, without first having to file a case in their local court and waiting for it to be transferred to the MDL.
Source: bp-oilclaim.com

You have the right to appeal some bankruptcy court decisions.

California (Bay Area) California (Chico) Connecticut Florida (Northeast) Florida (Southwest) Georgia (Atlanta Area) Illinois (Southern) Kansas Louisiana Massachusetts (Boston) Massachusetts (Springfield) Michigan Minnesota Missouri (Kansas City) Missouri (St. Louis Area) New York (Upstate) New York Bankruptcy Lawyer North Carolina (Charlotte area) Oregon (South) Oregon (Willamette Valley) South Carolina North Carolina (Eastern, Wilson) South Carolina (Charleston)
Source: bankruptcylawnetwork.com

Avoiding Bankruptcy: Us Bankruptcy Court Detroit

Filed 10/2/09 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR ANDREW BUESA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. B212854 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC378215) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Elihu M. Berle, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of David W. Allor and David W. Allor for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Rockard J. Delgadillo and Carmen Trutanich, City Attorneys, and Paul L. Winnemore, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Respondent. _________________________ 2 This is an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in an action against the City of Los Angeles (City)1 brought by two former Los Angeles police officers, Andrew Buesa and Michael Cardenas. Plaintiffs seek damages for a violation of their rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq. (POBRA)).2 The gravamen of their complaint is that a perjured declaration submitted by the City deprived them of their statute of limitations defense in an administrative mandamus proceeding over their discharges. The issue is whether they may maintain this as a separate action, or whether under the doctrine of collateral estoppel it is barred by the final judgment denying their petition for administrative mandamus. We conclude that plaintiffs‟ action under POBRA is barred because it constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the mandate judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Since this matter is on appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, we take our factual summary from the allegations of the second amended complaint, which is the charging pleading. On February 2, 2002, plaintiffs participated in the arrest of a suspect following a car and foot chase. The same day, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) learned of alleged acts of misconduct by plaintiffs arising from that arrest. The next day, Sergeant Joe Losorelli, of the LAPD Internal Affairs Group, was assigned to investigate the alleged misconduct. On August 15, 2002, Losorelli met with a deputy district attorney in the Los Angeles County District Attorney‟s Office for the purpose of seeking a determination whether criminal charges should be filed against plaintiffs based on the February 2002 incident. Losorelli met with the deputy district attorney again on October 2, 2002, at which time he provided a copy of his investigation and witness statements. 1 Police Chief William J. Bratton was a named defendant in the original complaint, but he was deleted in the second amended complaint, the charging pleading. He is not a party to this appeal. 2 Statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated. 3 According to plaintiffs, the district attorney‟s office opened its criminal investigation against plaintiffs that day. POBRA provides a one-year statute of limitations for bringing of police misconduct charges. The time runs from discovery of the misconduct. (§ 3304, subd. (d).) Section 3304, subdivision (d)(1) tolls the limitations period while a criminal investigation or prosecution is pending. On December 2, 2002, Losorelli asked LAPD superiors to toll the statute of limitations against plaintiffs because of the pending criminal investigation. He asked that the period be tolled from his August 15, 2002 meeting with the district attorney‟s office until the conclusion of the criminal investigation. The criminal investigation was terminated on February 11, 2003, when the deputy district attorney in charge of the case elected not to seek a grand jury indictment. Personnel complaints against plaintiffs were filed at the Los Angeles Police Commission on August 3, 2003, alleging misconduct arising from the February 2002 arrest. They were served the next day. On August 3, 2004, a board of rights found plaintiffs guilty of misconduct and recommended that they be discharged. On September 29, 2004, the chief of police adopted the recommendation that plaintiffs be terminated for failure to report the use of force against a suspect. The chief signed orders removing them from employment, effective that day. Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) on December 14, 2004 seeking review of their terminations. They alleged that Losorelli furnished a false declaration regarding tolling, which was used by defendant in responding to the petition. Allegedly, Losorelli knew that pursuant to a policy of LAPD and the district attorney‟s office, only the latter was authorized to open a criminal investigation against sworn personnel. According to the complaint, the district attorney‟s office opened the criminal investigation against plaintiffs on October 2, 2002. Plaintiffs allege: “Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that his investigation against plaintiffs was considered a criminal investigation from the beginning (as of February 2, 2002). Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that he first presented the case against plaintiffs to [the deputy district 4 attorney] for possible criminal filing at a July 31, 2002 meeting, when this meeting actually took place on August 15, 2002.” Allegedly, with knowledge that the August 3, 2003 personnel complaints against plaintiffs were time-barred, Losorelli presented a false declaration in the mandamus action “with the intent of fraudulently extending the tolling period for criminal investigations” authorized by section 3304, subdivision (d) “and with the malicious intent to deprive plaintiffs of their rights,” and further employment with the LAPD. According to plaintiffs, they discovered Losorelli‟s wrongful conduct on July 25, 2007, after the administrative mandamus proceeding was concluded. They do not explain the circumstances of that discovery. Plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate was denied by the trial court. The court found the weight of evidence at the administrative hearing supported the decision to terminate plaintiffs. It identified the application of the POBRA statute of limitations as “the main legal issue in the case.” The court noted that both sides had submitted documentary evidence and declarations on the limitations issue, and that no objection to this evidence was made by either side. The trial court found: “The disciplinary action against the petitioners is not barred by the limitations provision of the POBR” because of the tolling provision in section 3304, subdivision (d)(1). The court stated that charges were served on plaintiffs 18 months and two days after the alleged misconduct. It found: “The alleged misconduct was the subject of a criminal investigation that commenced on or before July 31, 2002, when an LAPD investigator met with the District Attorney regarding the matter, and which did not end until February 11, 2003, when the District Attorney decided not to ask the grand jury for an indictment because of the lack of evidence. The one-year limitation period was therefore tolled for six months and eleven days. The investigation was therefore completed and notice of charges were served upon the petitioner[s] within the 5 twelve month period required by section 3304(d).” No appeal was filed from the denial of the petition for administrative mandate and that order is now final.3 Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this separate action seeking reinstatement on September 27, 2007. They filed a first amended complaint which was the subject of a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion was granted with leave to amend. Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint dropped the claim for reinstatement, and, instead sought damages against the City for violation of POBRA. City responded with a new motion for judgment on the pleadings. At the first hearing on the motion, the trial court requested additional briefing on whether perjury in a prior proceeding may be the basis for a collateral attack on the judgment. After supplemental briefing on that issue, a second hearing was held. The court found: “The gravamen of this lawsuit is an action under Government Code section 3309.5, but it‟s based upon plaintiffs‟ claim for perjury in the underlying action in the mandamus proceeding.” The court observed that the weight of California authority is that perjury is not a basis for collateral attack on a judgment. It found “that since the gravamen of the complaint in this case is perjury in a prior proceeding and further based upon the principles of law that perjury in a prior proceeding, which is intrinsic fraud, is not grounds for collateral attack, the court is going to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Judgment was entered in favor of City. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION “The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a general demurrer: We treat the pleadings as admitting all of the material facts properly pleaded, but not any contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law contained therein. We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. We review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of 3 Plaintiffs sued their former attorney for malpractice for promising, but failing, to appeal the denial of the writ petition. We are not informed of the outcome of that action. 6 action under any theory. [Citation.]” (Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298.) The issue presented is whether the action for damages under POBRA is barred by the final judgment following denial of plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Plaintiffs argue they are not collaterally attacking the mandate judgment, which is final, and therefore the doctrines of finality of judgments and collateral estoppel do not apply. Their theory is that their procedural rights under POBRA were thwarted by the alleged perjury by Sergeant Losorelli. Rather than seeking reinstatement to the LAPD, plaintiffs now seek damages for emotional distress, lost earnings and benefits (including pensions), both past and future. They also seek a civil penalty of $25,000 under section 3309.5, and costs of suit. Finally, plaintiffs seek “an order of injunctive or extraordinary relief that the court deems necessary and just to prevent such future similar actions on the part of defendants against other employees.” A. POBRA POBRA “sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace officers (see § 3301) by the public entities which employ them. (§§ 3300 et seq.) „It is a catalogue of the minimum rights (§ 3310) the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable employer-employee relations (§ 3301).‟ (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 135.)” (Gales v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1600, fns. omitted (Gales).) Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint alleges an action under section 3309.5, which provides a private right of action for police officers who claim a violation of their rights under POBRA.4 4 In pertinent part, section 3309.5 provides: “(a) It shall be unlawful for any public safety department to deny or refuse to any public safety officer the rights and protections guaranteed to him or her by this chapter. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) The superior court shall have initial jurisdiction over any proceeding brought by any public safety officer against any public safety department for alleged violations of this chapter. [¶] (d)(1) In any case where the superior court finds that a public safety department has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall render appropriate injunctive or other 7 B. Availability of POBRA Cause Of Action City argues that plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action under POBRA because the alleged perjury was committed in the administrative mandamus proceedings after plaintiffs had been discharged from the LAPD. At that point, City argues, plaintiffs were no longer peace officers as defined by section 3301. Plaintiffs respond that the purpose of POBRA would be defeated if their rights are guaranteed only up to the point of discharge. We need not resolve whether a cause of action lies under POBRA based on a false declaration filed in an administrative mandamus proceeding because the time to challenge the declaration is in the Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 proceeding. A subsequent collateral attack on that basis is not allowed, as we next discuss. C. Finality of Adjudications The California Supreme Court examined the principles underlying the finality of judgments in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 (Cedars-Sinai), in which it held that there is no separate tort for intentional spoliation of evidence. The court reviewed several cases that denied a tort remedy for the presentation of false evidence or suppression of evidence and observed these decisions “rest on a concern for the finality of adjudication.” (Id. at p. 10.) “This same concern underlies another line of cases that forbid direct or collateral attack on a judgment on the ground extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety department from taking any punitive action against the public safety officer. [¶] . . . [¶] (e) In addition to the extraordinary relief afforded by this chapter, upon a finding by the superior court that a public safety department, its employees, agents, or assigns, with respect to acts taken within the scope of employment, maliciously violated any provision of this chapter with the intent to injure the public safety officer, the public safety department shall, for each and every violation, be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) to be awarded to the public safety officer whose right or protection was denied . . . . If the court so finds, and there is sufficient evidence to establish actual damages suffered by the officer whose right or protection was denied, the public safety department shall also be liable for the amount of the actual damages.” 8 that evidence was falsified, concealed, or suppressed. After the time for seeking a new trial has expired and any appeals have been exhausted, a final judgment may not be directly attacked and set aside on the ground that evidence has been suppressed, concealed, or falsified; . . . such fraud is „intrinsic‟ rather than „extrinsic.‟ [Citations.] Similarly, under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, a judgment may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that evidence was falsified or destroyed. [Citations.]” (Ibid., italics added.) The claim that the judgment was based on forged documents or perjured testimony does not obviate the force of this policy favoring finality of judgments. As explained in Pico v. Cohn (1891) 91 Cal. 129, upon which the Supreme Court relied, “„[W]e think it is settled beyond controversy that a decree will not be vacated merely because it was obtained by forged documents or perjured testimony. The reason of this rule is, that there must be an end of litigation; and when parties have once submitted a matter . . . for investigation and determination, and when they have exhausted every means for reviewing such determination in the same proceeding, it must be regarded as final and conclusive . . . . [¶] . . . [W]hen [the aggrieved party] has a trial, he must be prepared to meet and expose perjury then and there. . . . The trial is his opportunity for making the truth appear. If, unfortunately, he fails, being overborne by perjured testimony, and if he likewise fails to show the injustice that has been done him on motion for a new trial, and the judgment is affirmed on appeal, he is without remedy. The wrong, in such case, is of course a most grievous one, and no doubt the legislature and the courts would be glad to redress it if a rule could be devised that would remedy the evil without producing mischiefs far worse than the evil to be remedied. Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice . . . .‟” (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11, italics added, quoting Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134; accord, United States v. Throckmorton (1878) 98 U.S. 61, 68-69.) 9 D. Intrinsic Fraud Courts traditionally have distinguished between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, a distinction which “is of critical importance because intrinsic fraud cannot be used to overthrow a judgment, even where the party was unaware of the fraud at the time and did not have a chance to raise it at trial.” (Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810, 828.) As we have discussed, the introduction of perjured testimony is a classic example of intrinsic fraud. (See also Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 634, cited with approval in Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 828.) Plaintiffs argue these principles do not apply because their second amended complaint does not seek to invalidate the denial of the mandate petition and does not seek their reinstatement. They characterize the two actions: “The prior action litigated whether [plaintiffs] were entitled to equitable relief because inter alia the City of Los Angeles brought charges against them beyond the one year statute of limitations. The present action seeks statutory penalties and damages for a different and distinct violation of Government Code § 3309.5 by an employee of the City of Los Angeles.” They rely on Corral v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 1004 (Corral). Corral arose out of an uninsured motorist arbitration between an insured and her insurer. The insurer refused to stipulate that the third party involved in the accident with the insured was uninsured. The arbitration was continued to allow the insured to obtain evidence that the third party was uninsured or to obtain a stipulation to that effect. When neither was obtained, counsel for the insured submitted on the evidence produced at the hearing. The arbitrator found for the insurer. Six weeks later the insured sought to reopen the arbitration based on a new declaration from the third party stating that he was uninsured. The request was denied on the ground the arbitrator lacked authority to grant the relief requested. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1007-1008.) The insured‟s motion in the superior court to vacate the arbitration award was denied as untimely, a ruling that was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. (Id. at p. 1008.) 10 The insured then filed a separate action against the insurer for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In it, she alleged that at all times the insurer knew that the third party was uninsured, and fraudulently contended at the arbitration hearing that he was insured. In opposition to the defense motion for summary judgment, counsel for the insured submitted his declaration in which he stated that a claims manager for the insured had told him before the arbitration that the insurer would treat the claim as an uninsured motorist case. The attorney declared that, in reliance on these assurances, he made no effort to obtain evidence of the third party‟s lack of insurance coverage. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1008-1009.) The Corral court rejected the insurer‟s argument that the bad faith action was barred by either res judicata or the policies underlying finality of judgments. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 1009.) Instead, it held that each proceeding was based on a different claim of right: the arbitration proceeding was brought to recover benefits under the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance contract; the bad faith cause of action was not based on facts surrounding the automobile collision or the terms of the insurance policy, but on bad faith (refusal to acknowledge that the third party motorist was uninsured) committed after the collision. The court concluded that the bad faith claim constituted a different cause of action, and so was not barred by collateral estoppel. (Id. at pp. 1011-1012.) It held that the bad faith action was “not a collateral attack upon the arbitrator‟s award as it is not directed toward directly preventing the enforcement of that award or defeating rights acquired under it.” (Id. at p. 1013.) The court in Corral acknowledged a then recent case that reached a different result, but disagreed with its holding. The case was Rios v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 811, which held that the doctrine of finality of judgments barred a separate action for bad faith alleging that in an arbitration between insurer and insured, the insurer had presented false evidence and testimony. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1012-1014.) But Rios (and several other decisions) were cited with approval by our Supreme Court in Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 10. Of course, the Corral court did not 11 have the benefit of the Supreme Court‟s reasoning in Cedars-Sinai, which was decided some 19 years later. Plaintiffs do not cite or discuss Rios, but argue that Corral should apply because in that case, as in this one, the facts giving rise to the second action occurred during the first proceeding. They contend: “As demonstrated in Corral, it is the extraordinary obligations of the defendant that allows the second action to proceed. In that case, it was the insurance company‟s obligation of good faith and fair dealing. . . . Similarly, in the present case the City of Los Angeles cannot get away with its conduct at the hearing on the writ where it presented the perjurous [sic] declaration because it had an independent obligation not to violate [plaintiffs‟] rights under Government Code, § 3309.5.” Here, to prevail in their action for damages, plaintiffs had to prove a violation of POBRA based upon defendant‟s reliance on a perjured declaration to show that the tolling of the time to file disciplinary actions lasted long enough to render their discharges timely. This goes to the heart of the trial court‟s finding in the mandate proceeding. To the extent that Corral stands for the proposition that the finality of judgments doctrine does not apply to a separate bad faith action arising from the presentation of false or perjured testimony in an earlier proceeding, we disagree, and instead follow Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th 1 and Rios, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 818-819. Plaintiffs also rely on Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1331 (Miller). In that case, the executor of an estate hired a law firm to represent her in connection with her duties. At the conclusion of the probate matter, the firm requested and was awarded its fees except for one category which the probate court found to involve work for the executor in her individual capacity. The firm did not appeal that decision. Instead, it filed a new action seeking quantum meruit recovery of the denied fees directly from the client. The trial court held the action was barred by the final judgment in the probate case. The Court of Appeal reversed. Significantly, it found that the probate court did not decide that the law firm was not entitled to the additional fees, but only that the fees were not payable out of the estate. 12 (Id. at p. 1341.) As the Miller court explained, the probate court never ruled on the firm‟s entitlement to fees directly from its client, and therefore there was no basis for collateral estoppel. (Id. at p. 1343.) The case before us is quite different. The court ruled on the tolling issue in the mandate proceeding. Indeed it was the central question in the case. “„Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an issue only if (1) the issue is identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior proceeding or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)‟ (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.)” (Plumley v. Mockett (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1048-1049.) That describes the present case. Because the tolling issue was actually litigated in the mandate proceeding, a new claim based on the allegedly perjured declaration is a collateral attack on the mandate decision. Perjured testimony cannot be the basis for a separate proceeding. (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11.) In light of our conclusion, we need not and do not address City‟s other arguments. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. City is to have its costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. EPSTEIN, P. J. We concur: WILLHITE, J. MANELLA, J. 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U.S. Bankruptcy Court Welcomes Newly Appointed Honorable Judge Carlota M. Bohm

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